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ABSTRACT: 
Despite the DPRK’s geostrategic relevance and destabilizing role in the most economically 
dynamic region of the world, the EU lacks a clear strategy for involvement in and engagement 
with this country. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative analysis, this thesis aims to unveil both internal 
contradictions hindering the definition of a coherent and effective EU foreign policy vis-à-vis 
the DPRK, and discrepancies between the perceptions of EU actors and those of external 
stakeholders. 
Important coherence shortcomings and expectation gaps were detected, both among insiders’ 
views and between them and those of South Korean future leaders – even affecting the 
promotion of human rights. 
RESUM: 
Malgrat la rellevància estratègica i el paper desestabilitzador de Corea del Nord a la regió 
econòmicament més dinàmica del món, la UE no compta amb cap estratègia clara per 
involucrar-se amb aquest país. 
Combinant tècniques d’anàlisi qualitatives i quantitatives, aquest treball pretén descobrir 
possibles contradiccions internes que impedeixin la definició d'una política exterior europea 
coherent i efectiva amb respecte a Corea del Nord, així com discrepàncies entre les percepcions 
d’actors interns de la UE i les d’actors externs. 
S'han detectat importants diferències d’expectatives i mancances en termes de coherència, tant 
entre les visions expressades pels actors interns com entre les opinions d’aquests actors i les dels 
futurs líders sudcoreans enquestats – diferències que fins i tot afecten la promoció dels drets 
humans. 
KEYWORDS:  
north korea, dprk, northeast asia, eu-dprk relations, eu-korea relations, expectation gaps, cfsp, 
human rights, coherence and cohesion 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is undeniable that the Western press and publics have a soft spot for North Korea, the 
small country that is also the great unknown of Northeast Asia. A month never goes by 
without some fresh news or speculation on the latest exploits, trends, threats or abuses 
from the Pyongyang regime, including speculation about both the status of the young 
lady who had been seen next to the new leader, Kim Jong-un,1 or the possible political 
implications of the apparent expansion in the use of miniskirts and high heels by 
fashion-conscious Pyongyang young women.2 
 
Even if the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the most 
challenging countries that European Union (EU) policy could be directed towards 
(Barabesi, 2009), the EU’s North Korea policies do not hit the headlines, despite 
tensions running high in the most economically dynamic and one of the most politically 
unstable regions of the world and the fact that EU External action, under the auspices of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its security arm, the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the newly-minted European External Action 
Service (EEAS) and the related European Commission Directorate Generals (DGs), 
such as TRADE, DEVCO or ECHO, should be one of the key features of an 
increasingly powerful and coordinated European Union (Berkofsky, 2009). 
 
Favoring less-developed nations and helping them reap the benefits of globalization and 
modernization while promoting values such as democracy, human rights, good 
governance and sustainable development can be distinguished as a relevant feature of 
the European Union as an international normative actor, one able to make something 
previously exceptional the norm in international relations (Manners, 2002).  
 
                                                            
1 The mystery was finally resolved in July 25, when the Korea Central News Agency reported that the 
lady was Ri Sol-ju, Kim Jong-un’s wife. Despite sounding irrelevant to most casual observers, this news 
item could well be considered historic because the regime had never previously shown the leaders with 
their wives in public – secrecy in those issues went as far as never explaining the public if Kim Jong-il 
was married or had children before Kim Jong-un was introduced as the heir apparent in 2010. 
2 Both news items made headlines during the month of July 2012. For a more detailed account, see “Who 
is North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's 'mystery woman'” (Williamson, 2012) or “North Korea Experts 
Can See a Lot in a Hemline” (Choe, 2012a). 
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In fact, the EU could also be considered as one of the few international actors capable of 
exerting both relational and structural power via its foreign policy, the former – a 
concept loaned from the Lockean tradition – referring to the power of a given actor to 
get another actor to do something it would not otherwise do, and the latter referring to 
the authority and capacity to set or shape the organizing principles and rules of the game 
and to determine how others will play that game (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 
24). Moreover, further from this rule-setting role, the EU should also strive to act both 
as a global rule negotiator – in other words, an player in international negotiations, 
including in complex and distant regional setups such as Northeast Asia’s – and as a 
global rule implementer – the instrumental role the EU should play to fulfill its stated 
desire of developing effective multilateralism. 
 
After 9-11, the EU came to see East Asia not only as the most lucrative emerging region 
but also as a cluster of political and strategic partners in a rising multipolar international 
system. The translation of this realization was the 2001 document Europe and Asia: A 
Strategic Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, which highlighted six key objectives 
of the EU in relation to East Asia (Ohn, 2009): i) the promotion of peace and security 
and the region and globally; ii) mutual trade and investment flows; iii) development of 
the less prosperous countries of the regions by addressing the root causes of poverty; iv) 
human rights protection, spreading of democracy, good governance and rule of law; v) 
global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries; and vi) strengthen the awareness 
of Europe in Asia and vice versa. 
 
With its numerous states and different economic, political and social systems, Asia 
represents an interesting challenge for the EU in its quest to effectively, consistently and 
uniformly developing its foreign policy (Barabesi, 2009). A crucial political, economic 
and cultural partner for the EU, it accounts for more than half of the world’s population, 
a quarter of the economic wealth created every year, and is home to four of the twelve 
largest economies in the world (Japan, China, India and South Korea); yet countries 
such as North Korea remain among the poorest in the world.  
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Despite developing a pragmatic and supposedly proactive engagement policy to 
maximize soft power efficiency,3 the EU still lacks appropriate foreign policy 
instruments, chiefly in the security and political areas, which would allow it to influence 
international politics in the region. Ohn (2009) also points out that one of the defining 
traits of EU policy towards East Asia in the post-Cold War era has been a growing 
interdependence and partnership. There is, however, one clear exception to the rule: the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.4 
 
Despite its Strategic Partnership with the three great economic powers of the region and 
the enhanced visibility it should afford (Grevi, 2012), the EU is not a major political 
actor in the present situation of tension and confrontation in Northeast Asia, as it is not 
located near the region in question nor does it have vested interests in North Korea. It is 
nonetheless involved and remains a player that tries to bring a constructive approach to 
the problems that afflict North Korea, both internally and externally (Barabesi, 2009).  
 
Back in the early 2000s, the climate was one of widespread but moderate optimism. A 
strategy paper for North Korea was drafted in 2002 by the European Commission. In 
2003, when EU cooperation with North Korea was still rather active – at least compared 
to current standards –, Berkofsky still argued that EU-North Korea relations “do not 
make headlines,” even adding that the EU’s role right before Pyongyang revealed it 
pretended to acquire nuclear weapons in 2002 was “marginal.” Meanwhile, EU policy-
makers and officials stressed that their “quiet diplomacy” approach was based upon 
policies and initiatives that would complement South Korea’s "Sunshine Policy” 
(Berkofsky, 2003). These policies gravitated around humanitarian assistance, food aid 
and technical assistance, together with the EU-DPRK political dialogue set up in the 
late 1990s.  
 
                                                            
3 This particular approach, incomplete as it might appear, has been praised as the most effective and 
efficient by many East Asian leaders, who allegedly believe that a more prominent and visible European 
engagement in Asian “hard security” issues could never be as constructive and promoting security as 
Brussels’ “soft security” policies in Asia (Berkofsky, 2010). 
4 In that sense, despite growing disputes and uncertainties in what increasingly looks like a deadlock 
situation with China and, in particular, regarding the long overdue drafting of a new Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, relations – both economic and political – and overall engagement with Beijing 
has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War. 
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Lack of economic and political progress, combined with North Korea's nuclear 
program, instantly and severely hurt any attempt at enhanced cooperation the EU might 
have tried. Nowadays, it remains unlikely that Brussels will resume the ambitious and 
comprehensive economic engagement course and policies formulated and partly 
implemented in the early 2000s. As argued by Berkofsky (2009), Brussels would de-
facto have to start from scratch engaging North Korea economically should the 
Commission one day decide to resume these programs. 
 
But what is currently going on in North Korea that might prompt the EU to enhance its 
cooperation with the unruly regime? Progressive economic modernization might be one 
possible answer: Kim Jong-un’s appointment as the new leader has seemingly been 
accompanied by a stated emphasis on improving agricultural productivity and boosting 
light industry, as well as developing the now-decrepit Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
in the north of the country in order to lure foreign direct investment. Kim Jong-un has 
also stepped up his high-profile activities designed to focus attention on the economy 
and domestic policy. His actions have stressed the importance of keeping up with 
"global trends" in the areas of technology and light industry (Gause, 2012). 
 
However, ambivalence and doubts remain. After a rather promising start, culminated 
with the Leap Day agreement they reached with the U.S. on 29 February 2012, the 
failed launch of a long-range missile (camouflaged as a space rocket) and scaled-up 
anti-ROK rhetoric have put the international community back at the defensive and 
prompted the U.S. to declare the deal, which was to provide substantive food aid to 
Pyongyang, to be void. Moreover, the DPRK has revised its constitution by early 2012 
to add three new sentences, one of them being “National Defense Commission 
Chairman Kim Jong-il has turned our fatherland into an invincible state of political 
ideology, a nuclear-armed state and an indomitable military power, paving the ground 
for the construction of a strong and prosperous nation” (Yonhap News Agency, 2012). 
 
Apparently, young leader Kim Jong-un is making all the necessary adjustments to 
consolidate his grip on power. On 15 July 2012, North Korea announced that powerful 
Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho had been removed from his posts. Just three days later, Kim 
Jong-un was given the title of Marshal. Before being promoted to chief of the General 
Staff, and then the Politburo in 2010, Ri had run the Pyongyang Defense Command, an 
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army unit responsible for regime security, a sensitive job that requires the absolute trust 
of the Kim family (Gause, 2012). 
 
The completely unexpected change at the top of the all-powerful North Korean army 
might well be a power play by Kim Jong-un – or even his uncle Jang Song-taek – to 
reassert control over the military. However, another possible interpretation is that Kim 
is distancing himself from the regime's most powerful institution (Gause, 2012) and that 
the young leader might have some further, unexpected changes in store, despite the fact 
that the Supreme People's Assembly kept defense spending fixed at 15.8% of total state 
budget. In other words, the recent regime change and the less-hermetic leadership style 
exercised by the younger, Swiss-educated Kim might offer some glimpses of hope to 
the international community, including the EU, but deep shadows, doubts and 
misinformation are still the rule when it comes to the Hermit Kingdom. 
 
1.1. Exploring the future of EU-North Korea relations with an ad-hoc 
theoretical framework 
 
Such an unusual and complex topic called for an equally unusual and complex 
approach. With the main interest of this thesis lying in analyzing how the European 
Union could eventually engage with North Korea taking into account its contradicting 
internal interests and those of relevant external stakeholders, no conventional 
international relations or political science theoretical framework seemed to fit with the 
lines followed herein. 
 
On the one hand, while certain theories within the different international relations 
schools can be useful to explain the EU’s external action and foreign policy as it 
happens/evolves or as it has happened/evolved, none would be able to offer satisfactory 
explanations for the case at hand, as current bilateral EU-DPRK relations, shaped by 
and framed within a comprehensive, UN-sponsored sanctions regime, range from the 
negligible in economic terms to the openly negative in political and institutional terms. 
 
On the other hand, political science theories utilized to measure policy effectiveness 
would still be useless for the very same reason: to yield reliable results, they need 
tangible indicators and data from past and/or current policies. While it is obvious that 
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policies must be evaluated to avoid continued implementation of ineffectual policies, 
the goal of the current thesis does not reside in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
negative conditionality that currently dominates EU policies vis-à-vis North Korea, but 
in “pre-analyzing” which policies could eventually have more chances to be effective 
thanks to enjoying overwhelming support among all key stakeholders and actors. 
 
Therefore, this research project is based upon the pre-selection of several issues and 
areas that are usually considered to fall within the scope of EU foreign policy pre-
evaluate their eventual application to the North Korean case via the reactions they 
would arise among both internal and external stakeholders. 
 
Three basic criteria are followed in order to prepare this initial selection. The first one is 
an in-depth analysis of past and current EU engagement with North Korea, with special 
emphasis on the current status. This allows for a realistic assessment of both the 
available instruments and capabilities and the geographical, economic and political 
limits thereto. 
 
Second, the selection of criteria are also informed by previous unpublished work of this 
author studying the framework of currently comprehensive EU relations with two 
formerly isolated countries that share several key characteristics with North Korea – 
Cambodia and Vietnam5 – in order to put forward a set of proposals for future relations 
with a willing DPRK. 
 
The third and final criterion applied to pre-select the study topics was specific personal 
knowledge of and interest in the realities of both North Korea and South Korea, both as 
a temporary resident and as a visitor, has been streamlined to rationalize and optimize 
the choices of criteria to be studied in order to reflect as comprehensively as possible 
the realities the EU faces in the Korean peninsula, as well as to selecting a given 
methodology involving extensive direct interaction with and feedback from future 
                                                            
5 As indicated in Pont (2011), by analyzing the relations between the EU and two former Communist 
countries, both situated in South East Asia, consumed and impoverished by long wars during the last third 
of the 20th century and living under the direct sphere of influence of the Chinese giant, we can try to 
“single out exportable structures and instruments, but also detect and take into consideration key 
differences that will give a unique personality to any future cooperation framework between the EU and 
North Korea.” 
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South Korean leaders and its advanced statistical treatment – a skill that this author 
coincidentally acquired during his academic stay in South Korea.  
 
Departing from this analysis of the current situation and selection of discussion topics, 
this thesis ultimately aims to discover potential consensus and dissent points both 
among the views expressed by what we could consider internal EU actors – including 
actors who are very close to the EU, its policies, institutions and choices for 
professional reasons – and those of external stakeholders who would have an indirect 
but remarkable interest in how EU-North Korea relations take shape. 
 
In order to reach this stage, three questions related to the present trends and future 
evolution of EU-North Korea relations will have to be answered first, starting with 
known what current EU-DPRK relations are like. In order to explore this issue, the 
above-mentioned comprehensive analysis of the legal, institutional and sectorial facets 
of current bilateral relations between the European Union and North Korea, including a 
timeline-based review of historical high and low points and relevant facts and doubling 
as an ad-hoc literature review, will be performed. 
 
The next step should involve looking into discovering what the chances are that bilateral 
relations improve in the mid-term, and how they could improve. To answer this double-
barreled question, whose aim is presenting so-called insider views about what the EU 
might be willing to do in the context of a power transition and the chance for modest 
reform in the DPRK, four in-depth interviews with relevant actors have been performed: 
a Seoul-based European diplomat with close ties to North Korea, a South Korean 
scholar and expert in the European Union, a Member of the European Parliament who is 
also a member of the Delegation of the European Parliament for Relations with the 
Korean Peninsula, and a representative of an European non-profit organization (NPO) 
working actively in North Korea. 
 
Finally, the third baseline research question lies around the views of future South 
Korean political and business leaders regarding EU involvement in North Korea. How 
do they see it? How do they consider it can influence EU-South Korea relations? And, 
more importantly, how would they like it to evolve? In order to answer these 
interrelated questions, a survey was performed among South Korean elite university 
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students, with the overarching goal of comparing the views of such relevant 
stakeholders6 with those offered by the interviewed insiders and experts. Therefore, any 
expectation gaps between what the EU might be willing to do and what South Korean 
future leaders would like to see should be detected and highlighted. 
 
Two exhaustive chapters will be devoted to explaining and commenting the outcomes 
and analyses of the interview and survey data, respectively, with all relevant results held 
intimately connected and eventually tied together in a final section that will shed some 
light on the internal and internal-external levels of consensus the EU might be able to 
reach when defining a North Korea policy. 
 
1.2. Main hypotheses: horizontal and vertical inconsistencies and expectation 
gaps 
 
As a logical extension from the overarching research question and the three 
auxiliary/baseline questions formulated herein, this thesis aims at proving or refuting 
the following two basic hypotheses regarding the views of both insiders/experts and 
South Korean stakeholders: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
There will be a certain internal debate within the EU and related actors between those 
opting for a view limiting the possibility of engagement and underestimating the 
possible implications of the EU’s role in North Korea, and those arguing that the EU 
should increase humanitarian aid, reinforce institutionalized dialogues and adopt a more 
proactive approach to endorse the EU’s position and identity values in the region. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
There will be a certain degree of dissonance and expectation gaps between the South 
Korean publics and EU decision makers and related actors. Moreover, we can define 
three further, interrelated secondary hypotheses as follows: 
 
                                                            
6 Obviously enough, the ideal situation should have involved North Korean citizens, as the real direct 
beneficiaries of any EU policies towards the DPRK. However, accessibility reasons make it almost 
impossible for foreign researchers to perform such field work in North Korea. 
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- Engagement with North Korea could affect South Korean perceptions of the EU. 
- South Koreans would clearly prefer certain forms of EU engagement with North 
Korea over others. 
- There will be certain links between engagement preferences stated for South 
Korea and those desired for the European Union. Moreover, preferences and 
views of EU engagement with North Korea will also be correlated with political 
ideology and other socio-demographic factors, such as age, sex or reported ties 
with EU citizens or institutions. 
 
1.3. A dual methodology: combining qualitative and quantitative research 
 
Each research method has its strengths and weaknesses, and certain concepts are more 
appropriately studied through some methods than through others. However, the best 
study designs normally use more than one research method, taking advantage of their 
different strengths (Babbie, 2004: 110). 
 
Based on these premises, this thesis will follow a dual methodological approach for 
greater insight and consistency, combining an extensive review of EU-North Korea 
relations with an assessment of future possibilities using both qualitative (in-depth 
interviews) and quantitative (surveys) methods. 
  
The aim of this dual methodological approach is to logically combine the limited access 
to experts and insiders, authoritative figures able and willing to provide relevant and 
extensive information on the chosen topic with the wider access to non-experts who are 
asked to provide their personal views on the given issue. This allows for a more 
comprehensive research project which is able to describe the views from both sides and 
to compare them for possible discrepancies or expectation gaps. 
 
Further details about the methodological choices will be provided in the relevant 
sections of this thesis, which will now proceed with an analysis of the reasons why the 
EU should and/or could be interested in deepening its relations with North Korea, 
serving as a theoretical background to the research project. 
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2. From normative power to strategic vision: why the EU could pursue further 
engagement and strengthen institutional relations with North Korea 
 
“Literature and analysis of EU-DPRK relations is very limited. Analysis on EU-DPRK 
relations going beyond the description of current or planned EU contributions to the 
economic and social development in North is even harder to find. The information on 
EU-DPRK relations published by the EU does usually not reveal information beyond 
official declarations either.” 
 
“Press coverage on EU-DPRK relations is equally rare and the EU’s policy towards 
the DPRK usually only makes it to the news when an EU high-level delegation travels to 
Pyongyang or the EU Commission decides to provide North Korea with humanitarian 
aid and food assistance when nobody else does. However, this lack of literature and 
press coverage does not necessarily mean that the EU is an irrelevant actor.” 
 
Berkofsky, 2003 
 
Despite being written at a time in which EU-DPRK relations enjoyed a relative 
honeymoon, Berkofsky’s words still have full validity almost a decade later, and make 
for an unbeatable introduction to this section, aimed at exploring the reasons why the 
EU could – or even should – be a relevant actor in North Korea. 
 
Given the objective lack of a strong theoretical background or relevant literature 
supporting the concepts being explored in this thesis, it is of essence to clarify the 
reasons why North Korea should matter to the European Union and, consequently, why 
exploring the chances of and perceptions about future engagement is worth the effort. 
 
Seven main reasons that could grant a higher EU involvement in North Korea have been 
identified: i) geostrategic and security reasons; ii) smoothening complex EU-China 
relations; iii) deepening relations with a rising South Korea; iv) economic opportunities, 
both for the European companies and for the development of North Korea; v) value 
promotion (human rights, democracy and regional integration) via European soft power; 
vi) enhancing and giving visibility to the role of the EU as a benign power in Northeast 
Asia; and vii) the advancement of a more coherent, proactive and strategic CFSP.  
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2.1. Geostrategic and security reasons 
 
As already discussed in the introductory section, despite strong economic and business 
interests in Asia, there is near consensus amongst scholars and analysts that the EU 
remains – reluctant and probably unable – to develop a security profile in Asia 
(Berkofsky, 2010). EU states have only three aircraft carriers, their submarines never 
travel to the North Pacific Ocean, there is no integrated EU command and control and 
the EU has no meaningful ground forces that could be deployed to the Asia-Pacific for 
any length of time (Kelly, 2012). Consequently, North Korean elites do not perceive the 
EU to be a hard or security power they should care about. 
 
Additionally, Brussels’ absence from the 6 Party Talks de-facto excluded the EU from 
having a role in security and nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, limiting the EU’s 
current engagement in North Korea to the occasional (and by EU standards very 
modest) provision of humanitarian and food aid (Berkofsky, 2009), as we will further 
discuss later on. This undermines Brussels’ credibility and impact as global security 
actor in general, and in Northeast Asia in particular, posing a striking contrast to the 
economic and political engagement policies towards North Korea of the early 2000s.  
 
Standard rationalist thinking dictates that the security of the Korean peninsula is not a 
direct concern of the EU for at least four reasons. First, the Union’s most acute security 
interests lie in Europe and its direct neighborhood, so there is no strategic interest or 
ambition strong enough to force the EU to act (Lee, 2012). Second, the key players in 
the region are the two Koreas, the U.S., Japan, China and Russia, all of them directly 
and immediately concerned with pending security issues between them, while the EU 
only occupies a marginal, non-conflictual position. Third, as far as global security is 
concerned, the EU plays a subordinate role to the U.S. and NATO, which have 
consistently taken the initiative in addressing a variety of global and regional issues in 
the international community. Fourth, the very nature of the EU’s security policy means 
that, under the current CFSP and CSDP, the Union will preferably address soft security 
issues and only act as a force for good when its role does not conflict with the national 
interests of the member states (Hyde-Price, 2006). 
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However, East Asia has been undergoing a drastic transition toward a post-Cold War 
context of democratization and globalization. Although there still remain some 
interstate confrontations, and even if the impact of globalization and democratization on 
the region differs from state to state, this transition seems irreversible and is creating a 
new security environment in the region (Kim and Lee, 2011). The EU’s decision not to 
get too involved in hard security issues like the North Korean missile and nuclear crisis 
undermines the credibility of Brussels’ global foreign and security policy vision, and 
runs against the spirit and goals of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), through 
which the EU assigned itself a global role in international security, including in Korea 
(Berkofsky, 2009). Therefore, the EU, as a global structural power, could adopt a more 
active, constructive role in the context of East Asian security, especially regarding the 
situation in the Korean peninsula.7 
 
One needs to look no further than the latest update of the Guidelines on the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia to discover why North Korea should matter 
both for geostrategic and security reasons to an European Union that should strive to 
develop “a stronger voice on regional foreign and security policy issues” (Council of the 
European Union, 2007). While the opening sentence of the document states that “East 
Asia is a region of especially dynamic change in which the EU has substantial 
interests,” the list of key security challenges – valid for East Asia and the wider world – 
already make it clear that the North Korean regime is a deal breaker that goes against all 
defined goals, such as: i) the preservation of peace and strengthening of international 
security, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; ii) the 
promotion of a rule based international system; iii) the promotion of regional 
integration; iv) the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; v) the promotion of cooperative 
and sustainable policies to meet global challenges such as climate change, energy 
security, environmental protection, poverty, economic imbalances, and health issues; 
and vi) the promotion of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
                                                            
7 According to Berkofsky (2010), there is also a certain level of agreement amongst Asian policymakers 
and analysts that a more prominent and visible European engagement in Asian “hard security” issues 
could never be as constructive and promoting security as Brussels’ “soft security” policies in Asia. 
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As also clearly stated in these Guidelines, East Asian security and stability is a 
precondition for the region’s continued economic success and, therefore, threats to 
regional security – such as the DPRK’s nuclear programme and the related risks of 
proliferation – have a direct bearing on the interests of the EU. The EU should, 
therefore, develop its cooperation with all regional partners on issues such as non-
proliferation of WMD, among others, as well as demonstrate its willingness to 
cooperate in the context of a future broader Northeast Asia regional peace and security 
mechanism (Council of the European Union, 2007). 
 
This document ends with a full subsection devoted to the Korean Peninsula and, more 
specifically, to North Korea’s nuclear programme. According to these guidelines, the 
EU should “i) maintain its insistence on the verified full dismantlement of the DPRK's 
nuclear weapons; ii) request the DPRK to return to the NPT and sign and ratify the 
CTBT; iii) support the integration of DPRK into the non-proliferation regime and 
explore the potential for EU assistance activities to this effect; iv) continue to express its 
willingness to gradually deepen and widen relations with the DPRK in exchange for 
verifiable progresses from the Korean side; v) stress its continuing support for the 6 
Party Talks and maintain close cooperation with its key players while reiterating that 
proliferation is a serious threat to global security; vi) urge the DPRK not to pursue sales 
to countries of concern, and encourage appropriate international cooperation to prevent 
such sales taking place; and vii) build up dialogue with the players, especially the 
Republic of Korea, on the issue of the broader stability of the Korean Peninsula, on 
humanitarian assistance to the DPRK and on human rights and on practical areas in 
which the EU could provide assistance” (Council of the European Union, 2007). 
 
Since 2004 and 2005, respectively, the EU is discussing East Asian security issues with 
the U.S. and Japan on an institutionalized level. These exchanges are the so-called EU-
US and EU-Japan Strategic Dialogues on East Asian Security, taking place every six 
months.8 The North Korean nuclear crisis and the 6 Party Talks are part of these 
dialogues, but their relevance for the resolution of the nuclear crisis on the Korean 
                                                            
8 According to Berkofsky (2009), the real motive for Washington and Tokyo to start discussing East 
Asian security issues with the EU on a regular basis was to de-facto institutionalize pressure on the EU 
not to lift the weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989 – successfully, as it turned out, as the embargo 
is still in place and not anywhere near the top of the EU’s China agenda. In fact, the U.S. and Japan were 
never planning to coordinate their respective North Korea policies with the EU. 
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Peninsula has been very limited, not even resulting in any joint North Korea policies or 
policy initiatives so far. 
 
The participants of the 6 Party Talks – the U.S., Japan, Russia, China, South Korea and 
North Korea – have not encouraged the EU to join the forum, and the EU is seemingly 
satisfied with this non-role in security and nuclear issues in North Korea, limiting itself 
to offer verbal “political support” for the talks.9 Then again, not being invited to Beijing 
is not necessarily a disadvantage: the last session was scheduled for December 2008 but 
was unilaterally cancelled by Pyongyang and, after North Korea’s 2009 nuclear test, 
they have yet to resume. 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that, despite existent low-intensity engagement in security 
matters, and contrary to the claims of irrelevance to the EU’s physical and national 
security stated by some scholars as Kelly (2012), security issues in the Korean 
peninsula should matter for the EU, both as a major trading partner in this politically 
unstable area and also for the direct security implications tied to proliferation in 
sensitive areas such as the Middle East via North Korean sales and technical assistance. 
A deeper EU-DPRK relationship would not only help increase national security of 
valuable EU partners, but also have positive effects for its own internal security and 
raise the prestige of the EU as an international actor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
9 For instance, on October 2006, then EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
announced that the EU was offering political support for the 6 Party Talks. However, she failed to 
quantify and qualify what kind of “political support” the EU is willing and able to offer (Berkofsky, 
2009). 
15 
 
2.2. Counterweight in the complicated EU-China relations 
 
A further argument for enhanced EU engagement in North Korea would be its use as a 
lever to improve EU-China relations and help create a truly distinguishable strategic 
partnership between the two powers. 
 
The idea of a strategic partnership between the EU and China first appeared in 2003, 
when the joint statement of the China-EU summit saw this as a consequence of “the 
expanded intensity and scope and the multi-layered structure of China-EU relations” 
(Council of the European Union, 2003a). The 2003 European Security Strategy also 
included China among the EU’s six strategic partners (European Council, 2003). 
Finally, the parties indicated a strategic partnership had been achieved in 2005. 
However, although there are sufficient shared strategic interests, and despite the official 
rhetoric, the EU and China do not really enjoy a working strategic alliance. 
 
It could be argued that strategic partnerships are what the involved parties make of it. 
While Beijing seems set on engaging Europe as a function of its own relationship with 
the United States and not as a main partner in the international arena, Europe recognizes 
China as a key actor, but continues to see the U.S. as its main international partner. 
Therefore, we can agree with Holslag (2011) that the strategic partnership between the 
EU and China has yet to materialize in practice. There is indeed a clear gap between 
China’s belief that cooperation should depart from normative diversity and joint interest 
and Europe’s assumption that differences in interests can be resolved by a consensus 
over certain universal political rules.  
 
The EU and China started to negotiate a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) in January 2007. Key objectives of the EU were “to improve access to the 
Chinese market for European exporters and investors beyond WTO commitments and to 
enhance cooperation in political matters and human rights issues” (Bersick, 2008). 
Progress, however has been slow and inconclusive, mainly due to ongoing problems in 
trade relations (blocking progress from the European side) and the continuing European 
arms embargo against China (blocking progress from the Chinese side). 
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Based upon joint statements made after annual EU-China summits, common interests 
are relatively few and not very well defined, and bilateral relations are essentially 
dominated by the economic and commercial spheres (Holslag, 2011). One of the few 
security issues to appear consistently in such joint statements is stability in the Korean 
peninsula and North Korean proliferation. However, the EU has failed to coordinate its 
aid strategies regarding North Korea with China (Holslag, 2011).  
 
The only direct attempt of the EU to engage China concerned the situation of North 
Korean refugees in the border area, but Beijing did not allow the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees to enter the country to supervise the situation, as the EU 
requested.10 Despite this failure and the limited formal dialogue between the parties on 
the North Korean nuclear issue, the European Union can still play a legitimizing role for 
China’s pragmatic diplomacy in the wider Northeast Asia. More precisely, and in line 
with China’s realist worldview, it can act as a valuable go-between against the U.S. 
regarding North Korea, thus helping improve bilateral China-U.S. and China-DPRK 
relations. 
 
At first sight, this argument could be considered unrealistic or even counterproductive, 
given the current status of China as sole protector of the North Korean regime. 
However, according to Cha (2012), the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang is 
not nearly as cordial as the popular press believes: both countries are indeed caught in a 
“mutual hostage relationship,” as the Chinese need the North Korean regime not to 
collapse for both political and security reasons. As a recent New York Times article 
pointed out, shortly after Kim Jong-un took over, a Chinese vice minister of foreign 
affairs, Fu Ying, visited Pyongyang and clearly warned him not to proceed with a 
ballistic missile test. As is widely known, the new Korean leader went ahead anyway 
(Perlez, 2012).  
 
North Korea not being the most serious or fundamental challenge to China’s national 
security and strategic interests, Beijing chooses to muddle through (Cha, 2012), despite 
                                                            
10 In separate démarches at various levels, the EU has also continuously asked Beijing, so far to little 
avail, to show permissiveness to DPRK citizens who cross the border into China in search of food, and to 
reconsider its policy concerning these refugees, who might be sentenced to death or forced labor if 
returned to the DPRK. 
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strong internal policy debate, while hoping that economic reform will bring about a 
North Korea modeled after China. However, as warned by Sun (2012), “China might 
change its strategic calculation if North Korea launches new provocations and drags the 
region into a military conflict.” 
 
In any case, the EU should also be aware that, despite China’s frustration with its poor 
and unruly neighbor, it will never abandon it, as shown by the fact that, right after the 
younger Kim assumed power, Beijing gave North Korea 500,000 tons of food and 
250,000 tons of crude oil (Perlez, 2012). China needs North Korea not to collapse, both 
for foreign policy reasons – keeping a security buffer against a U.S.-backed South 
Korea11 – and internal political and economic goals – trade with North Korea and via its 
ports as a key to develop the poor Northeast of China, Jilin and Liaoning provinces, its 
former rust belt. According to Cha (2012), as the only patron of the regime, China is 
more powerless than omnipotent, as the regime livelihood lies entirely in its hands.12 
Therefore, North Korea is clearly an important issue for China, and Europe’s 
willingness to play a greater, more constructive role in the isolated and impoverished 
North Korea could definitely help improve EU-China relations by partially defusing 
China’s dependency on the unpredictable regime.13 
 
Although the EU has the ambition to persuade China to join the liberal international 
order, these attempts are doomed to fail unless a “grand bargain” with the rising Asian 
power is stricken (Howorth, 2010a).14 Additionally, the idea that the EU will continue 
                                                            
11 This vital link is perfectly exemplified by Stapleton’s (2012) assertion that “Beijing disapproves of 
every aspect of North Korean policy, including the dynastic succession arrangements and North Korea’s 
self-destructive economy", quickly adding that “Beijing has an overriding security interest in maintaining 
influence in Pyongyang and in not permitting other powers to gain the upper hand there.” 
12 Chinese internal sources estimate that if China cut out its aid to North Korea, the regime could only 
survive for a few months, or maximum one year (Cha, 2012). 
13 In fact, the communication EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006), widely considered as marking an important shift in EU attitudes towards 
China, already touched on China's internal stability, touting it as the key driver for Chinese policy, while 
also calling on the EU and China to cooperate more closely in regards to East Asia policies and related 
challenges, including non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula (Cameron, 2009). 
14 EU leverage vis-à-vis China is also limited by the competition between Member States seeking to build 
stronger bilateral relations in order to favor national companies looking for business opportunities in 
China – an approach wisely encouraged and exploited by Beijing and leading to European inability to 
translate its remarkable economic capital into political leverage. These internal differences also spill over 
the desirability to prioritize human rights concerns, with smaller Member States and the European 
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to fail to deliver as a strategic player is becoming more and more common among 
Chinese (Holslag, 2011). This dangerous trend must be reverted if Europe wants to be 
an important political player in the economically vibrant East Asia: seeking wider and 
stronger cooperation on the North Korea issue with China could only help in that score.
                                                                                                                                                                              
Parliament advocating a tougher stance than Germany, France and the UK, which are largely responsible 
for the EU’s decreasingly critical attitude (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 321). 
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2.3. Deepening relations with a natural rising partner: South Korea 
 
Many experts consider Seoul to be Brussels’ natural partner of choice in Northeast Asia, 
one that shares most of the EU’s core values and priorities, also regarding the future 
evolution of the North Korean regime. As detailed in the website of the Delegation of 
the EU to South Korea, this bilateral partnership is based on reciprocal intentions, like-
minded values (democracy, plurality, human rights and freedom) and common global 
objectives (climate change, security, development cooperation, peacekeeping, 
denuclearization, the G20 and the reform of global financial institutions), with a high-
performance trade component as its backbone, as demonstrated by the landmark EU-
South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KOREU FTA), the first of its kind for the EU in 
East Asia. 
 
Normative discourse and policy practice between the European Union and South Korea 
are also closely aligned, even more so than with other “natural” strategic partners. 
Moreover, even if it might not yet be considered a global power, South Korea performs 
a lynchpin role in certain regional or even global issues (Grevi, 2012), as demonstrated 
by the celebration of the 2011 G20 Summit and the 2012 Nuclear Summit in Seoul. 
 
Relations between the European Union and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have come a 
long way since bilateral diplomatic relations were established in 1963, undergoing a 
substantive change during the last two decades. The 1990s, the era of the “Asian tigers,” 
saw the start of a progressive enhancement of EU-ROK, as shown by the opening of the 
European Commission Delegation to Korea in 1990 and the adoption of a Korea 
Strategy Paper in 1993 by the European Commission. 
 
This still lukewarm mutual interest received a dual boost in 2009. On the one hand, the 
bilateral Framework Agreement, which was first signed in 1996, was retooled and 
updated in 2009, considerably upgrading the bilateral relationship. On the other hand, 
after just three years of negotiation rounds, the Republic of Korea and the European 
Union concluded a free trade agreement, which entered into force on 1 July 2011.  
 
The KOREU FTA is arguably the most important completed to date for both parties 
(Lee-Makiyama, 2010), and lays a foundation on which to build a relationship beyond 
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sheer trade (Kelly, 2012). Even with its limited scope in the fields of agriculture and 
services, it is expected to double the already substantial EU-North Korea trade: in 2010, 
before the FTA went into effect, South Korea was the EU’s eight biggest importer and 
tenth biggest export destination, while the EU was Korea’s fourth biggest importer and 
second biggest export destination (Kelly, 2012; European Commission, 2012a).15 
 
Outside trade relations, EU interest in Korea had been traditionally quite low, and CFSP 
literature says little on Korea (Krotz and Maher, 2011; Kelly, 2012). Similarly, South 
Korea has had little need for a specific EU policy in its history. This all may be 
changing: the growing clout of a rapidly modernizing and highly competitive Chinese 
economy and the United States’ strategic shift to Asia might push Seoul towards a 
hedging strategy and, therefore, higher engagement with other partners. Common values 
and interests, coupled with a lack of historic animosity and/or territorial disputes make 
the European Union an ideal ally for Seoul to solidify its status in the complicated East 
Asian puzzle. As argued by Kelly (2012), deepening its non-trade relations with a 
visible and prestigious actor such as the EU will allow South Korea to solidify its status 
as a rising middle power while effectively reducing its still growing dependence from a 
rising China and a still hegemonic United States.16,17 
 
Despite ongoing territorial and historical rifts with regional neighbors, stark nationalism 
and apparently limited interest in sovereignty losses for the regional good, Kelly’s 
(2012) assertion that South Korea is deeply attached to a rather classical Westphalian 
conception of the nation-state is being put into doubt by the ongoing Free Trade 
Agreement negotiations with China and Japan, already in an advanced stage (MOFAT, 
2012), and the limited but relevant defense agreement signed in June with historical 
enemy Japan.18 Therefore, Seoul can perfectly become the “Asian bridge” for the 
                                                            
15 Contrary to the wide acceptance among the South Korean public enjoyed by the KOREU FTA, the 
even more recent signing and ratification of a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. (KORUS FTA) has 
spurred considerable protests and debate among the citizenry and the major political parties, with the 
main opposition party threatening to revoke it and ask for its renegotiation had it won the April 
parliamentary elections. 
16 As asserted by most analysts and commentators, beyond North Korea, South Korea’s primary security 
concerns are the rise of China, suspicion of lurking Japanese revisionism and possible U.S. decline. 
17 However, as warned by Kim (2010), should alienation from the United States because of a tilt towards 
the EU arise, South Korea would probably shed or scale back its relations with the EU. 
18 It must be noted, however, that implementation of the agreement has been suspended by the Republic 
of Korea in retaliation to the visit of Japanese lawmakers to the disputed Dokdo islets in August 2012. 
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promotion of not just liberal democracy in a non-European context, as argued by Kelly 
(2012), but also a beacon of regionalization. 
 
A third factor, beyond commercial interests and hedging against Chinese and U.S. 
hegemony, that could push South Korea even closer to the EU would be prospects of 
reconciliation and eventual reunification with North Korea. Although South Korean 
openness towards North Korea will not happen until after the departure of conservative 
President Lee Myung-bak,19 whoever succeeds him after the December 2012 election is 
likely to be willing to renew contact with the DPRK, with companies such as Hyundai, 
Samsung and Posco believed to be making contingency plans for business with 
Pyongyang (The Economist, 2012). In the run-up to this eventual heightened economic 
cooperation, commercial exchanges between the two Koreas increased by 36% in the 
first months of 2012 compared with the same period in 2011 (La Vanguardia, 2012). 
 
There are currently no leading politicians on either side of the 38th parallel wishing 
immediate reunification. Both sides have, over time, proposed different confederation 
models, headlined by Kim Dae-jung’s, former President of the Republic of Korea, who 
proposed a three-phase unification model later translated into his “Sunshine Policy”: 
confederation (pacific coexistence), federation (pacific exchanges) and reunification 
(pacific unification), all spanning over several decades.  
 
Clearly enough, no immediate economic or political stimulus would be achieved by the 
South Korean government if reunification was pursued, as it would entail an 
extraordinary economic cost for South Korea. According to Cha (2012: 393), there was 
a silent but practical motivation for the “Sunshine Policy:” fear of unification,20 or a 
                                                            
19 Despite much negative publicity regarding his unwillingness to defuse tensions with North Korea, Cha 
(2012: 404-405) details two engagement proposals the Lee Myung-bak administration had put forward for 
inter-Korean cooperation, and that were duly rejected by Pyongyang. The first was the “Denuclearization 
and Opening 3,000”, in which South Korea promised to raise North Korean income per capita to $3,000 
per year within ten years if Pyongyang agreed to abandon nuclear weapons and open to the world. The 
second proposal was a “Grand Bargain”, announced at the UN General Assembly in September 2009, in 
which Lee promised to make massive investments in North Korean infrastructure and to end the era of 
North-South strife if the DPRK committed to denuclearization and addressed human rights concerns. 
20 In fact, Kim Dae-jung ordered that the word “unification” be removed completely from the 
government’s policy toward the North. Instead, he began to use words like “constructive engagement 
policy” to avoid fomenting North Korea’s fear of being absorbed by its stronger southern counterpart 
(Cha, 2012). 
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hard landing in which South Korea would have to foot an insurmountable bill. The goal 
was, therefore, to achieve a soft landing, a slow and controlled process of integration via 
decades-long engagement. Moreover, North Korea will also insist on the fact that any 
settlement with the South regarding unification should initially give a guarantee of two 
countries, two systems, and not a real unification in which the economically stronger 
Seoul clearly takes the lead and de facto absorbs the North (Ford, 2012). 
 
Whatever shape the eventual reunification process might take, Seoul will look to the EU 
and its experience with the reunification of Germany in the early 1990s. Despite the 
enormous differences between the two processes – with North Korea being much poorer 
relative to its more modern neighbor than East Germany was by the end of the Cold 
War, and also with a population amounting to almost half of South Korea’s, a far 
greater proportion than that of East Germany compared to the Western Länder –, 
insights and expertise, as well as practical help and probably aid, would be extremely 
welcome. 
 
As the official written statement released just before the 6th EU-Republic of Korea 
Summit, which was held in Seoul on 28 March 2012, points out: “The EU attaches great 
importance to maintaining stability in the region and reducing tensions on the Korean 
Peninsula. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes as well as the 
human rights situation remain a grave concern” (European Council, 2012). South Korea 
seeks support from the European Union in its relations with North Korea. If the EU was 
willing to take its commitment on the resolution of the North Korean issue and follow 
Seoul along what will probably be a more cooperative line vis-à-vis Pyongyang in 2013, 
South Korean perception and sensitivity towards the EU – already widely positive due 
to real shared interests and goals – could receive a big boost. 
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2.4. Economic opportunities: how economic cooperation could benefit North 
Korea and the EU 
 
The argument behind boosting EU-North Korea trade can easily be looked at from a 
dual perspective: that of European companies wishing to invest in what could, in due 
time, become a promising emerging market, and that of the North Korean economy, 
which would highly benefit from progressive economic aperture and foreign direct 
investment flows. 
 
Analyzing what drove the North Korean economy into its current state of disarray is 
well beyond the scope of this thesis.21 While many developing countries thrived in the 
post-Cold War globalization process and increased trade flows, North Korea’s 1990s 
were characterized by negative economic growth, with an average rate of -4% from 
1990 to 1998. North Korea ended up isolated from the globalized world, with crumbling 
infrastructure, technological obsolescence and uncompetitive industries (Park, 2009). 
Today, after failed agricultural and industrial reforms, undertaken in 2002 and 2003 
respectively, North Korea remains trapped in an aid-dependent economy with rampant 
corruption and negligible (legal) foreign trade.  
 
This dire situation, compounded by severe draught during the Spring and massive 
floods during the Summer of 2012, prompted young leader Kim Jong-un to confide that 
“developing the economy and improving livelihoods, so that the Korean people lead 
happy and civilized lives, is the goal the Korean Workers' Party is struggling towards” 
to Wang Jiarui, head of the Chinese Communist Party's International Department and 
Beijing's key interlocutor with the North (Buckley and Park, 2012). Only a few weeks 
later, and amidst news of a fresh agricultural reform that would increase market access 
for peasants, the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reported that Jang 
Song-taek, a powerful figure in the DPRK’s government and uncle of the young leader, 
                                                            
21 A simplified explanation of some key economic decisions that could explain how North Korea fell to 
the current depths is offered by Cha (2012). In his book, he points to five bad macroeconomic choices as 
leading North Korea to its current pitiful economic state. In chronological order, those are the excessive 
focus on heavy industry in the 1950s, the Chollima movement – based on using ideology and not 
technology to improve production – in the late 1950s and 1960s, the accumulation of debt and eventual 
default during the 1970s, the failed big-scale projects undertaken in the second half of the 1980s in 
response to Seoul’s Olympic nomination and the poor management of Soviet abandonment since 1990, 
converting the country into an economy dependent of external aid to survive. 
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had traveled to China to discuss building and developing the joint industrial complexes 
on their borders, the Rason and Hwanggumphyong economic zones (Choe, 2012b), 
something several analysts consider a game-changing move.22 
 
Are those modest signs of economic changes relevant enough to be optimistic about the 
prospects of change? The jury is still out. While The New York Times asserted that the 
new leader has shown no interest in following the advice of China to open up the 
economy, even in a modest way (Perlez, 2012), Haggard (2012) suggests adopting a 
cautious, critical approach towards recent agricultural and economic reforms – in his 
opinion, echoing the failed moves of 2002.23 In several chapters of his book, Cha (2012) 
also argues that, instead of progressively liberalizing markets, Kim Jong-un is likely to 
adopt a policy of neojuche revivalism, combined with a less extreme version of Kim 
Jong-il’s songun (military first) policy. In other words, a militarized return to a 
conservative and hard-line self-reliance ideology based on the golden age of the DPRK, 
namely the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, according to both Cha and Korean 
scholar Kim Yong-hyon, the regime is indeed seeking tighter internal control rather than 
economic reform, and is doing it via tactical actions borne out of temporary need or 
halfhearted attempts at inviting trade and investment. 
 
China is, by and large, North Korea’s largest trade partner. According to some 
estimates, there are roughly 150 Chinese companies operating in North Korea and more 
than 80% of consumer goods sold in the DPRK originate in China (Berkofsky, 2010). It 
can be argued that North Korea has systematically avoided foreign direct investment not 
coming from China and neglected international trade relations because of its distrust of 
foreign powers and fear of being exploited by Westerners (Park, 2009).  
                                                            
22 In line with that strategy, the Joint Venture and Investment Commission (JVIC) was established a little 
over a year ago to deal with inward investment, and it has the stated goal to see that the DPRK attracts 
investors looking for a low wage, skilled labor force. FDI protection agreements to prevent dual taxation 
have been signed with around 30 countries, and new investment laws, passed in 2010 and amended in 
January 2012, provide for the creation of three different kinds of joint ventures: equity joint ventures, 
contractual joint ventures and exclusively foreign-owned business (this one only possible inside SEZs). 
23 According to Haggard (2012), three counties have been picked to test a new system of small farms, 
under which farmers will be allowed to keep 30% of their production quota and any excess. Kim Jong-un 
has reportedly also complained about the way the country’s resources are being sold off on the cheap. 
However, this could be seen as a move to recentralize economic control, as any economic relaxation is 
hampered by the fear of losing political control. This is backed by a recent news piece published by the 
official North Korean news agency, which asserted that expecting reform and opening was nothing but a 
"foolish and silly dream, just like wanting the Sun to rise in the West" (Haggard, 2012). 
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Further barriers to foreign trade and investment include: local trading companies which 
are subsidiaries of or affiliated with the government, the military or the Communist 
party and, therefore, not guided by purely economic incentives (Park, 2009); rampant 
inflation, only accentuated by the failed, anti-market currency reform of November 
2009; the dual exchange rate systems, which impede international trade and FDI flows; 
higher tax rates than those of other competing FDI recipients (Park, 2009); foreign 
firms’ dependence on labor pools arranged by government agencies; and slow 
bureaucracy – Park (2009 citing Jung, 2008) reported that it took 65 days to obtain 
business approval in North Korea, as opposed to only 45-55 days in Vietnam. 
 
Many studies have shown that trade is an engine for development and economic growth 
for small open economies (Park, 2009 citing Balassa, 1989; Baro, 1991; Frankel and 
Romer, 1999), and a rapid increase in exports would not be possible without foreign 
direct investment (FDI). North Korea has a geographical advantage in promoting its 
trade relations because it is surrounded by several big or rich economies (Park, 2009): a 
recent report by Bank of America-Merrill Lynch states that North Korea’s integration in 
the international community could translate into yearly growth rates between 10 and 
12%, sustainable over time. However, such growth prospects would only be feasible 
within the context of a gradual integration of North Korea in the regional Northeast 
Asian economy.24 
 
From the EU perspective, current trade figures between the DPRK and the European 
Union are almost negligible – with North Korea ranking as the 154th most important 
trade partner for the EU in 2010. According to Eurostat data, trade amounted to just 
€167 million in 2010, with figures hovering between a high of €280 million in 2006 and 
a low mark of €120 million a year later. However, the EU was North Korea’s 4th most 
important trade partner in 2010 – right behind Egypt and India –, and it consistently 
enjoys a trade surplus with the bloc. North Korea mostly exports minerals, 
manufactured articles (mostly clothing) and chemicals to the EU, while it imports 
agricultural products, fuels, chemicals and machinery. 
 
                                                            
24 At the same time, a developing North Korea could also be a mid-to-long term boon for South Korea, as 
it would have access to cheap and willing labor and a country in dire need of capital influxes. 
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Sanctions aside, trade between the European Union and North Korea is shaped by two 
relevant issues. First, North Korea is not a member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and does not benefit from the privileges granted to imported goods from 
developing countries under the EU’s General System of Preferences (GSP).25 Second, 
being a state and not a market economy, trade with the EU is regulated according to 
Council Regulation (EC) 519/94.26 However, the EU applies Most Favored Nation 
status to North Korea (European Commission, 2002),27 only strictly regulating and 
limiting imports of textile products, which are specifically covered by Regulation (EC) 
517/94,28 as duly amended by up to 26 Council and Commission Regulations. 
 
Despite the difficult environment, European business does not shun North Korea 
completely. A European Business Association Pyongyang (EBA) was founded in 2004, 
and recent European-North Korean business cooperation examples include the PyongSu 
pharmaceutical joint venture, which produces generics for the North Korean market, a 
Polish-North Korean shipping joint venture and a partnership in IT services between the 
Korea Computer Centre (KCC) and a German partner company. The most successful 
joint ventures to date, however, are tobacco and beer factories (Berkofsky, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, a remarkable business opportunity in North Korea for European companies 
would be related to mining and processing rare earth metals29 and other minerals, 
including coal, iron ore, gold ore, zinc ore, copper ore, limestone and graphite.30 South 
                                                            
25 In fact, even goods produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex will not be considered as originating 
in the Republic of Korea, pursuant to the rules of origin of the EU-Republic of Korea Free Trade 
Agreement (Delegation of the EU to the Republic of Korea, 2011). 
26 Council Regulation (EC) 519/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third 
(State-trading) countries and repealing Regulations (EEC) 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83 (OJ L 67, 
10.3.1994, p. 89) 
27 At the time of writing, the EU was the only major trading power allowing the application of the Most 
Favored Nation clause to North Korea. However, tariff rates under this clause are higher than those under 
the Generalized System of Preferences (Park, 2009). 
28 Council Regulation (EC) 517/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports of textile products from 
certain third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements, or by other 
specific Community import rules (OJ L 67, 10.3.1994, p. 1) 
29 China can be seen a case in point in that respect: prior to 2004, it had no mining-related investments in 
North Korea. Nowadays, more than 40% of Chinese joint ventures in the DPRK are in extraction 
industries. In 2010, top export items from North Korea to China were already iron ore, coal and copper 
(Cha, 2012: 337). 
30 In fact, among the three key reasons cited by European businesses present in North Korea, two are 
related to the country’s resources, “to secure a part of the rich mineral resources the country possesses” 
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Korean estimates put the North’s mineral resources figure at over $6 trillion 
(Abrahamian & See, 2012). North Korea expert Leonid Petrov (2012) argues that the 
country’s rare earth deposits could enrich the country without reforming the economy, 
and that South Korea is cooperating with North Korea to exploit its rare earth deposits. 
However, the processing technology for rare earths metals is still extremely 
complicated, with only China, Japan, and a few European countries having the 
necessary processing plants (Haggard, 2012). 
 
The role of trade and development aid as a key instrument of EU foreign policy to 
facilitate internal reforms must not be understated. As asserted in the 2003 European 
Security Strategy: “Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting 
reform. As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading 
entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals” 
(European Council, 2003). Reforms and changes already detected in the 2001-2004 
North Korea Country Strategy Paper (European Commission, 2002) still hold valid 
nowadays:  
 
“The authorities need to establish an environment that will attract foreign capital and 
trade partners in order to mobilize the capital and build markets for North Korean 
industrial recovery and growth. Creating this environment requires addressing 
questions of macroeconomic stability and management, external debt management, 
laws and regulations for investment and trade, labor training and management, the 
administrative capacity of government, and an effective legal system.” 
 
According to former Member of the European Parliament Glyn Ford, North Korea is 
eager for advice. It wants to learn from the West and the rest but it wants to do this in its 
own way (Ford, 2008: 124). The EU, together with the U.S., generates around 80% of 
the international norms and standards that regulate international markets (Zielonka, 
2011). It is precisely this overwhelming structural power in trade issues what converts 
the EU in the perfect partner for North Korean economic opening and eventual revival. 
European experts have presented experiences of economic transition in other parts of 
the world and outlined options for reform, including improving the climate for inward 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and “to be present in the basic industries of the country”, the last one being “to tap the potential of North 
Korea as an hypothetical emerging market” (Park, 2009). 
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investment, economic transition based on the example of Central and Eastern Europe, 
creating SMEs and attracting FDI (Ford, 2008: 208-209). 
 
Therefore, if the EU (and, above all, the Commission) is really interested in having a 
role in the (at least potential) recovery of North Korea’s economy – thus indirectly 
benefiting European businesses –, it should continue to promote and advocate economic 
reform in North Korea through existing and new institutional links and exchanges.  
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2.5. Value promotion via European soft power: human rights, democracy and 
regional integration 
 
“The European Union is founded on a shared determination to promote peace and 
stability and to build a world founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law. These principles underpin all aspects of the internal and external policies of 
the European Union.” 
 
Council of the European Union, 2012b 
 
Over the last two decades, the European Union has actively tried to promote the so-
called European values as part of its foreign action. The EU, more than any other 
international actor, has inserted the principles of democracy and human rights in the 
structures and policies of its foreign policy and external relations and has matched its 
commitment with those values by creating tools for promoting them (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008). 
 
Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, EU foreign action has, with 
a varying degree of coherence and cohesiveness, revolved around human rights. 
However, only with the Lisbon Treaty has this become an explicit obligation weighing 
on the Union in its external action. Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union now 
provides that: 
 
“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values 
and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens.” 
 
This “missionary principle” is also reflected in Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union, which provides that: 
 
“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
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principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law.” 
 
In other words, Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union provides that the 
Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to – among others – 
consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of 
international law. 
 
Moreover, Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union, concerning the Union’s 
external action, specifies that:  
 
“The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles 
of international law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including 
those relating to external borders31” 
 
The fact that the Treaties now explicitly oblige the European Union to promote its 
values in the wider world, together with the strengthening of the coherence principle, 
entails that the Union is effectively given less leeway when framing its external 
policies: there is now a formal obligation of framing them in such a way that they will 
further promote a set of values that are not only important as an external objective but 
also as an (internal) identity objective, thus shaping a distinct international identity for 
the EU as a values-driven normative power (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). 
 
                                                            
31 Further specification of several of the Union’s values may be found in its Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, in the case-law of the Court of Justice and in secondary legislation such as the European 
Consensus on Development. 
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In line with those changes, the EU adopted, on 25 June 2012, its brand new Strategic 
Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, building on a previous joint 
communication adopted by the European Commission on 12 December 2011 following 
a proposal by High Representative Catherine Ashton. This new strategy sets out 
principles, objectives and priorities, all designed to improve the effectiveness and 
consistency of EU policy as a whole in the next ten years (Council of the European 
Union, 2012b). 
 
According the Strategic Framework, the EU will promote the universality of human 
rights via all its external policies – on the basis of the aforementioned Article 21 of the 
Treaty on European Union – in a coherent manner and both through bilateral 
partnerships and multilateral institutions. In the document, it is claimed that “the EU 
will place human rights at the centre of its relations with all third countries” and 
“promote human rights in all areas of its external action without exception,” while also 
clarifying that “the EU’s policy on human rights will be carefully designed for the 
circumstances of each country,” including through the development of country human 
rights strategies and via human rights dialogues and consultations with partner countries 
(Council of the European Union, 2012b).  
 
Tied to the strategy, an Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy has also been 
adopted, covering the period until 31 December 2014 (Council of the European Union, 
2012b). Among the 97 planned actions, the plan to create a toolbox to integrate human 
rights principles into EU operational activities for development by 2013 should be 
highlighted (Council of the European Union, 2012b). 
 
What could this updated and upgraded legal framework mean for prospective relations 
with the DPRK? As a matter of a fact, Kim Jong-un’s North Korea could, with the right 
political will in Europe and a certain degree of commitment towards aperture from the 
Korean side, become a prime candidate to put into practice the EU’s relational and 
structural power as far as value promotion is concerned. 
 
The strategy adopted by the EU has mostly been based upon the “carrot and stick” 
concept, and unruly North Korea has not been an exception: humanitarian aid has been 
offered on a consistent basis (albeit in a varying degree) since the end of the 20th 
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century; aperture has been rewarded with financial incentives, while provocations have 
prompted sanctions, mostly in response to UN Security Council resolutions. A decade 
ago, Brussels policymakers believed that EU “soft power” in forms of technical 
assistance, generous economic, humanitarian and financial aid would offer enough 
leverage to help convincing Pyongyang to give up its missile and nuclear programs. 
While it was obviously not enough to stop Kim Jong-il’s proliferation strategy, they 
could have a positive effect on his successor. 
 
In many instances, the EU pursues the promotion of human rights through its 
cooperation and assistance programmes. Therefore, it seems natural for the EU to 
provide humanitarian aid as part of the endeavor to promote human rights in North 
Korea (Lee, 2012). Moreover, integrating human rights issues into trade and external 
assistance is indicative of its basic position: the answer to the North Korean issue lies 
with a soft approach that stresses gradual and peaceful reform, rather than belligerent 
gestures (Lee, 2012 citing Bridges 2008: 227). 
 
Fostering regional integration – including North Korea in the process – would also be 
positive to further advance EU identity values, while also being clearly in line with the 
Regional Strategy for Asia 2007-2013, whose main stated priority was to encourage 
cooperation and regional integration (European Commission, 2007). To achieve this, the 
EU supports work and dialogue with the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Asia-
Europe Foundation (ASEF), the Trans-Eurasia Information Network (TEIN), the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the South Asian Free Trade 
Area (SAFTA) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
 
Despite its failure in balancing the depth of the US-Europe or the US-East Asia bonds 
(Kelly, 2012) and deepening or spurring integration (Kelly, 2012 citing Yeo and 
Hofmeister, 2010), the EU could revitalize the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a tool 
for inclusive regional integration by making inroads – conditions allowing – in still 
isolated Asian countries such as North Korea.32 
 
                                                            
32 The EU also participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which has ironically helped further 
diplomatically isolate the DPRK (Kelly, 2012). 
33 
 
Differences on values such as democracy and human rights, as well as the perception 
that Asian countries and people were the victims of European exploitation during the 
colonial era have been a constant source of friction between the EU and Asian 
policymakers defending so-called “Asian values,” and thus hindered the development of 
the ASEM process (Fitriani, 2011). However, the EU represents a package of 
philosophic ideals, economic wealth, physical comfort, democratic practice, and cultural 
status to which many Asian countries aspire. 
 
While promoting such values in North Korea might seemingly be a dead end, the fact 
that South Korea does not share such negative perceptions about the EU with most of its 
Asian neighbors could open a window of opportunity for the EU to become a 
“benevolent preacher” of such values in North Korea. This role would certainly be 
welcomed by Seoul and also be received with less hostility from Pyongyang, as the Kim 
regime already considers the EU to be a benevolent actor with no hidden, self-interested 
agenda in regime destabilization. 
 
We could conclude by using Lee’s (2012) suggestion that the EU should continuously 
pressure the North Korean leadership through mechanisms as political and human rights 
dialogues, along with emergency humanitarian assistance, to abide by the international 
human rights standards, while also making efforts to integrate North Korea in the 
international community. That would be clearly in line with the EU’s capacity as a 
structural power and also with its core values, doubling as the basis defining its role in 
the international arena. 
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2.6. The European difference: the EU as a benign power in Northeast Asia 
 
“North Koreans see Europe as a valuable alternative to the US in politics, trade, and 
security. The EU can play a very positive role in helping North Korea through 
economic cooperation and training programs.” 
Leonid Petrov, 2009 
 
“The prospects for an economic upturn and for genuine social development in North 
Korea are limited if the country continues to remain secluded and largely deprived of 
international assistance.” 
European Commission, 2007 
 
The dual reality of EU-DPRK relations is perfectly expressed by those two sentences – 
the latter belonging to the Strategy Paper drafted for another poor and, until very 
recently, highly isolated Asian country, Myanmar: the EU could be better positioned 
than other major powers to play a key constructive role in North Korea’s development, 
but Pyongyang should first show its willingness to cooperate with actions and not only 
with words. 
 
It is often argued that the EU is a peculiar if not unique international actor: it is a largely 
civilian power promoting universal norms in its vast neighborhood and beyond 
(Zielonka, 2011). Europe’s polycentric system of governance is more suited to creating 
institutional structures and setting up the rules of legitimate behavior than to bold and 
swift power projection abroad, while also making it less vulnerable to accusations of 
pursuing selfish ambitions at the expense of others33 – as much as it hampers its ability 
to project it in a strategic fashion.  
 
Additionally, experience tells us that coercive diplomacy over North Korea to change its 
external behavior and domestic policies will be rather ineffective (Ohn, 2009), both due 
to the domestic constraints of the autocratic Kim regime and also to the historical state-
centric and nationalistic tendencies in East Asia.  
                                                            
33 In the concrete case of North Korea, this has prompted Lee (2012) to assert that “institutionalized 
contact and economic aid for North Korea relations are motivated not by strategic ambition or economic 
interests but as a manifestation of moral traits that the EU has embraced to develop.” 
35 
 
Therefore, the Union’s civilian power, one that tries to gradually reform through 
economic and legal engineering, with a more technical than ideological goal in mind, 
tends not to cause animosity among third countries (Zielonka, 2011). This perception of 
non-contradiction with any of the racial and historical posits upon which rests the 
ideology of the regime,34 also extensively cited by Ford (2008), coupled with Europe’s 
sheer physical distance from the Korean peninsula and the fact that no EU country poses 
a direct military threat to the regime, would explain why Pyongyang could see the EU 
as a “valuable alternative.” 
 
The EU and its Member States are already the biggest donor of global humanitarian, 
food and development assistance (providing more than 50% of the total) and its 
capacity-building policies – including technical assistance, technology and know-how 
transfers, among others – in many Asian countries have without a doubt contributed to 
peace and stability in Asia in recent decades (Berkofsky, 2010). 
 
The establishment of EU-North Korea diplomatic relations has not yet led to increased 
EU influence on politics and security in North Korea, as it was hoped in Brussels in the 
early 2000s – most notably in 2001, when the EU briefly tried to normalize relations 
with North Korea after dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang was suspended 
(Lee, 2009) –, in part because Brussels did not turn into a counterweight of U.S. policies 
towards North Korea, as it was initially hoped in Pyongyang (Berkofsky, 2010). 
However, while sharing the basic foreign policy values and objectives emphasized by 
the U.S., the ways in which the EU has pursued them in the international arena have 
been more acceptable to many East Asian nations (Ohn, 2009), thereby opening a 
window of opportunity for further engagement with the DPRK via the quintessential 
European soft power. 
 
Indeed, the EU’s ability to act as a neutral facilitator of dialogue and peace in the region 
within the existing frameworks in which it participates might give it a great normative 
and de facto edge in pursuing a constructive, integrative policy vis-à-vis North Korea, in 
                                                            
34 An accessible but comprehensive analysis of the complex philosophical-political-racial system of 
beliefs that orchestrates North Korea’s monolithic ideology can be found in Myers’ 2009 book The 
Cleanest Race. How North Koreans See Themselves – And Why It Matters (New York: Melville House). 
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a way loosely comparable to the much-touted Helsinki Process35 and the mediation in 
U.S.-USSR relations in the 1970s. 
 
As asserted by Cha (2012), even regimes like Pyongyang’s might like to reform, but are 
afraid of undertaking changes because they witnessed the Arab Spring and fear that a 
slight opening could lead to total collapse. The EU could play an important role in that 
sense, using its soft power and benevolent image to promote gradual regime reform and 
opening. This would serve both the North Korean population, as it could enjoy 
increasing political and economic freedoms, and the perception of the EU as a global 
normative power with a positive influence that can extend to areas well beyond its 
borders. 
 
 
  
                                                            
35 As Zubok states in his 2007 book A Failed Empire, the commitments to human rights embedded in the 
Helsinki Final Act “proved to be a time bomb under the Soviet regime.” 
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2.7. Towards a more coherent, proactive and strategic Common Foreign and 
Security Policy 
 
“The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action 
and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall 
ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.” 
 
Article 21(3)(2) of the Treaty on European Union 
 
As Yale Professor Jolyon Howorth stated in a keynote speech at the Royal Military 
Academy of Belgium on 13 July 2010, “we find ourselves facing a historical turning 
point, where failed states have become more worrisome than strong states, collective 
security becomes more relevant than territorial defense, human rights become as 
important as states’ rights, soft civilian instruments of intervention become as crucial as 
military instruments and multi-level bargaining trumps muscle-flexing” (Howorth, 
2010b). In other words, the global context seems to be fit for the EU to take a more 
active, comprehensive and strategic role as an international actor. 
 
However, in 2010, Berkofsky performed a comparative analysis of the EU’s relations 
with the two major Northeast Asian powers, China and Japan, and the unruly North 
Korea, concluding that relations in general, and security ties with Tokyo, Beijing and 
Pyongyang in particular, did not necessarily show common and recurring patterns of EU 
security policies towards Asia (Berkofsky, 2010). 
 
According to Solana (2009), the EU was ahead of its time in 1999, initiating a new 
approach to international relations, responding to crises, instability and insecurity with 
effective crisis management instruments; however, it was lacking coordination and 
strategic thinking. One can easily argue that it is still lacking in those aspects nowadays, 
despite the fact that 25 out of the 62 amendments to the Nice Treaty included in the 
final version of the new Treaty on European Union deal with CFSP and CSDP 
(Charalampous, 2010). 
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Foreign relationships conducted at the EU level, a genuine CFSP, help establish the 
EU’s still-contested global role (Kelly, 2012) and improve its bargaining position 
against Member States fighting to retain foreign policy-making authority (Krotz, 2009; 
Krotz and Maher, 2011). So far, the EU’s CFSP remains mired in confusion, overlap, 
and turf conflict (Kelly, 2012). The outside world remains unsure if there is a true 
European foreign identity (Rosato, 2011), and the widening and deepening debt crisis 
may only worsen this tension. 
 
Despite the risks involved for the EU in adopting a more proactive approach vis-à-vis 
the DPRK, tensions in the Korean peninsula give the EU grounds to prove its political 
maturity in a theater where it has yet to play a visible geopolitical role. Moreover, 
deeper engagement in the Korean Peninsula could serve the interests of Brussels’ 
bureaucracy – vis-à-vis the rifts between Member States within the Council – and pro-
European elites as it simultaneously serves the EU’s general prestige (Krotz, 2009). 
 
Coherence entails EU norms should be part of a widely applicable and holistic strategy 
for world peace, whereas consistence means its internal policies, external prescriptions 
and actions should be consistent when promoting norms (Manners 2008). Therefore, if 
the EU and its Member States want to preserve their influence in the increasingly 
challenging and multipolar global setup of the 21st century, it is imperative that they act 
in a coherent, consistent and proactive way in all relevant regional theaters – among 
which Northeast Asia should be considered primus inter pares. 
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3. Past and present EU-North Korea relations 
 
After reviewing the key reasons why the European Union could be interested in 
pursuing a more active policy and eventually look for greater engagement vis-à-vis 
North Korea, the focus of this section moves to the past and current status of EU-DPRK 
bilateral relations. 
 
This section is subsequently divided in two parts. First, a chronological overview of EU 
relations with North Korea, based on historical highlights – including those not directly 
involving the EU but that have had a direct effect on bilateral relations –, will be 
provided in the form of a table. In the second part, the current status of EU-North Korea 
relations will be presented, focusing on the following topics: i) the legal framework and 
the sanctions regime; ii) the human rights issue and institutional relations; iii) 
humanitarian aid; iv) non-proliferation and the North Korean nuclear program; and, 
given its past relevance and future possibilities, v) energy assistance. 
 
3.1. Timeline of bilateral relations: from the hope of the 90s to the doubts of the 
leadership transition 
 
The present section will succinctly present the most relevant historical dates and facts 
that have given shape to EU relations with the DPRK up to the present day. Starting in 
the Second Cold War years, EU engagement with North Korea has not followed a 
stable, upward path. The following table, mostly focusing on contemporary issues, aims 
to offer a better understanding of the key reasons behind the current troubled relation 
between an allegedly trying European Union and the hostile North Korean regime. To 
further help the reader, the events have been divided into two overarching typologies: 
those that signaled a rapprochement between the EU and the DPRK and those that 
complicated bilateral relations. 
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YEAR(s) EVENTS FACILITATING ENGAGEMENT EVENTS  COMPLICATING ENGAGEMENT 
1976-1988 The U.S.-Soviet Détente promoted a limited enhancement of the relations 
and cooperation between North Korea and then-CE countries. 
 
1989-1992 Initial political relationships were established, at a time in which the 
relations between North Korea and the former socialist states in Central and 
Eastern Europe took a more pragmatic nature. This was compounded by the 
fact that many of these former Communist countries established diplomatic 
relations with South Korea and stopped giving aid to North Korea. 
Additionally, in 1991, North Korea passed the Foreigner Investment Act 
and opened the Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone. 
 
1993  On 12 March, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and denied inspectors access to its nuclear sites. 
1994 The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea was signed on 21 October 1994, 
shortly after Kim Il-sung’s death (8 July 1994). The objective of the 
agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's own nuclear 
program with light water reactor power plants, and the step-by-step 
normalization of relations between the U.S. and the DPRK. 
 
1995 The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), whose 
principal aim was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in 
North Korea to replace North Korea's reactors, is constituted. 
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The EU officially began its involvement in assistance programmes and 
cooperation activities with the DPRK. 
1996 The European Union Chamber of Commerce in Korea also established a 
North Korea Committee as a bridge to help European enterprisers visit 
North Korea and to establish contact with economic bureaucrats of the 
North. It was succeeded by the EU-Korea Foundation in 2001. 
 
1997 The European Union became a member of the KEDO project. The mortality peak of North Korea’s Arduous March was reached. Widespread 
famine from 1994 to 1998 caused somewhere between 900,000 and 3,500,000 
dead out of a total population of 22 million. 
 
First EU resolution on the issue of human rights in North Korea. 
1998 Kim Dae-jung, the new South Korean president, implemented the 
“Sunshine Policy” of rapprochement with the North. 
 
The first official visit from a European Parliament delegation took place in 
December to assess the situation of the country in terms of food and energy. 
The first EU-DPRK political dialogue was also held in Brussels. 
In August 1998, North Korea test-fired a long-range ballistic missile – 
allegedly a rocket to put a satellite in orbit – over Japan. 
1999 A resolution was passed by the European Parliament in March calling for 
the establishment of diplomatic ties, a dialogue on human rights and 
assistance beyond food aid. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of North 
Korea also visited the European Parliament in April 1999, and a second EU-
DPRK political dialogue was held in Berlin. 
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2000 Italy set up diplomatic relations with the DPRK in January. The UK 
followed in December. 
 
The historic Pyongyang Summit, between North Korean leader Kim Jong-il 
and South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, was held in June. 
 
The Korean Peninsula–European Union lines of action towards North Korea 
were published by the European Council in November. This document 
helped the Union to articulate the principles that Member States had to 
follow, while reiterating that the EU was not an outsider to the issues 
affecting the Korean peninsula (Kim, 2008). 
 
The EU’s approach towards the Korean Peninsula and the DPRK was 
defined in the Council Conclusions of 9 October and 20 November 2000, in 
which EU commitment to support the inter-Korean reconciliation process 
and to increase assistance to the DPRK was highlighted. 
 
2001 The Netherlands and Belgium established diplomatic relations with the 
DPRK in January 2001, followed by Spain on February and Germany, 
Luxembourg and Greece in March. 
 
On 14 May, after the official visit by Foreign Minister Person of Sweden, 
High Representative Javier Solana and EU Commissioner of Foreign 
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Relations Chris Patten to North Korea on 2-4 May, the EU established 
official diplomatic relations with the DPRK. 
 
The first human rights dialogue between the two parties took place between 
the EU and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Korea in 
Brussels in June. 
2002 The European Commission adopted the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 
2001-2004, in which it asserted that the “direction is clear and the process 
that is currently underway is considered by both parties as irreversible” 
(European Commission, 2002). 
 
A set of reforms introducing market economy elements to the command 
economy, the economic adjustment policy, was passed in North Korea. The 
Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, on the northwestern border with 
China, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, not far from the border with 
South Korea, were also established. 
 
A second round of human rights talks was held in June, and Pyongyang 
dispatched a group of senior officials to Europe to learn about EU economic 
policies and models and welcomed the European Parliament’s initiative to 
establish (quasi)-institutional and – by North Korean standards – regular 
exchanges (Ford, 2008). 
In October, the U.S. Government informed that a clandestine North Korean 
nuclear program had been detected. The European Council of November 
strongly demanded Pyongyang to suspend its uranium enrichment program and 
ordered the North to respect the NPT, announcing that “failure to resolve the 
nuclear issue would jeopardize the future development of EU-DPRK 
relations.” (European Council, 2002). 
 
During the KEDO Executive Board Meeting of 14 November, it was also 
decided to suspend heavy fuel oil deliveries as from December 2002. 
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2003 The 6 Party Talks between North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., China, 
Japan and Russia, were established. 
On 10 January, North Korea became the first nation ever to withdraw from the 
NPT and, at the same time, unilaterally cancel all nuclear arrangements under 
the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This prompted the 
EU to suspend official and large-scale humanitarian aid implemented under the 
aegis of the North Korea Country Strategy Paper. 
 
The EU also stopped providing its share of expenses for KEDO (with the light-
water reactor project being eventually put on hold in November), suspended a 
planned technical support plan to be funded by the National Indicative Program 
(2002-2004) and paralyzed the scheme to support enlargement of the EU 
market towards North Korean products (Lee, 2009). 
 
The EU sponsored a resolution against North Korea at the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in Geneva, which was adopted on 16 April. The changes in EU 
attitudes led the North Koreans to announce, during the meeting with the EU in 
December 2003, that they suspended the human rights dialogue. 
2004 The European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the Korean 
Peninsula was established in September 2004. Yearly visits to both North 
and South are undertaken, often with return visits by both countries. Also 
starting in 2004, Commission delegations visited North Korea to hold 
seminars on EU-North Korea relations and economic reforms in North 
Korea. 
The economic policy of partial liberalization started in July 2002 was gradually 
abandoned and old patterns of central economic planning, public distribution 
system, and strictly controlled market activity were being reintroduced. North 
Korean government officials and the army are told that market liberalism was a 
temporary phenomenon and would not be tolerated in the future. 
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The DPRK decided to suspend political dialogue due to the continued activism 
of the EU in sponsoring human rights resolutions at the UN level. 
2005  At the request of the EU, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights practices for the first time 
in the Human Rights Committee’s 57-year history on November 17 (Kim, 
2008; Lee, 2009). 
2006  On July 1, KEDO’s termination was announced. The reactors had cost the EU 
$125 million (6% of the total and as much as the U.S. paid in heavy oil).36 
 
Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 and declared itself a 
“nuclear state”. After the test, the UN Security Council passed two resolutions, 
1695 and 1718, which imposed strict sanctions to the North Korean regime. 
2007 As a result of the ongoing 6 Party Talks, the February 2007 agreement was 
reached, stating the provision of economic, financial and energy aid for 
North Korea in return for the verifiable and sustainable end of Pyongyang’s 
nuclear programs and the eventual dismantlement of all North Korean 
facilities (Barabesi, 2009; Berkofsky, 2009). After the announcement, 
Javier Solana stated that the EU would request to be a “player” as opposed 
to only a “payer” in a post-nuclear North Korea.   
 
 
                                                            
36 According to Lee (2009), the EU’s generous participation in the program can be in part seen as compensation to Japan for its support in the Balkan wars of the early 1990s. 
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2008  The economic policy of partial liberalization started in July 2002 was gradually 
abandoned and old patterns of central economic planning, public distribution 
system, and strictly controlled market activity were being reintroduced. 
 
DG ECHO closed its Pyongyang office in May. 
 
The December round of the 6 Party Talks ended in disagreement. It would 
eventually be the last round of multiparty negotiations to date. 
2009  In January, Pyongyang nullified a 1991 agreement with Seoul on 
reconciliation, non-aggression and co-operation, asserting it would no longer 
honor the Western maritime boundary between the two countries. This would 
later lead to the March 2010 Cheonan corvette sinking, in which 46 South 
Korean soldiers perished, and the November 2010 Yeonpyeong island shelling, 
with 4 civilian casualties. 
 
North Korea conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May, which led to the 
passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 and the subsequent 
reinforcement of existing EU sanctions against North Korea. In September, the 
DPRK officially acknowledged to the UN Security Council that it had a 
uranium enrichment program. 
 
Anti-market reforms in North Korea culminated with a failed currency reform 
in November, which subsequently led to uncontrolled inflation. 
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2010  After recovering from the stroke he suffered in 2008, Kim Jong-il accelerated 
his succession plans. In April, he gave his third son Kim Jong-un the post of 
vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). The junior 
Kim was also given the post of “first secretary” of the party, which doubles as 
the CMC chairman. Two days later, Kim Jong-un became the “first chairman” 
of the National Defense Committee (NDC). 
 
In December, Pyongyang revealed a fully operational uranium enrichment 
facility at Yongbyon to a reputed U.S. nuclear scientist. 
2011  In December 19, 2011, Kim Jong-il died of a massive stroke. His third and 
younger son, Kim Jong-un, was named successor and swiftly moved to 
consolidate his grip on power. Civilian elites such as Kim Kyong-hui, a 
younger sister of Kim Jong-il, and her husband Jang Song-taek, were set to flex 
considerable muscle within the North Korean government. While the EU and 
the U.S. showed wariness towards the dynastic succession while offering half-
hearted condolences to the regime, China promptly declared the legitimacy of 
the successor and vowed to stand behind him. 
2012 The Leap Day Agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK was reached on 
29 February. Under the tentative agreement, the U.S. would provide 
generous but strictly monitored food aid to the ailing North Korean 
population. 
In April, the UN Security Council tightened sanctions on Pyongyang for its 
failed rocket/satellite launch, an alleged violation of a ban on ballistic missile 
testing. It also led to the suspension of the agreement reached two months 
earlier with the Obama administration. 
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3.2. ¿What does the EU have now? The legal framework, the sanctions regime, 
limited unconditional aid and the non-proliferation of WMDs 
 
The EU’s current relative inactivity on the Korean peninsula issues somehow stands in 
contrast to the Union’s economic and political engagement policies towards North 
Korea of the early 2000s. The present section will be devoted to analyzing the elements 
that characterize the current status of EU-DPRK relations. Shaped by the overarching 
role of the past and current legal framework of the bilateral relations and the strict 
sanctions regime imposed by the EU on Pyongyang, engagement possibilities are 
effectively limited both within the EU’s external relations – i.e. trade relations, 
humanitarian aid, technical aid and development cooperation – and foreign policy 
toolsets. Still, as we will see, the EU has found ways to modestly help improve 
conditions in the field and to cooperate with other foreign powers in the fight to resolve 
the security and human rights issues that still plague Northeast Asia. 
 
3.2.1. The legal framework and the sanctions regime 
 
Up until 1997, there was no official channel of communication between the European 
institutions and Pyongyang. Only five out of 15 member states had diplomatic relations 
with the DPRK. (Ford, 2008: 193-194). In May 2001, the EU established diplomatic 
relations with Pyongyang and many EU Member States followed the EU example in 
2001 and 2002. By 2012, 26 out of the 27 EU Member States (all except France) 
maintain bilateral diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. 
 
Seven EU Member States (Germany, Bulgaria, Sweden, Romania, Great Britain, Poland 
and Hungary) maintain embassies in Pyongyang, the other Member States have 
themselves represented by either their embassies in Seoul or Beijing. Given that the EU 
itself does not maintain an embassy in Pyongyang – despite plans to open one after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the DPRK in May 2001, which have been 
consistently blocked by France – the seven embassies hold a rotating system of EU 
representation vis-à-vis the North Korean government and, depending on the issue and 
the political circumstances, the EU ambassador in Seoul can also act as EU 
representative in North Korea. 
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The EU approach towards the Korean Peninsula and the DPRK was set out in the 
Council Conclusions of 9 October37 and 20 November 2000.38 By underlining EU 
commitment to support the inter-Korean reconciliation process and to increase 
assistance to the DPRK in response to progress by North Korea in addressing the 
concerns of the EU and the international community in human rights, non-proliferation 
and security issues, progress in inter-Korean reconciliation, economic structural reform 
and social development (Barabesi, 2009), they endorsed the Commission decision to 
expand its assistance to the DPRK through providing additional market access 
possibilities for North Korean exports and launching a technical assistance program, 
while continuing the current humanitarian and food assistance to the DPRK and support 
for the KEDO project. 
 
The establishment of diplomatic relations in May 2001 led to the adoption of a North 
Korea Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2001-2004 in March 2002 (European 
Commission, 2002). Based upon the aforementioned Council Conclusions, the CSP, 
together with the EU’s National Indicative Program (NIP) for North Korea, laid out the 
framework and objectives for technical assistance projects in North Korea. The 
Commission’s declared priorities concentrated on three main areas: i) institutional 
support and capacity building; ii) sustainable development and use of natural resources 
including access to sustain-able energy sources; and iii) reliable and sustainable 
transport sector and rural development. Moreover, the EU concluded that support for 
North Korea’s industrial sector as opposed to support for the agricultural sector was 
crucial for a possible economic recovery in North Korea, whose economy was 
structurally similar to that of many Eastern European economies of the 1990s (European 
Commission, 2002). 
 
However, the implementation of the paper was suspended and it subsequently expired. 
There are currently no indications that Brussels is planning to draft and adopt a new 
North Korea Country Strategy Paper as the basis and framework for an economic 
engagement course. On the contrary, current relations are shaped by EU negative 
conditionality in the form of sanctions, viewed as the primary means of addressing the 
                                                            
37 Council meeting – General Affairs 2294th – Luxembourg, 9 October 2000 (PRES/00/364) 
38 Council meeting – General Affairs 2308th – Brussels, 20 November 2000 (PRES/00/435) 
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DPRK’s vertical – i.e. the development of its own programs – and horizontal – i.e. 
selling technology to third countries – proliferation potential (Cha, 2012: 456-457). 
 
International negotiations are costly and states can only enforce international 
cooperation to the degree that they negotiate an international agreement that authorizes 
sanctions upon defection (Downs, 1997), i.e. a set of actions aimed at reverting or 
reducing, to a higher or lesser degree, diplomatic or economic relations to spur changes 
in certain activities or practices, such as international law or human rights violations, or 
policies against the rule of law or democratic principles, engaged in by third country 
governments, persons or entities. 
 
Scholastic debate about the utility of negative conditionality in the form of sanctions is 
still ongoing. Although analyzing wider perspectives is outside the scope of this 
thesis,39 it must be pointed out that it is not difficult to find opposed views regarding the 
particular case of North Korea. On the one hand, we find views such as Cha’s (2012: 
456), who argues that sanctions imposed against North Korea are designed for 
counterproliferation and, therefore, should remain in place as long as Pyongyang 
maintains its nuclear capabilities. On the other, we find scholars as Stares (2010), who 
asserts that rather than making the verifiable and irreversible disarmament of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program a precondition to all subsequent relaxation of 
tensions and progress in other areas, including sanctions, limiting the size and 
operational readiness of the existing arsenal could become the main objective – even 
without abandoning the ultimate goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula. In fact, since 
the April 2012 failed missile test, North Korea’s status as a “nuclear armed state” has 
been enshrined in the Constitution, another signal that the government has no intention 
of giving up its nuclear program. 
 
The current EU sanctions regime is mostly based upon Article 215 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides a legal basis for the 
interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of the Union’s economic and financial 
relations with one or more third countries, where such restrictive measures are 
                                                            
39 For a theoretically reasoned argument on the level of sanctions states should choose to achieve 
international cooperation in an asymmetric power relationship, see Urpelainen’s (2010) paper “The 
enforcement–exploitation trade-off in international cooperation between weak and powerful states.” 
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necessary to achieve the objectives of the CFSP (European Commission, 2012d).40 
These sanctions are implemented via Council Decisions and (prior to 1 December 2009) 
Common Positions, including those providing measures not detailed in any specific 
Regulation, such as restrictions on admission (European Commission, 2012). 
 
The first Council Common Position concerning restrictive measures against the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 2006/795/CFSP,41 was approved in November 
2006, after North Korea made its first underground nuclear test in October of the same 
year. This Common Position, which implemented United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 1695 and 1718, focused on the sale of all arms and weapons, nuclear- and 
missile technology-related materials, luxury goods, the entry or transit of certain 
individuals and a fund and asset freeze. It was further amended in July 2009 by 
Common Position 2009/573/CFSP,42 after a second North Korean nuclear detonation 
and with the goal of transposing UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which widened 
the scope of the restrictive measures by extending the arms embargo. 
 
However, as thoroughly detailed in the latest available update of the Commission 
document on the European Union’s Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force, the 
current EU sanctions regime is mainly based upon Council Decision 2010/800/CFSP,43 
which superseded Common Position 2006/795/CFSP (and, therefore, also Common 
Position 2009/573/CFSP). It provides for an extensive list of up to fifteen restrictive 
measures, including an embargo on arms and related materiel; a ban on exports of 
technology and luxury goods; a ban on new commitments for grants, financial 
assistance and loans to the DPRK; measures to prevent specialized teaching or training; 
the inspection of cargoes to and from DPRK; and restrictions on admission and the 
                                                            
40 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, sanctions were based upon Articles 60 and 301 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. 
41 Council Common Position 2006/795/CFSP of 20 November 2006 concerning restrictive measures 
against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (OJ L 322, 22.11.2006, p. 32) 
42 Council Common Position 2009/573/CFSP of 27 July 2009 amending Common Position 
2006/795/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (OJ 
L 197, 29.7.2009, p. 111) 
43 Council Decision 2010/800/CFSP of 22 December 2010 concerning restrictive measures against the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and repealing Common Position 2006/795/CFSP  (OJ L 341, 
23.12.2010, p. 32) 
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freezing of the funds and economic resources of the persons, entities and bodies listed in 
Annexes II and III (later amended by Council Decision 2011/860/CFSP44). 
 
Still in force is also Council Regulation (EC) 329/2007,45 essentially banning exports 
and imports of certain goods and technology listed by the UN, exports of luxury goods, 
the provision of certain services and the freezing of funds of certain individuals and 
entities. It was amended by Commission Regulation (EC) 117/200846 and, most notably, 
by Council Regulation (EU) 1283/2009,47 including an additional ban on exports and 
imports of certain goods and technology; the prior information requirement on cargoes 
to and from DPRK; measures to be applied by EU credit and financial institutions to 
exercise vigilance over their activities with banks domiciled in DPRK and their 
subsidiaries; the amendment of the provision concerning freezing of funds and 
economic resources; and the completion of Annexes I48 and IV of the original 
Regulation.49 
 
Overall, we find a heavily curtailed scope for bilateral economic and commercial 
relations. However, current sanctions fall short of banning fruitful exchanges outside the 
provided limitations: being heavily targeted at certain persons, entities and goods – i.e. 
“smart sanctions” –, they are meant to spare the rest of the population and, therefore, 
allow for hypothetical aid flows and businesses exchanges that could alleviate the 
overall situation. This becomes clear when analyzing the wording of several articles of 
Council Decision 2010/800/CFSP: despite banning certain forms of trade, Article 2(1) 
                                                            
44 Council Decision 2011/860/CFSP of 19 December 2011 amending Decision 2010/800/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (OJ L 338, 
21.12.2011, p. 56) 
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 of 27 March 2007 concerning restrictive measures against the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (OJ L 88, 29.03.2007, p. 1) 
46 Commission Regulation (EC) No 117/2008 of 28 January 2008 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (OJ L 35, 
9.2.2008, p. 57) 
47 Council Regulation (EU) No 1283/2009 of 22 December 2009 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (OJ L 346, 
23.12.2009, p. 1) 
48 Annex I, listing goods and technology subject to ban on exports and imports (other than luxury goods), 
would be subsequently amended by Council Regulation (EU) 567/2010 (OJ L 163, 30.6.2010, p. 15). 
49 Annex V, listing the targeted persons, entities and bodies whose funds and economic resources should 
be frozen, was amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1355/2011 (OJ L 338, 
21.12.2011, p. 39), passed just two days after the death of Kim Jong-il and the rushed transfer of power to 
his younger son Kim Jong-un. 
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clearly opens the door for wider trade; Article 2(2) also uses what could be qualified as 
ambiguous wording, failing to quantify the extent to which trade shall be limited; and 
Article 8 also limits training opportunities in a somewhat fuzzy manner. 
 
Therefore, thanks to the non-exhaustiveness of the current targeted sanctions, the EU 
has managed to stay engaged with North Korea, albeit in a limited manner, as we will 
see in the next subsections. 
 
3.2.2. The human rights issue: defining institutional relations 
 
On 15 April 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of his late grandfather, Kim Il-sung, 
young leader Kim Jong-un addressed the North Korean masses. The contrast with his 
late father, Kim Jong-il, could not have been clearer. He spoke directly to the nation. 
His regime invited international television crews to film the festivities. It even admitted 
that a mission to put a satellite into orbit in honor of his grandfather had failed. Some 
commentators claimed to detect signals from the young ruler of a new openness in the 
regime (The Economist, 2012a). 
  
However, the situation inside the country is as dire as ever. As asserted by Cha (2012: 
8), “North Korea ranks seventh out of seven (lowest possible) on Freedom’s House 
2012 Freedom in the World index, and is therefore one of just nine countries forming 
the group of ‘the worst of the worst’. It is in the 0th percentile for the World Bank’s 
Voice and Accountability index and ranks dead last in the Freedom of the Press index.” 
Reports about the victims of repression in North Korea tell us how ruthless the regime 
still is. Whole families, including children, are incarcerated for “guilt by association.”50 
There are no trials for those in the political camps. Crimes include not wiping the dust 
off a portrait of Kim Il-sung; having been a diplomat or student in Eastern Europe in the 
late 1980s and having witnessed the collapse of socialism; having contact (usually in 
China) with South Koreans; or even being a Christian (Cha, 2012). 
 
As already explored in the previous chapter, the promotion of human rights and 
democracy has been very high on the EU’s agenda. The EU has introduced over 200 
                                                            
50 Under an edict from Kim Il-sung in 1972, up to three generations must be punished in order to wipe out 
the “seed” of class enemies (Cha, 2012). 
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resolutions on specific human rights situations in UN forums since 1991, and North 
Korea has been, since 1997, one of the main targets, including a resolution at the 53rd 
UN Commission on Human Rights to prepare the first formal UN assessment of North 
Korea’s human rights conditions (Lee, 2012 citing Brantner and Gowan, 2008: 83). 
 
North Korea participates in some international treaties on human rights. It is a signatory 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), although in 1997 it 
decided to withdraw unilaterally after the first UN resolution regarding the human rights 
situation in the country (European Commission, 2002). It is also a signatory to the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. It has failed, however, to ratify its accession and, therefore, does 
not implement the relevant provisions. 
 
Political dialogue between the EU and North Korea was initiated in 1998, with 
subsequent rounds coming in the following years. From the outset, they included a 
modest human rights element, which was reinforced after the May 2001 Troika visit to 
North Korea (see table on section 3.1.1), where the EU highlighted the importance of 
addressing human rights issues by telling their counterparts that further assistance 
would depend on the improvement of the human rights situation. Pyongyang 
subsequently accepted to hold a seminar on human rights (Kim, 2008). 
 
The first human rights dialogue took place between the “troika” (consisting of Swedish 
Prime Minister and President of the European Council Goran Persson, the EU’s Foreign 
Policy Representative Javier Solana, and the EC Commissioner for External Relations 
Chris Patten) and representatives of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign affairs in 
Brussels in June 2001 (Kim, 2008). Later in 2001, at the fourth political dialogue held 
in Pyongyang, the parties agreed to include humanitarian issues in the annual political 
dialogue instead of holding separate humanitarian talks. The second round of human 
rights talks, held in June 2002, was criticized as not producing any substantial results. 
The fifth political dialogue of June 2003 also fell short of expectations (Kim, 2008).  
 
Admitting that moderate measures would not work to improve the North Korea’s 
human rights situations (Berkofsky, 2003), the EU opted for multilateral engagement by 
tabling a resolution on human rights in North Korea at the UN Commission on Human 
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Rights (UNCHR) meeting in 2003.51 This led the North Koreans to announce, during 
the meeting with the EU in December 2003, that they suspended the human rights 
dialogue; political dialogue would also be suspended in 2004. Instead of backing down, 
the EU became more assertive on human rights issues, leading the passing of a 
resolution denouncing the North’s human rights record to the UN General Assembly for 
the first time in November 2005 (Kim, 2008).  
 
Despite a temporary pause in 2007, the multilateral efforts of the EU to deal with North 
Korea’s human rights issue at the UN continued in 2008, 2009 and 2010.52 Political 
dialogue was also resumed in 2007 and held again in 2009, and the EU used it to voice 
its concern with the human rights situation and the denuclearization issue (Delegation of 
the Commission to the Republic of Korea, 2012). 
 
According to the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 
2011, the EU remained “seriously concerned” over the violations of human rights in 
DPRK, and looked “to improve the situation” (European Commission, 2011b). Human 
rights concerns were also raised directly with the DPRK authorities by the resident 
ambassadors of the EU Member States in Pyongyang and during meetings with DPRK 
officials in Brussels and in other EU Member States (European Commission, 2011b). 
 
Bilateral dialogue and institutional relations are complemented by regular meetings 
between senior officials from both sides and official EU visits to Pyongyang at regional 
director level, which are also used to request respect for all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the recommendations of relevant UN Resolutions, while 
offering expertise and constructive cooperation if substantial dialogue is established. 
 
Finally, the role of the European Parliament should not be dismissed. Featuring a 
Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula, which also holds inter-
parliamentary meetings with the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK on a non-
regular basis (European Parliament, 2012), it has passed numerous resolutions 
                                                            
51 A second and third resolution on North Korean human rights conditions were also adopted in April 
2004 and 2005, respectively. 
52 As recently as 21 December 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution initiated by the EU, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea on the human rights situation in DPRK. 
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concerning human rights in the DPRK,53 expressing deep concern and criticism over the 
large scale human rights abuses taking place and urging Pyongyang to improve the 
situation. 
 
Dialogue and institutional relations have a particular significance, especially when the 
existing environment would not allow the parties concerned to directly address human 
rights issues, as is the case of the DPRK (Lee, 2012). Therefore, even if limited by the 
current political situation, shaped by North Korean hostility and EU negative 
conditionality, maintaining channels of communication open at all times is still 
considered an essential feature of EU-DPRK bilateral relations.  
                                                            
53 With European Parliament Resolution of 23 March 1999 on relations between the European Union and 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (OJ C 177, 22.6.1999, p. 51) being the first and European 
Parliament Resolution of 8 July 2010 on North Korea (OJ C 351E, 2.12.2011, p. 132) the latest so far. 
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3.2.3. Unconditional humanitarian aid 
 
For as long as human rights have existed, the right to food has been an inseparable part 
of the concept. Article 25 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that “all have the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care” 
(UN General Assembly, 1948). Article 11 of the International Covenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, to which North Korea acceded in 1981, recognizes “the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger” (UN General Assembly, 1966). 
However, North Korea has consistently been unable guarantee these basic fundamental 
rights to its citizens since the mid-1990s. 
 
When it became clear to the international community that North Korea was suffering a 
catastrophic food crisis, donors moved quickly to bring some relief to the country’s 
people. In 1995 and 1996, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivered over half a 
million metric tons of food aid per year. The years 1997 and 1998 saw over 900,000 
metric tons and almost 800,000 metric tons, respectively. From 1999 to 2002, the WFP 
annually donated more than 1 million metric tons of food aid to North Korea, peaking at 
1.5 million metric tons in 2001. In total, since the program started working in the 
country, it has delivered over 12 million metric tons of food to the North Korean people 
(Cha, 2012). 
 
Figure 1: Net ODA received per capita (in USD). Source: International Development Statistics Database, 
OECD (2012). 
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Still, as Figure 1 clearly demonstrates, levels of aid received by North Korea are 
extremely low compared to those of other countries facing severe humanitarian issues. 
The World Food Program estimates that around 16 million North Koreans (2/3 of the 
population) still depend on the old official Public Distribution System (Cha, 2012). 
Actual rations delivered are well below the official minimum of 573g of cereals per 
person per day, with estimates for 2011 putting the figure around 250g.54 Consequences 
on public health are obviously nefarious and punctuated by the fact that, although a 
decent health service system is in place, it lacks medicines and equipment. North 
Korea’s ratio of arable land to population is among the lowest in the world, and 
agricultural production requires ongoing imported inputs such as fertilizer and 
irrigation, that subsequently depends on a reliable electricity supply for pumping 
(European Commission, 2002). 
 
The EU has been providing significant humanitarian aid in a non-conditional fashion: 
since 1995, it has destined more than 370 million euro55 in aid to the DPRK, consisting 
of food, medical and sanitation assistance, as well as the supply of agricultural 
equipment. Unlike other major donors, interactions between the EU and the DPRK can 
only be understood upon the EU’s ongoing decision to separate security from 
humanitarian issues (Berkofsky, 2003).  For instance, while U.S. humanitarian aid fell 
into a sharp decline after the 2002 nuclear crisis, the EU did not follow the same path. 
The reconstruction of water and sanitation facilities, as well as actions in the health 
sector initiated from 2003, continued with the allocation of relief funds for sudden 
emergencies, such as the 2004 Ryongchon train explosion (Barabesi, 2009 citing 
Dawson, 2004). Intermittent and sporadic aid was also offered even after the missile test 
in 2005, which derailed the relationship between the EU and North Korea. 
 
With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has been given, via Article 214 TFEU, 
explicit powers in the field of humanitarian aid. Moreover, the provision refers to “third 
countries,” thus encompassing both developing countries and countries that, for 
                                                            
54 According to Cha (2012), NGO groups that visited rural areas of the country in early 2011 included a 
question asking when it was the last time the respondent had protein in their nutritional surveys. Virtually 
every respondent could remember the exact date when they last had an egg or a piece of meat, revealing 
the dire state of undernourishment. 
55 It should be noted that transport costs to and distribution costs in North Korea are usually included in 
these totals, which significantly reduces the funds available for actual food and humanitarian aid. 
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whatever reasons, do not fall into that category. As stated by the EEAS on its website, 
current EU activities vis-à-vis North Korea “are mainly oriented towards support for the 
agricultural sector and are financed under the Food Security Thematic Programme of 
the Development Cooperation Instrument” (European External Action Service, 2012a). 
 
After the closure of the Pyongyang office of DG ECHO in May 2008, the EU’s 
multilateral, longer-term cooperation instruments have been managed by EuropeAid’s56 
Coordination Office, and funds have been provided to six international NGOs active in 
North Korea. The EU funded projects worth 7.4 million Euros in 2008 and 8.4 million 
Euros in 201057 (Lee, 2012), mostly targeting people and communities at the local 
level58 and focusing on agricultural self sustainability and education in environmental 
management – including education in erosion, deforestation, pest management, sloping 
land management and agricultural techniques (Barabesi, 2009). 
 
NGOs, relabeled “EU Project Teams” for political reasons, carry out their projects using 
funds from the Food Security thematic program, granted after bidding in calls for 
proposals, and enjoy the support of a consultant office, which is sometimes perceived as 
an EU representation office despite having a very different role: it is used by contractors 
to discuss project interests and, only to some extent, to bring up issues with the North 
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Projects focus on health – including a project for people with disabilities under a 
different budget line – and food and water security. Several NGOs have provided 
specific technical assistance, offering courses to candidates selected by the North 
Korean government in economics, agriculture, and capacity building. Some have 
advised North Koreans on water, sanitation, seed improvement, and soil erosion 
prevention projects. Others have offered North Koreans officials study-abroad 
opportunities and/or classes in English language (Taylor and Manyin, 2011). 
                                                            
56 It must be noted that, since January 2011, EuropeAid is part of the new Directorate-General for 
Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DG DEVCO). 
57 The aid amount was however reduced to 2.5 million Euros in 2009 due to North Korea’s second 
nuclear test. 
58 According to Ford (2011), the EU focuses its assistance in the Northeast of the country and to children 
under five hospitalized with malnutrition or in residential care, pregnant and breastfeeding women, 
hospital patients and the elderly. 
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On top of the long-term development cooperation instruments, DG ECHO has also 
responded to humanitarian needs. When floods devastated part of the Northwestern 
provinces of North Korea in the summer of 2010, ECHO also provided 200,000 Euro to 
the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to help about 
100,000 affected people (European Commission, 2011a). Most recently, the 
Commission decided, in July 2011, to provide emergency food aid worth of 10 million 
Euros to protect 650,000 North Koreans at risk from dying of malnutrition (Lee, 2012). 
 
The Commission has repeatedly assured that this limited aid will be available no matter 
the political situation, as it acknowledges that technical aid is one of the long term 
solutions to the causes of many problems in countries it works in. The Commission, 
now with the assistance of the EEAS, in charge of developing aid policy on the field, is 
also ready to intervene if natural disasters or famines occur again in the future. 
However, direct development aid, under the Development Co-operation Instrument 
(DCI), will not be offered to the DPRK until the nuclear crisis is settled (Barabesi, 
2009). Moreover, if monitoring distribution is not possible, EU aid will not be delivered 
and, in case the aid is being diverted from its intended recipients, the Commission will 
not hesitate to end its humanitarian intervention, as Commissioner Georgieva made 
clear in 2011 (Ford, 2011). 
 
To summarize, we see a complex scenario in which, despite the current international 
political climate and the harsh sanctions imposed on North Korea, limited but valuable 
EU aid is consistently and non-conditionally provided to the ailing North Korean 
population, albeit usually in an indirect fashion. 
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3.2.4. Non-proliferation and the North Korean nuclear program 
 
The EU has, since 2003, a Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Council of the European Union, 2003b), considered a complement to the 
2003 European Security Strategy and initially including the appointment of a Personal 
Representative of the High Representative on non-proliferation of WMD – a post that 
disappeared with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the revamped CFSP. The 
implementation of this strategy, complemented by two additional Council documents – 
the updated list of priorities (Council of the European Union, 2008a) and the new lines 
for action (Council of the European Union, 2008b) –, is reviewed by six-monthly 
progress reports. 
 
As stated in the latest progress report, the guiding principle and overall aim of the EU in 
the field of proliferation is the promotion of the universality of international treaties, 
conventions and other instruments by means of all available instruments and financial 
resources, including the CFSP budget and the Instrument for Stability (Council of the 
European Union, 2012a). For instance, the EU has committed more than €30 million to 
the Nuclear Security Fund, as well as €25 million to the IAEA’s Low Enriched Uranium 
Bank through the Instrument for Stability. Moreover, the EU aims to address non-
proliferation issues in the bilateral relations with all relevant countries – obviously 
including the DPRK. 
 
In this regard, the EU has strongly condemned the attempted missile/rocket launch 
conducted on 13 April 2012, has continued to urge the DPRK to abandon all its existing 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. 
In June 2012, it demarched the DPRK urging it to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and to refrain from any further provocative acts, in particular in the form of new 
nuclear tests (Council of the European Union, 2012a). 
 
However, the strategy cannot fully conceal the enduring internal divergences on nuclear 
issues, namely the gap between the views of the two nuclear powers (France and the 
United Kingdom) and those of the remaining Member States. According to Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan, the EU faces a serious credibility issue in pressuring third countries 
to sign and respect the NPT, to renounce their nuclear ambitions and to accept non-
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proliferation provisions in any relations with the EU. This is further compounded by the 
inability of the EU’s nuclear powers to provide a credible security guarantee to these 
third countries, which often pursue nuclear capability due to their shaky security 
situation (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 168). 
 
Additionally, in terms of the two most recent successful non-proliferation initiatives, the 
Libyan model – relinquishing nuclear capability in exchange for integration into the 
international community – would not work because North Korea needs aid before 
access, while the Ukrainian model – in which nuclear capabilities would be given up for 
multilateral security guarantees and economic inducements – fits the bill but does not 
suit the interests of the past U.S. and current South Korean administrations. 
 
The recent Libyan experience – with Gaddafi’s regime being toppled with NATO help a 
few years after renouncing to its nuclear program – means that there is very little chance 
that Pyongyang agrees to surrender its nuclear weapons. Currently, the DPRK sees 
nuclear deterrence as a sine qua non condition for the protection of its national 
sovereignty (Ford, 2012). A very graphic example of this approach is given by Cha 
(2012), as he quotes a North Korean negotiator as saying: “You will never attack us 
because we have nuclear weapons. Afghanistan did not. Iraq did not. Libya gave them 
up. That’s why you attacked them, but not us”. 
 
According to Cha (2012: 301-304), North Korea seeks a deal similar to the one the U.S. 
accepted with India and Pakistan: full acceptance as a nuclear state in exchange for 
coming back into the IAEA safeguards and monitoring, plus the permission to run a 
civilian nuclear energy program and to control a portion of its nuclear armament as a 
deterrent and a generous package of economic development aid and energy assistance. 
Ford (2008) agrees with this posture, stating that the only basis for any settlement must 
be the guarantee of non-intervention by the United States – something Cha calls a 
“regime security assurance”. 
 
North Korea has the notion that nuclear weapons are the only guarantor of national 
security and the most reliable means of deterrence against military provocation from 
hostile governments (Park, 2010). Therefore, we have to wonder how strongly the EU’s 
words can resonate in North Korean ears if the incentives for the regime to 
progressively give up its nuclear capacity are not dramatically heightened.  
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3.2.5. Energy assistance 
 
Although non-existent at the time of writing, EU-DPRK cooperation in the energy field 
is not unprecedented. As already detailed on section 3.1, the EU took part in the now-
defunct KEDO project. The EU participated in the project almost from its inception: it 
joined the Executive Board in 1997, accelerating its participation from 2001 and halting 
it after North Korea’s missile tests and self-exclusion from the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
in 2003 (Ohn, 2009). It did so probably on the grounds that it was in line with its goal of 
strengthening non-proliferation and contributed to regional security, but also because 
Japan, South Korea and the U.S. needed a strong and neutral member (Lee, 2009). 
However, the EU probably would not accept playing such a role again – i.e. being a 
“payer” that is not a real “player.” 
 
Energy supply is maybe the crucial bottleneck for the North Korean economy at the 
moment. Outside of privileged Pyongyang and some limited number of industrial sites, 
electricity supply is limited to 3 or 4 hours a day. The Korean regime is trying to boost 
power production, especially from renewable sources. Such efforts are, however, 
insufficient: beyond boosting domestic production, the DPRK needs energy imports.  
 
North Korea must meet virtually all of its oil demand through imports, even if it 
amounts to just 6% of total energy consumption (Ford, 2008). The discussed Gazprom 
proposal to build a gas pipeline across North Korea to supply natural gas to South Korea 
would allow the North Korean to apply transit duties and bleed a percentage for its own 
use. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the North Korean Ministry 
of the Oil Industry and Gazprom in September 2011, setting up a working group, but 
further intergovernmental agreements have failed to materialize, as there should be 
some serious guarantees from the DPRK regarding security of supply to the South. 
 
The fact that no projects are currently active on this particular field should not mar its 
historical importance and its relevance for the future development of North Korea. 
Probably focused on new sources of renewable energy – wind and tidal energy could be 
prime candidates –, future cooperation in this field could prove beneficial for all 
involved parties. Its eventual feasibility and desirability will subsequently be explored 
in the following section of this thesis. 
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After reviewing this analysis of the past and current status of EU-North Korea relations, 
the focus will fall on the expected and/or desired evolution of these relations, both in the 
eyes of directly involved actors and relevant stakeholders. 
 
In order to achieve that, a double methodological approach, combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, has been adopted and will be presented in the next two 
chapters. On Chapter 4, the focus will be on the qualitative element: a series of in-depth 
interviews with relevant actors, directly or indirectly related to the European Union, its 
policymaking and its relations with North Korea. Chapter 5 will revolve around the 
quantitative part of the research project, conducted via a statistically relevant number of 
survey answers collected among South Korean university students. 
 
Finally, the results presented in both chapters will be merged and analyzed in a 
combined fashion to detect any possible expectation gaps between the two subsets of 
stakeholders in order to assess the validity of our initial hypotheses.  
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4. The insiders speak: a qualitative approach to future perspectives on EU-North 
Korea relations (I) 
 
4.1. Overview 
 
The design of the first part of this study is partially guided by the qualitative method in 
social science, with the goal of constructing descriptive inferences based on the 
collected and analyzed data. It includes a combination of historical, inductive, and 
interpretive approaches to better reveal the factual realities and the insights of the 
interviewees. Therefore, this part of the thesis is mainly based on interview data, 
sometimes complemented with relevant contextual information obtained from other 
relevant sources. 
 
Opinions and reflections from interviews with relevant professionals who are directly 
and indirectly involved in the relations between the European Union and North Korea 
provide rich information and “close to the ground” insights. The choice of interviews is 
meant to offer the widest possible scope, from the views of a Seoul-based Korean 
academic expert on the European Union and those of a Member of the European 
Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula, to the insights of a 
Seoul-based European diplomat and those of a representative of an NPO working in the 
field in North Korea. 
 
An interpretive method is used in the interview data analysis in order to separate and 
interpret the collected opinions based on the profile of the interviewees and their 
contexts. Thus, who said what and why he/she said it might matter. Moreover, the 
researcher may add his own value in the interviews and his own values may interfere 
when being confronted by multiple interpretations of the data. In addition, the author 
realizes that this analysis may not represent a holistic picture of EU-North Korea 
relations. However, as a multidisciplinary study controlling for such factors is so far 
absent in the literature, this research can help fill some of the gap – while precisely 
aiming to explain perception and expectation gaps. 
 
To that end, four in-depth interviews have been performed, two of them in person and 
the remaining two via e-mail. The choice of participants was carefully designed to 
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ensure maximal exposure and relevance concentration in a reduced number of 
interviews, representing academia, European diplomacy, European decision making and 
field work in North Korea. 
 
The first interviewee was Dr. Daewoon Ohn, Vice-Dean of the Graduate School of 
International and Area Studies and Chair of the European Studies Department at the 
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, as well as a frequent collaborator of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea. Dr. Ohn, as a top representative 
from academia, offers the rare combination of advanced knowledge of both the 
European Union and North Korea. The interview was conducted on 11 May 2012 on the 
premises of the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. In the case of this face-to-face 
interview, the discussion was recorded upon approval of the interviewee, and later 
analyzed for the purpose of evaluation. 
 
The second interviewee was a senior European diplomat based in Seoul that has 
requested anonymity due to the political sensibility of the discussed information. As a 
high-ranking diplomat, this person has had direct contact with North Korean authorities 
and is fully familiar with the EU’s current engagement and relations with North Korea, 
as well as being a knowledgeable source to discuss future perspectives. This interview 
was conducted in person on 15 May 2012 in Seoul. No verbatim or recording thereof is 
available, due to the anonymity requests of the interviewee. 
 
The third participant is Mr. Lucas Hartong, a Dutch non-affiliated Member of the 
European Parliament and member of the Delegation of the European Parliament for 
Relations with the Korean Peninsula. The interview was conducted per e-mail. A 
questionnaire was sent to Mr. Hartong on 2 July 2012, and he answered the questions in 
written form on 26 August 2012.  
 
Even if the European Parliament is not considered an important actor in EU foreign 
policy, it does indeed play a key role in external relations issues – albeit indirectly59 – 
                                                            
59 In that respect, the main roles of the European Parliament with implications for the EU external 
relations are its budgetary powers and its power not to ratify international agreements which, even if 
seldom used, give it considerable leverage in negotiation processes and add relevance to its consulting 
role. 
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and in human rights promotion, as it establishes strong conceptual links between human 
rights, the Union’s global position. Moreover, its existence as the only democratically 
elected EU institution and its oversight of CFSP and EU external action make Mr. 
Hartong’s views – in his double status of representative of the Parliament and expert in 
Korean issues – extremely relevant for the current research project.60 
 
Finally, in line with the fact that the EU channels most of its aid to Pyongyang in an 
indirect fashion (see section 3.2.4), the fourth interviewee should represent some 
relevant European organization working on the field with North Korea – independently 
of the fact of directly receiving EU funds or not. A relevant representative of one of the 
more active non-profit organizations (NPOs) in the Korean peninsula, with direct and 
very recent experience in North Korea, agreed to answer an in-depth questionnaire per 
email, which was sent on July 2, sending his answers back to this researcher on 20 
August 2012. For confidentiality reasons, the name of the respondent, as well as that of 
the relevant NPO, are kept secret. 
 
The chosen interview method depended on how it was ultimately conducted. In the case 
of the two live meetings, a semi-structured interview was conducted in order to 
guarantee an open framework allowing for focused, conversational, two-way 
communication. A base questionnaire was prepared for both interviewees, and it was 
subsequently modified on the go, according to the answers given and the particular 
interests of the interviewee. 
 
As far as the interviews performed per e-mail are concerned, the method used was a 
structured questionnaire framework, where detailed questions are formulated ahead of 
time. The lack of two-way communication is offset by the detailed answers and the 
possibility that the interviewee carefully prepares his/her answers. In this case, two 
different questionnaires were prepared, one aimed at the Member of the European 
Parliament and the other focusing on the insights that a lead representative of an NPO 
                                                            
60 We must, however, acknowledge that the political nature of the Parliament makes it impossible that the 
views of just one of its members represent those of the wider political spectrum. Efforts were made to 
contact other members of the Delegation of the European Parliament for Relations with the Korean 
Peninsula representing other political options and views, but interviews were politely refused on grounds 
of lack of time by the relevant MEPs or their assistants. Consequently, future research on this topic should 
strive to incorporate a wider variety of political views for greater reliability and representativeness. 
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working in North Korea could offer. All questionnaires can be found in Appendices II 
and III, respectively. 
 
For improved coherence and relevance of the results, a similar set of questions and 
concerns was addressed in both the qualitative interviews and the quantitative surveys. 
Therefore, and based upon the main topics that were dealt with, both the current and the 
following sections are essentially divided into relevant topics in order to present the 
answers and findings in a clear and orderly way.  
 
In order to facilitate comprehension and processing, the analysis of the information 
given by the four interviewees has been divided along three major thematic lines: i) 
possible changes in the North Korean regime; ii) possible changes in EU engagement 
with North Korea; and iii) hypothetical areas for increased cooperation. These three 
major blocks will be further subdivided in thematic subsets to better distribute the 
collected insights and align them with the statistical results of the survey, detailed in the 
next section of this thesis. 
 
This will be followed by two tables. First, a table summarizing the key points of view 
expressed by each participant will be provided for further clarity. Next to it, a second 
table with the same structure will visually present the postures of each interviewee on a 
positive-negative color-coded scale. Elaborated using an ad-hoc modification of content 
analysis, focusing on overall tone and content instead of keywords, it will also allow for 
easy assessment of the degree of consensus (or lack thereof) on the issues and topics. 
 
Finally, a brief set of observations related to the degree of consensus (or lack thereof) 
achieved in the responses given by the interviewees will be presented. 
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4.2. Possible changes inside the North Korean regime 
 
4.2.1. Social and economic systems 
 
One of the major question marks surrounding the new North Korean leader, as already 
discussed in the introductory chapter, is his willingness and/or ability to introduce 
market-oriented reforms and to progressively open up the economy of the hermetic 
country and, therefore, ameliorate the living conditions of an ailing society.  
 
This is an issue that prompted quasi-unanimous optimism, in that the four interviewees 
consider that reforms are “possible” or even “probable.” However, they differ in the 
timeframe of the reforms and the reasons that will eventually define the depth and scope 
of any changes.  
 
According to the Seoul-based European diplomat, the New Year’s editorial of 2012 was 
remarkably shorter because the new government wants to leave things relatively open. 
For the time being, a high degree of continuity should be expected, because young Kim 
Jong-un does not yet have the power base or the experience to implement real changes. 
Even so, the diplomat notes that he spoke directly to his people on the occasion of the 
100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday, something that Kim Jong-il did just once in 
his 17 years in power. 
 
This diplomat also asserts that, if Kim Jong-un really wants to run the country, he can 
“hardly continue” down the path set by his father. He might be inclined to doing some 
incremental economic reforms, highlighted by the revival of SEZs, to bring foreign 
direct investment into the country and probably improve living conditions for the 
people. Kim Jong-un has to ensure income to buy off his inner circle and eventually 
enlarge it. Plus, average North Koreans are becoming aware they don’t live in a 
paradise, as they see Chinese businessmen and they can figure out that they are better 
off, and seeing Chinese “comrades” doing well is profoundly different in quality to 
seeing “evil” rich Westerners.61   
                                                            
61 Remarkably enough, the views expressed by the South Korean academic expert – who expressed that 
North Koreans might be more inclined towards doing business with the Chinese for historic-political and 
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Additionally, there is a growing local elite that benefits from capitalism, black markets 
and corruption: inequality fuels tensions in a society emphasizing equality, and the 
government is failing in controlling the society and even its own officials the way it 
would like to. The risk of regime collapse is, nevertheless, minimum, as the country 
lacks the social infrastructure to ignite a revolutionary movement. The regime has 
survived under very trying circumstances for more than 20 years, and China will do its 
best to keep it alive as long as possible. The greater risk could come from internal 
power struggles. 
 
Dr. Daewoon Ohn mostly agrees with the posture expressed by the diplomatic source, 
only dissenting on the main sources of Kim Jong-un’s behavior. While the diplomatic 
source focuses on internal factors to explain why changes will not be forthcoming, Dr. 
Ohn asserts that the reason why Kim Jong-un will not implement substantive changes in 
2012 is as much external as it is internal.  
 
Despite openly acknowledging that there is no quick fix to the pressing domestic 
problems the regime faces – and the opening up versus regime preservation dilemma –, 
Dr. Ohn stresses that the new North Korean leader has chosen to adopt a “wait-and-see” 
approach. In other words, Kim Jong-un needs a clearer vision of how upcoming 
political developments in South Korea (with the December 2012 presidential elections), 
China (with its impeding and convulse power transition) and Russia (with Vladimir 
Putin’s controversial return to power) unfold before embarking on a reform path. 
 
However, Dr. Ohn also points out the importance of the Kaesong industrial complex as 
a “test ground” for the North Korean regime and as a model that could be further 
replicated and extended. He considers that comparisons with China’s gradual economic 
opening during the decade of the 1980s, highlighted by agricultural reform and the 
creation of Special Economic Zones, are not off the mark. Therefore, he also stresses 
the key role that SEZs may play in any future economic opening, something that the 
North Korean regime seems to confirm with its plans to revive now-decrepit SEZs near 
the Chinese border. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
cultural reasons – seem to contradict the views of the Western diplomat, therefore underlining a what can 
be a perception heavily influenced by the culture of the respondent. 
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Tied to that, the representative of the NPO interviewed for this project also mentions the 
role SEZs could have in eventual economic development as he asserts that “the main 
task of the current DPRK leadership is to improve the living conditions of its people,” 
while also warning that reforms will be limited by the regime’s prevailing security 
concerns. Therefore, he considers that it is impossible to define a timeframe for reforms. 
 
This opinion is shared by Mr. Hartong: the independent MEP considers reforms to be 
possible, but also that a timeframe for those changes cannot be predicted so far, while 
warning that foreseeing the support such measures would have from the all-important 
military apparatus is also hard to gauge due to the utter lack of reliable information 
emanating from the country. 
 
4.2.2. Denuclearization 
 
All the consulted experts consider denuclearization to be highly improbable for lack of 
will on the North Korean side. However, their relative pessimism is punctuated by the 
engagement possibilities and paths to progress that they foresee.  
 
According to the European diplomat, nuclear weapons are the regime's only guarantee 
for survival, thus agreeing with Cha (2012) or Ford (2011). Even if they are not yet 
operational due to unreliable missile technology, nuclear weapons serve both as a 
deterrent and a status symbol. Therefore, North Korea would only relinquish its nuclear 
status if it obtains all the concessions it would be asking for, namely for the U.S. forces 
to abandon South Korea and reunification on their own terms.62 
 
By leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea defied the international 
community, and this case cannot be compared to what happened with Pakistan a few 
years back, basically on strategic grounds – therefore, once again agreeing with Victor 
Cha’s views (see section 3.2.5). The international community now requests verifiable 
steps towards denuclearization – freezing enrichment programs, letting inspectors into 
the country, etc. – and not just empty promises. The idea of a grand bargain, as put 
forward by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, is quite unrealistic, as the North 
                                                            
62 In fact, this diplomatic source even went as far as asserting that North Korea's dream would be 
becoming an ally of the U.S. against China's rise. 
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Korean side would never accept it. Moreover, the evident lack of trust between the 
involved parties has also severely hindered denuclearization talks. 
 
As far as the EU role in denuclearization is concerned, this diplomatic source asserts 
that Brussels clearly supports denuclearization talks and condemns military 
provocations, but does not see a role for the EU within the 6 Party Talks negotiation 
framework: nobody seriously advocates for the EU to join the talks and the EU does not 
see value in being there. As far as a neutral brokerage role for the EU is concerned, he 
does not think Brussels is powerful enough to convincingly influence the parties. 
 
Dr. Daewoon Ohn agrees in assessing the nature of the issue as “very complex and 
risky,” with the potential to escalate and affect the whole Northeast Asia, setting a 
“vicious cycle” of proliferation. Therefore, he agrees with the European diplomat in 
asserting that the EU should strive to maintain a consistent, principled approach in 
demanding North Korea to abide by international norms and to return to the NPT. 
However, he differs in that he sees the possibility of a “grand bargain” as feasible, one 
including economic enticements for the regime to open up and cooperate. 
 
Therefore, Dr. Ohn suggests that, despite the need for criticism to pressure for 
denuclearization, the international community should find a suitable compromise 
solution, one that the North Korean leaders might find relevant and attractive, letting 
them join the international community with confidence. The current setup will not allow 
denuclearization to take place: “carrots” and not just “sticks” must be offered in order 
for the regime to open up, and rewards (both economic and security-related) would spill 
over to the regional and international levels.63 
 
Finally, Mr. Lucas Hartong considers that North Korea has no will to denuclearize at 
all. He also considers that the EU has no role to play in multilateral negotiation setups 
                                                            
63 Dr. Ohn’s assertion partially echoes the view expressed by another relevant scholar, Axel Berkofsky, 
who suggested that the EU could have continued its engagement towards North Korea in spite of the 
nuclear revelations, thus offering North Korea and the international community an alternative approach of 
how to deal with a failing state on the brink of going nuclear (Berkofsky, 2010). Therefore, it seems safe 
to assert that scholars tend to view engagement postures more favorably than those experts from the 
political and diplomatic spheres. 
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such as the 6 Party Talks and asserts that only China, which he labels North Korea’s 
“big brother,” could force the DPRK to change its mind.64 
 
Therefore, while pessimism on this issue is widespread, the size and the shape of the 
window of opportunity seen by each interviewee differs greatly: from the optimism 
about effective multilateral incentives shown by Dr. Ohn and the suggestion that North 
Korean requests can never be reasonably met made by the diplomat, to the overarching 
influence of China on the DRPK and the role it could eventually play for regional 
security. 
  
                                                            
64 No opinion on this issue was registered from the NPO representative. 
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4.3. Possible changes in EU-North Korea relations 
 
4.3.1. A more proactive EU and the eventual lifting of sanctions 
 
Another of the theoretical pillars supporting this research project is the possibility that 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy could offer much-desired signs of 
proactivity in the North Korean theater (see section 2.7).  
 
Dr. Daewoon Ohn asserted that “increasing possibilities for interaction might be 
possible soon,” but was also quick to add that the EU needs a different approach vis-à-
vis the DPRK to change some perceptions on the North Korean side. This should entail 
devising a non-threatening representation of the EU which resulted appealing to the 
regime, including the use of positive conditionality instead of the current negative 
conditionality (i.e. sanctions). However, Dr. Ohn also admits that this could probably 
run against EU principles and goals, including its commitment to effective 
multilateralism, international law and the promotion of good governance.  
 
It is for this reason that he suggests adopting a dual-track approach: while the EU 
should not relinquish its open criticism of North Korea’s nuclear program and keep 
requesting its unconditional and verifiable end – and, therefore, maintain current 
sanctions in place –, it should also strive to engage, independently of progress in the 
denuclearization issue, in low-key, track-two diplomatic maneuvers and negotiations to 
offer enticing conditions (and eventual guarantees) for the regime in exchange for 
incremental opening and reform.  
 
This should be done in close cooperation with the EU’s strategic partners in the area, 
especially South Korea and China, and the initiative should not be openly taken by the 
EU – at the risk of alienating its partners, who would not want to be seen as 
bandwagoning on an EU-led initiative in their own backyard. Any momentum-creating 
actions should be performed in a discreet way and in close coordination with the 
aforementioned partners. 
 
Dr Ohn’s insights raise the question about the possibility that an approach based on 
incentives – i.e. positive conditionality – towards improving human rights conditions in 
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North Korea, combined with enhanced aid, would be more effective than the 
multilateral condemning resolutions have proven to be. However, Dr. Ohn coincides 
with the analysis made by Kim and Friedhoff (2011), who stated that, due to North 
Korea’s insularity and East Asia’s complex and delicate geopolitics, any movement on 
Korean relations is assumed to require the involvement of other countries. 
 
Contrary to that view, in the opinion of the Seoul-based European diplomatic source, a 
higher degree of cooperation with North Korea would only be possible if there is 
certifiable progress within the framework of the 6 Party Talks – such as a verifiable 
freezing of the uranium enrichment program. In any case, the EU would not take the 
initiative but join in if the international community tries to enhance ties with the regime. 
Less tension and more engagement would be welcome and the EU “would play the 
game.” So far, however, the EU has been content to mostly follow South Korean 
policies (with the exception of the continued provision of limited humanitarian aid via 
select European NPOs). 
 
This source also points out that such heightened engagement would also require a 
number of political conditions, including certain substantial policy changes in the 
DPRK, as its policy has historically been based upon playing off partners against one 
another. 
 
According to this diplomat, the EU cannot really take a more proactive stance because it 
is not a matter of the EU to take the lead: all it could do would be encouraging regional 
powers to move forward, and even this approach would be highly controversial within 
the EU, as the staunchest defendants of the European human rights agenda would 
oppose any kind of engagement if there is no progress on that issue. 
 
Despite the ongoing nuclear crisis, North Korea will continue to be nowhere near the 
top of the EU’s external relations agenda. Consequently, the EU is very unlikely to 
increase the existing limited resources dedicated to deal with and work on North Korea 
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– unless there emerges an inter-European political consensus to increase the EU’s 
economic and political engagement after the resolution of the nuclear crisis.65 
 
Mr. Hartong also agrees with the view that the EU should not take the lead, but the 
reasons he states are quite different. First, analyzing the role played by the institution he 
represents, he sees a clear lack interest from the European Parliament side to engage in 
real and honest discussion with North Korea, including from the very Delegation for 
Relations with the Korean Peninsula. Second, while asserting that a multilateral 
approach is essential and that China, South Korea and the U.S. should be in the lead, he 
points out that he considers the EU to be very weak in active mediation and dialogue in 
general, a task for which individual Member States are better suited.66 
 
Regarding the status of the sanctions against the North Korean regime currently 
enforced by the EU, the interviewed MEP considers that they should remain in place as 
long as North Korea is not denuclearizing, is maltreating its people and is violating 
basic human rights. However, he also points out that targeting of the boycotts and 
sanctions should be improved. 
 
Finally, the representative from the European NPO considers that, despite North Korean 
interest in expanding relations with the EU, unless political issues are solved and 
sanctions are lifted, engagement will remain limited. 
 
Summing up, multilateralism and close coordination with (or subordination to) regional 
powers and not proactivity should be the key factor to any further EU engagement in 
North Korea, which is also seen as doubtful unless the current political climate changes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
65 Therefore, this diplomatic source agrees with Berkofsky’s (2009) assertion that both the lack of 
resources and support from EU Member States “make it unlikely that Brussels will resume the ambitious 
and comprehensive economic engagement course and policies formulated and partly implemented in the 
early 2000s.” 
66 He underlines his skepticism vis-à-vis EU foreign policy by stating that “foreign policy is a task of the 
EU Member States; not of the EU.” 
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4.3.2. Institutional relations 
 
According to the interviewed senior diplomat, although Pyongyang diplomats publicly 
argue that relations should be progressively upgraded, the North Korean regime is quite 
content with the current status, under which the EU provides some humanitarian aid 
independently of the internal political climate. There is no real possibility of progress if 
the country does not change and, in his own words, “as the regime muddles through, 
everybody muddles through.” 
 
However, he openly supports the idea that the special status of the EU as a 
supranational, benign power makes it especially relevant for the North Korean regime. 
In the words of the consulted diplomatic source, the EU is not perceived as having an 
agenda or as being responsible of risks and threats by the North Koreans, a stark 
comparison with the major regional powers and the U.S. 
 
In that he fully coincides with the views expressed by the NPO representative, who 
asserted that “conversations in South and North Korea have shown that the EU is 
primarily seen as a rather neutral actor who has no geopolitical interests in the Korean 
Peninsula.” Therefore, he considers that promoting dialogue and track-two exchanges, 
especially during politically challenging times – i.e. the last decade – and keeping 
channels of dialogue open is crucial for enhancing peace and stability. 
 
Meanwhile, the high-ranking European diplomat also points out that Lee Myung-bak’s 
hard line stance has not been particularly helpful for Brussels: the EU was clearly happy 
with the Sunshine Policy. Additionally, this diplomatic source also expressed frustration 
with the changes in American policy in the past, including the failure of the KEDO 
project, which in most cases were motivated by domestic political reasons. 
 
This last statement runs contrary to the views expressed by Mr. Hartong, who considers 
that the South Korean parliament has the democratic right to formulate its stance vis-à-
vis North Korea and that the EU has no right to interfere in that respect. Regarding EU-
DPRK institutional relations, Mr. Hartong highlights that the results of bilateral 
dialogue between North Korean delegates and Members of the European Parliament 
traveling to Pyongyang on visiting delegations is “very meager,” probably also due to 
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the poor preparation and a perceived lack of ideological plurality on the European side. 
In his opinion, there is a clear lack of mutual understanding, and the situation does not 
seem to be improving. However, he also considers that institutional relations with third 
parties would improve if North Korea stopped its military and rhetorical aggressiveness. 
 
Adopting a completely different line of thought, Dr. Daewoon Ohn, who proclaims that 
unilateral or bilateral approaches towards institutional relations with North Korea do not 
work. According to him, the best strategic approach towards institutional relations with 
North Korea would be creating a multilateral network with overarching, structural goals 
and elaborate policies taking into account the psychology of the actors and the fears and 
aspirations of the regime. This should allow not just the EU but the international 
community at large to become more adaptive to changes in the situation, including 
unpredictable issues. 
 
This multilateral network would ideally develop effective confidence-building measures 
to achieve incremental results and engagement. To illustrate it, Dr. Ohn used the 
functionalist example of Jean Monnet’s conception of a Coal and Steel Community in 
1951: contrary to the expectations, this apparently technical approach had the potential 
to become something much bigger. In other words, positive spillover effects from the 
multilateral approach would gradually smooth institutional relations with the DPRK and 
eventually incorporate it into the international community.  
 
We can summarize that, while we see many similarities between the approach taken by 
the European diplomat and the NPO representative, Dr. Ohn and Mr. Hartong offer 
alternative views – the former rather optimistic, the latter quite pessimistic – of 
institutional relations with the DPRK. 
 
4.3.3. Human rights 
 
Only two of the interviewees, fittingly enough the Seoul-based diplomat and the 
Member of the European Parliament, fully expressed their views on the role human 
rights issues play in (and might play in the future of) EU-DPRK relations. 
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The senior European diplomat asserted that human rights dialogue has been 
systematically refused by the Korean side since the EU brings its human rights abuses 
to the UN. This begs the question of what would be the North Korean answer if the EU 
stopped denouncing its abuses. In 1994, the EU stopped sponsoring resolutions against 
China in exchange for bilateral dialogue, a staple of EU-China relations ever since, even 
if respect of human rights has not improved too much in China. Therefore, this probably 
leads the EU to the conclusion that any such efforts with North Korea would be pretty 
sterile, too. 
 
Meanwhile, Mr. Hartong asserted that neither most Members of the European 
Parliament nor the EU as a whole were interested in bilateral human rights dialogue. His 
strong words merit literal reproduction: 
 
“Chairmen of D-KOR67 don’t like it when MEPs table critical questions and/or remarks to 
North Korean officials. Several times I have tried to bring human rights situations or the plight 
of North Korean refugees to China under the attention of the visiting officials, but was denied 
speaking time. […] Especially the EPP fraction (Christian Democrats) MEPs block questions to 
North Korean visitors. I have complained officially to the president of parliament, Mr. Schulz, 
but he does nothing either.” 
 
He went on to assert that despite the EU not being interested “at all” in a “real and 
honest” discussion on human rights issues with its North Korean counterparts, EU 
Member States should individually voice their concern over the issues of democracy 
and human rights in the DPRK. 
 
Finally, the NPO representative also commented briefly on human rights issues by 
asserting that progress in that respect – coupled with progress in the nuclear issue – 
could trigger the allocation of EU official development assistance (ODA) to the 
beleaguered country. However, based on Mr. Hartong’s statements, we should wonder 
how important really is human rights promotion in North Korea for the EU if its 
democratically elected representatives do not actively seek to engage in dialogue or 
even block the efforts of those who try to. 
                                                            
67 “D-KOR” stands for the Delegation of the European Parliament for Relations with the Korean 
Peninsula, of which Mr. Hartong is a member. 
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4.3.4. Effects on EU-South Korea relations 
 
A further issue that was raised during the interviews was the effect greater EU 
engagement with North Korea – including denuclearization efforts – might have on EU-
South Korea bilateral relations, a relevant collateral factor of deeper EU-DPRK 
relations (see section 2.3). 
 
According to Dr. Daewoon Ohn, South Korea should develop a closer relationship with 
the EU on the issue of North Korea, as it is one of the best available partners, also in 
case conflict escalates. As he also wrote in a 2009 paper, in the case of a potential 
serious destabilization of the North Korean regime, the EU might initiate civilian and 
even military support missions for the restoration of peace and stability, obviously in 
conjunction with its strategic partners in the area (Ohn, 2009). Consequently, 
developing a close partnership in that sense would also attract other countries and spill 
over to wider EU-South Korea relations. 
 
Contrary to Dr. Ohn’s positive view, the interviewed NPO representative highlights the 
polarization – along the left/right political divide – of South Korean public opinion on 
the issue of engagement with Pyongyang.68 Therefore, he concludes that mixed results 
should be expected in that respect. 
 
Finally, Mr. Hartong adopts a strikingly different posture, considering that any 
engagement initiatives should be led by South Korea, in close cooperation with China, 
Japan and the United States, with the EU playing “no role.” Therefore, we can infer 
that, according to this independent MEP, any eventual EU involvement would be so 
negligible that no effects on EU-South Korea relations should be expected.  
                                                            
68 For instance, as asserted by Cha (2012), South Korea’s policy on human rights in North Korea is 
complex and highly politicized, and its approach towards denouncing Pyongyang’s abuses has been 
quieter than the EU’s, especially during the decade of the politically progressive Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun administrations (1998-2007), when the country even abstained from voting on U.N. human 
rights resolutions on North Korea. Meanwhile, South Korean conservatives tend to consider that human 
rights violations reflect the impossibility of political reconciliation with the current regime in Pyongyang, 
as well as a barometer of real reform intentions. 
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4.4. Potential areas for increased cooperation and further engagement 
 
4.4.1. Humanitarian aid 
 
As already discussed in the previous chapter (see section 3.2.4), unconditional 
humanitarian aid is one of the staples that differentiate the EU from its partners when it 
comes the North Korean issue. It is therefore highly relevant to consider how the 
consulted sources see the future of EU food and humanitarian aid in the DPRK. 
 
The European diplomat points out that, outside valuable emergency food and 
humanitarian aid, the EU mostly funds small scale projects he labels as “very useful 
inputs for the North Korean society.” He further underlines the indirect benefits for the 
North Korean people who work with European NPOs, which are able to learn new 
production and organization methods. As an example of such side benefits, he cites the 
North Korean farmers’ cooperatives growing vegetables in greenhouses and then selling 
the surplus in local markets or institutions; in this case, the EU induces a certain market 
orientation at the grassroots level without officially and publicly stating it, keeping 
away from government meddling as much as possible. 
 
When asked about this same issue, MEP Lucas Hartong adopted a rather critical point 
of view. While underlining the usefulness of providing food aid to the needy North 
Korean population, Mr. Hartong quickly added that EU action in that respect lacks 
effectiveness due to insufficient oversight mechanisms, leading to huge amounts of aid 
being sold on the black market by corrupt officials or military officers. Moreover, he 
pointed out that EU Member States should closely cooperate with the U.S. in the 
provision of humanitarian aid. 
 
Finally, the representative of the European NPO working on the field takes a more 
nuanced tone, in line with his outsider role representing an organization providing 
training – and not humanitarian aid – to the North Korean population. Therefore, he 
expects that, further from providing emergency food aid, the EU will continue to 
support community-based projects that improve the daily lives of the local people. 
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4.4.2. Development cooperation 
 
As we already discussed in section 3.2.4, North Korea is currently not a beneficiary of 
the EU Development Co-operation Instrument. However, according to the senior 
European diplomat, EU cooperation with North Korea can currently be considered as 
being somewhere in between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, with no 
attached development strategy for political reasons: flagrant and systematic violations of 
all the principles and values defended by the EU make it possible to assert that the EU 
does not consider the current North Korean government to represent its people. 
 
Dissent on future perspectives is maybe the most relevant aspect on this issue: while the 
diplomat takes a neutral approach focused on the current situation, the NPO 
representative highlights that while the EU has consistently supported development-
oriented projects despite the unsolved nuclear crisis, any expansion of its programmes 
and the eventual provision of official development assistance will entirely depend on 
further progress in the denuclearization issue and on the eventual improvement of the 
human rights situation.  
 
Mr. Hartong, the independent Dutch Member of the European Parliament, dismisses 
both views and states his frontal opposition to any official development assistance 
coming from the EU budget, thus indirectly underlining his overall posture opposing 
EU engagement in foreign policy issues when financial resources are involved. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that, as was the case with the previous possible cooperation 
arena, this question was not explicitly discussed with Dr. Daewoon Ohn, thus 
explaining the lack of relevant input from his interview on this particular aspect. 
 
4.4.3. Energy cooperation 
 
North Korea has been facing an energy crisis that it has not been able to solve through 
internal means. While there is a desperate humanitarian need to provide North Korea 
with energy assistance, current energy assistance policies for North Korea do not 
provide a fundamental or a permanent solution. The outdated facilities and aging 
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infrastructure of the North Korean energy sector make direct energy transfer ineffective 
(Yi, Sin and Heo, 2011).  
 
Renewable energy, and more concretely wind and solar power, which North Korea has 
already shown willingness to actively develop, might be the best sustainable energy 
solution South Korea – and, as a natural extension, other partners and donors – can 
provide to assist North Korea in overcoming its chronic energy shortage. This is the 
conclusion reached by Yi, Sin and Heo (2011) after consulting a panel of Korean and 
foreign experts, which overwhelmingly viewed security as the most important factor 
among the strategic criteria, followed by cost. 
 
Moreover, the case of North Korea is also very special for South Korea, as it can 
prepare for the eventual unification of the peninsula as it constructs and upgrades North 
Korea’s energy infrastructure (Yi, Sin and Heo, 2011). International help in such 
endeavors would also help improve relations with Seoul, in what would probably be a 
win-win situation for all involved parties. 
 
Our sources, however, do not seem to share Yi, Sin and Heo’s optimism. First, as the 
NPO representative points out, “the Wassenaar Arrangement (on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) prohibits the export of 
dual-use technology to the DPRK, and the provision of technology for renewable 
energy to the DPRK may therefore be restricted.” Moreover, instead of explicit 
government support, he points out that private sector investment should be sought. 
However, South Korean companies currently need explicit government permission to 
deal with North Korea, so opportunities are very limited. This leaves Chinese 
companies and Sino-North Korean joint ventures as the most viable alternatives to 
solving the energy issues. 
 
South Korean scholar Daewoon Ohn is even less optimistic, ruling out the possibility of 
energy cooperation with North Korea on the basis of past failures. In his view, 
regardless of the energy assistance offered, the North Korean regime has consistently 
been reluctant to relinquish its nuclear weapons, which poses a serious problem for such 
an approach. Moreover, he also cites the nature of the technical assistance involved as 
troublesome, as strict restrictions in the transfer of double-use technologies should 
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always be taken into account. Therefore, he concludes that any engagement approach 
touching this issue will not be successful and end up in failure as the Agreed 
Framework, the February 2007 agreement and the 6 Party Talks. 
 
The consulted diplomatic source considers that the energy problems the country faces 
should be solved by expanding local energy production, but he does not rule out 
external help. However, he discards EU participation in any such projects, at least in the 
current context of North Korean lack of transparency and accountability and financial 
crisis in the EU. 
 
According to this diplomat, there is just one clear element regarding hypothetical 
energy-related cooperation initiatives: the EU would really want to be a player, and not 
just a payer, as former CFSP chief Javier Solana famously said. The EU is not going to 
pour money in just because South Korea, Japan and/or the U.S. have a certain project or 
policy going on and are passing the hat around, as it was the case with KEDO. 
 
Rounding off this subset of negative views, Mr. Hartong asserts that eventual energy 
cooperation should not be a task for the EU: Member States should decide for 
themselves on economic and/or political grounds, after due consultation with all the 
relevant partners – especially South Korea.  
 
Therefore, we must conclude that an active EU role in remediating North Korea’s 
energy needs is neither feasible nor desirable. 
 
4.4.4. Environmental cooperation 
 
Despite the breadth of initiatives that environmental cooperation could entail, this might 
be the only proposed cooperation field in which relative consensus among the 
interviewees has been reached, with all of them69 seeing it in a positive light. However, 
this shared positivity is punctuated by differences regarding the procedures to be 
followed and the ownership of the decision. 
                                                            
69 Dr. Daewoon Ohn’s semi-structured interview finally did not include any question on environmental 
cooperation. 
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The consulted diplomatic source asserts that there has not been any serious proposal on 
the EU table along those lines, but the EU would be willing to consider it if the right 
development framework is devised. However, Brussels would expect local powers – 
chiefly South Korea, a fully developed country by all standards70 – to take the lead also 
on that issue, also on the grounds that many EU Member States would refuse such 
cooperation on the grounds of human rights violations. 
 
After pointing out that projects funded by the EU to enhance food security in the DPRK 
already include valuable environmental components, such as sloping land management 
and natural resource management, the representative of the European NPO, asserts that, 
with food security probably remaining the top priority, indirect or instrumental 
cooperation in environmental issues should be expected. 
 
Finally, the Dutch MEP considers eventual cooperation in environmental issues, 
disaster management and risk reduction a “good approach.” However, he insists once 
again on the prerogative of Member States to decide by themselves and not at the EU 
level, thus implicitly denying the EU its aspired role of coordinating the development 
cooperation policies of its Member States. 
 
4.4.5. Trade relations and capacity building 
 
As discussed on section 2.4, improving trade relations and assisting in building capacity 
in North Korea could have positive effects both for the beleaguered North Korean 
population and European businesses. Conscious of the importance of this particular 
field for engagement, all interviewees devoted considerable attention to the issue, 
agreeing in the fact that North Korea lacks a functioning, stable economy for European 
companies to invest there.  
 
Additionally, three of the interviewees agreed upon the need to be active in capacity 
building and to promote economic reform in the DPRK, with a clearly multilateral 
                                                            
70 This source also reports that the South Korean forestry administration is studying the possibility of 
helping North Korea earn emission reduction credits via the reforestation of the country. However, it is 
not clear that the North Korean side would be up to the bureaucratic challenges and the necessary 
reporting procedures. 
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approach in the case of Dr. Daewoon Ohn – an approach partially shared by the senior 
European diplomat, who instead of proposing engagement on an equal footing 
advocates for EU submissiveness to U.S. and South Korea initiatives. 
 
Dr. Daewoon Ohn was especially prolific in analyzing this aspect of potential bilateral 
relations. In his opinion, there are two major barriers for the EU and European 
businesses to increase their trade relations with North Korea, the first being that EU 
trade policies pursue the maximization of commercial interactions, while the North 
Korean regime privileges being in control over the optimization of commercial flows. 
Their goal is to increase revenues in a way that does not threaten internal regime 
stability. Therefore, there is a clear expectation gap between the two parties’ interests 
and views. 
 
Additionally, he pointed out that the EU is also accustomed to staying in control of 
international trade and economic norms, a trend that is also reflected when dealing or 
negotiating with third countries. It is precisely this European “normative power” what 
causes most fear among North Korean bureaucrats: they cannot just cede the driver’s 
seat to any foreign liberal power if they want to keep the regime in place. 
 
The second obstacle highlighted by Dr. Ohn would be related not to the institutional and 
political procedures and features of the EU but to European business culture: according 
to this South Korean scholar, (Western) Europeans don’t understand very well how to 
do business with a regime such as the North Korean. Experiences are quite limited 
outside some companies and businessmen from Central and Eastern Europe, who were 
used to dealing with Soviet-era Communist systems and thus have the required specific 
experience and know-how. 
 
Added to that, Dr. Daewoon Ohn considers that European businesses are at a 
disadvantage compared to Chinese companies to operate in the North Korean market for 
three further reasons. First, close monitoring of all foreign business activity by the 
North Korean government, widespread corruption and the lack of legal guarantees and 
property rights laws combine to generate an extremely risky business environment in 
which capitalistic ventures can rarely operate. To partially overcome that, the Chinese 
government runs a special insurance scheme for its companies operating in North 
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Korea, something the EU would not be able to do for European businesses. As a second 
factor, he cites that most Chinese companies in North Korea are operated by ethnically 
Korean Chinese, cultural and ethnic proximity being a factor to consider a heavily 
nationalistic and xenophobic regime such as North Korea’s. The third and final reason 
cited by this scholar is that North Korea can potentially feel threatened by foreign 
companies: they prefer to get much-needed foreign currency trough trade with China, as 
it is less dangerous for the control of the information flows – also heavily regulated in 
China – and also for political and ideological reasons, with China’s still nominally a 
socialist economy.  
 
To overcome these important shortcomings for the EU and Western powers in general 
who would like to increase business exchanges with North Korea, Dr. Ohn also suggests 
the creation of an international consortium for entrepreneurial action in North Korea, 
with active South Korean, EU and U.S. engagement and including the respective civil 
societies and business leaders. This consortium should make sure to accumulate the 
necessary know-how needed to solidify trade relations with the DPRK without 
alienating it by going against the basic principles and norms of the regime. 
 
While not going as far as suggesting the creation of a joint consortium, the consulted 
diplomatic source also that improved trade relations and capacity building would only 
be possible only if the United States and South Korea took the lead. The EU would 
never do it against them, as it would be easily accused of betraying its partners just to 
get a market share. 
 
The North Koreans ask for foreign investment and try to present themselves as a great 
market and a good partner; however, there are not many European companies willing to 
invest there – despite an European business association and chamber of commerce 
having some presence there and organizing the yearly Pyongyang fair –, as nobody has 
the impression that investment conditions are good enough in the country and also 
considering the ongoing financial sanctions against the regime. North Korea needs, 
according to this senior diplomat, credible market-oriented reforms, so that private 
operators could access the country and do business. 
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Meanwhile, the European NPO representative points out that fostering trade relations 
with the DPRK has been a political issue due to the sanctions and other trade 
impediments in place, including quotas for textile products. However, he values the 
positive influence of all dialogue and exchanges and considers that enhancing capacities 
would be both a valuable means and objective if done in an effective and sustainable 
way. This leads him to call on European companies to operate in North Korea and assist 
in the development of the country in case political relations improve and the DPRK 
makes “serious efforts” to modernize its economy. 
 
Those views are mostly echoed by Mr. Hartong, who asserts that EU companies are not 
yet ready to operate in North Korea due to the lack of a stable political and economic 
surrounding to invest in but would positively value the EU making its considerable 
civilian and institutional resources available to assist with political and economic 
reforms. 
 
4.4.6. Educational and cultural exchanges 
 
A further element to be considered is the role that EU-sponsored educational and 
cultural exchanges and training opportunities for North Korean students, scholars or 
officials could have in eventually improving bilateral relations and helping in the 
economic and social development of the North Korean society.  
 
Scientific or technical cooperation has historically been a good start to improve relations 
with politically hostile countries, and also an avenue towards future cooperation in more 
sensitive issues. The EU has experience linking funding to establish international 
research and education networks with its international aid programs (Na, 2009), and this 
know-how could prove extremely beneficial for the average citizens of a country badly 
struggling to adapt to the knowledge-based economy of the 21st century. 
 
As was the case with improving trade relations and capacity building, the four 
interviewees value positively engagement in the field of education, nevertheless with 
diverging degrees of intensity and including some reservations. Thus, while the South 
Korean scholar mentions language training as a valuable tool the EU could use, the 
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diplomat asserts that this is already being done by individual Member States, but denies 
the possibility of future EU budgetary involvement.  
 
Meanwhile, both the scholar and the NPO representative warn about organizational 
challenges and the need to define a clear framework before proceeding with any training 
activities. Finally, the MEP further limits educational engagement possibilities by 
highlighting the need to provide training in the field instead of via exchanges to prevent 
government meddling and candidate picking.  
 
Thus, according to the consulted European diplomatic source, it is an implicit EU policy 
to promote the exposure of North Koreans to Western societies, and several Member 
States, such as Italy, Austria or the United Kingdom provide specialized educational 
and cultural exchange programs. However, there is no EU budget line to promote such 
exchanges, and it is not likely that it will be created in the future. 
 
Contrary to that more pragmatic view, the consulted South Korean scholar considered 
that EU-sponsored educational opportunities and exchanges, including foreign language 
learning, would be a viable path for further engagement. However, he points out that a 
framework should clearly be defined, including reciprocal security assurances in order 
to build confidence and assure the correct functioning of any such program.71 
 
With first-hand experience in developing training programs and seminars in North 
Korea, the NPO representative openly welcomes cooperation in the fields of education 
and culture, despite warning about the challenges tied to implementation. Consequently, 
he stresses the need to thoroughly assess the feasibility and sustainability of each project 
in advance and duly taking into account all relevant socio-political, cultural and 
organizational factors. 
 
Finally, Mr. Hartong suggests sending European specialists and teachers to North Korea 
to work there among the “normal” population instead of promoting academic 
exchanges, as they normally only benefit select individuals chosen by the regime. 
                                                            
71 This prudent assertion is in line with Development and Cooperation Commissioner Andris Piebalgs 
thinking, i.e. that the EU will need to prioritize its interventions in order to have impact (ECDPM, 2010). 
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4.5.  Summary tables and related findings 
 
  South Korean EU-affairs scholar 
Seoul-based senior 
European diplomat 
Representative of a NPO 
active in North Korea 
Member of the European 
Parliament 
Changes in the 
DPRK 
Social and 
economic 
Probable but not immediate, 
for internal (stability) and 
external (political uncertainty 
in regional powers) reasons 
Possible but not immediate, 
mostly for internal reasons 
(lack of reliable power base) 
Possible but will have to 
comply with the regime’s 
prevailing security concerns; 
impossible to sketch a 
timeframe 
Possible, but unable to 
devise a timeframe or to 
foresee the support of the 
military apparatus 
Denuclearization 
Highly improbable but 
multilateral “grand bargain” 
an option 
Highly improbable and 
“grand bargain” not an 
option, also due to lack of 
trust between the parties 
 
No EU role in 6 Party Talks 
 
 
- 
No willingness on the North 
Korean side; only China 
could force them to do it 
 
 
No EU role in 6 Party Talks 
 
 
Changes in EU-
DPRK relations 
 
 
Proactive 
engagement 
The EU could join (but not 
openly lead) its strategic 
partners in a proactive 
strategy of “discreet 
engagement” 
The EU should not take the 
lead: leave it to South Korea 
and/or China and follow, 
political conditions allowing 
 
Very unlikely to increase the 
existing limited resources 
dedicated to deal with and 
work on North Korea 
Unless political issues are 
solved and sanctions are 
lifted, engagement will 
remain limited 
 
Lack of interest from the EU 
(European Parliament) side 
to engage in real and honest 
discussion with North Korea 
 
EU very weak in active 
mediation and dialogue in 
general – individual Member 
States could do better 
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Changes in EU-
DPRK relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No increased role if no 
progress on denuclearization 
Multilateral approach of the 
essence, with China, South 
Korea and the U.S. leading 
Sanctions 
Should formally remain in 
place but multilateral track-
two negotiations with 
“carrots” should be 
performed 
Will remain in place as long 
as the DPRK does not take 
clear and verifiable steps 
towards denuclearization 
- Should remain in place as 
long as North Korea is not 
denuclearizing, is maltreating 
its people and is violating 
basic human rights 
 
Smarter boycotts and 
sanctions to clearly and 
exclusively target the elites 
Institutional 
relations 
Adoption of a multilateral, 
network-based strategic 
approach to institutional 
relations 
 
EU seen as threatening due 
to its normative power 
 
 
Develop confidence-building 
measures to achieve 
incremental results and 
engagement 
North Korea quite content 
with current status and no 
real possibility of progress if 
the country does not change 
 
EU not perceived as having 
an agenda or as being 
responsible of risks and 
threats by North Korea 
 
EU happier with the 
Sunshine Policy; also critical 
of U.S. policy shifts 
Expansion of relations with 
Europe on various levels is 
therefore actively sought 
 
 
EU primarily seen as a 
neutral actor who has no 
geopolitical interests in the 
Korean Peninsula 
 
Promotion of dialogue and 
track-two exchanges during 
politically challenging times; 
Results of bilateral dialogue 
with EP delegations “very 
meager,” probably also due 
to poor preparation and lack 
of ideological plurality on 
the European side 
 
Lack of mutual 
understanding 
 
The EU has no right to 
interfere in South Korean 
policies vis-à-vis the DPRK 
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Changes in EU-
DPRK relations 
 
 
 
keeping channels of dialogue 
open crucial for enhancing 
peace and stability 
North Korea would be 
treated differently if less 
aggressive 
Human rights 
- The EU sponsoring human 
rights resolutions at the UN 
kills any possibility of 
bilateral dialogue; however, 
skeptical of what dialogue 
could achieve on the basis of 
lack of progress with China 
Progress in that respect could 
help trigger the provision of 
ODA by the EU. 
Despite the EU not being 
interested “at all” in a 
bilateral human rights 
dialogue, Member States 
should voice concern over 
democracy and human rights 
 
Direct dialogue on human 
rights issues with North 
Korean officials is not 
encouraged by the European 
Parliament, with questions 
from dissenting MEPs 
consistently being blocked 
Effects on EU-
South Korea 
relations 
South Korea should develop 
a closer relationship with the 
EU on North Korea 
 
 
Greater EU engagement 
would also benefit EU-South 
Korea relations 
 
 
 
 
- 
Public opinion in South 
Korea about how to engage 
with the North has been 
highly polarized; therefore, 
mixed results should be 
expected 
South Korea has to lead any 
engagement initiatives in 
close cooperation with 
regional partners, like China 
 
The EU has no role to play. 
Therefore, no effects should 
be expected 
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Areas for 
increased 
cooperation and 
engagement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humanitarian 
aid 
 
 
 
 
- 
Aid currently offered 
somewhere in between 
humanitarian aid and 
development cooperation 
 
 
EU inducing market 
orientation at the grassroots 
level without officially 
stating it 
Expects that the 
EU will continue to support 
community-based projects 
that improve the daily lives 
of the local people. 
 
 
Food aid is important but 
lacks effectiveness due to 
insufficient oversight 
mechanisms – a lot is sold on 
the black market 
 
EU Member States should 
closely cooperate with the 
U.S. in the provision of 
humanitarian aid 
Development 
cooperation 
- Development strategy 
conditional to political 
changes 
 
The EU has 
supported development-
oriented projects despite the 
unsolved nuclear crisis 
Expansion of its programs 
and provision of ODA 
dependant on further 
progress in denuclearization 
and the improvement of the 
human rights situation 
No to any formal assistance 
to North Korea from the EU 
budget 
Energy 
cooperation 
Not a viable option due to 
proven past failures 
 
 
 
Energy problems should be 
solved by expanding local 
energy production, probably 
with external help 
 
Private companies should 
take the lead; however, 
limited opportunities outside 
Chinese companies 
 
Not a task for the EU: 
Member States should decide 
for themselves on economic 
and/or political grounds, 
after consultation with 
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Areas for 
increased 
cooperation and 
engagement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technical assistance always 
a complicated issue, as strict 
restrictions in double-use 
technologies should be taken 
into account at all times 
 
 
Conditional EU participation 
in South Korean-led 
multilateral projects only if 
the EU is a player and the 
current political and 
economic contexts improve 
 
 
Provision of 
technology for renewable 
energy might be restricted 
due to current restrictions on 
the export of dual-use 
technology to the DPRK 
relevant partners (especially 
South Korea) 
 
Environmental 
cooperation 
-  
EU willing to consider it if 
the right development 
framework is devised; 
however, local powers – 
chiefly South Korea – should 
take the lead 
 
Projects funded by the EU to 
enhance food security in the 
DPRK already include 
environmental components 
 
Food security will remain the 
priority; therefore, indirect or 
instrumental environmental 
cooperation expected 
 
 
Possibly a good approach 
 
Should be left to decide by 
individual Member States 
 
Trade relations 
and capacity 
building 
EU businesses at a 
disadvantage (mainly to 
Chinese businesses) for lack 
of know-how and other 
factors (culture, political 
reasons, etc.) 
EU trade relations with 
North Korea could only 
improve if the U.S. and 
South Korea take the lead 
 
 
Enhancing capacities both a 
valuable means and 
objective, if effective and 
sustainable 
 
Trade relations with the 
If the EU can help with 
political and economic 
reform to improve the 
situation of the North Korean 
people, it should be done 
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Suggests the creation of a 
multilateral EU-U.S.-ROK 
consortium to promote 
business ties with North 
Korea 
 
 
North Korea needs credible 
market-oriented reforms 
DPRK a political issue 
 
Dialogue and exchanges 
mutually beneficial 
 
If relations improve 
and the DPRK modernizes 
economy, more engagement 
by European companies 
would be welcome 
 
 
EU companies not yet ready 
to operate in North Korea 
due to the lack of a stable 
political and economic 
surrounding to invest in 
 
 
 
Educational and 
cultural 
exchanges 
 
Provision of educational 
opportunities and exchanges, 
including foreign language 
training, would be positive 
 
An framework should clearly 
be defined, including 
reciprocal security 
assurances 
 
Implicit EU policy to 
promote the exposure of 
North Koreans to Western 
societies 
 
Several Member States 
provide specialized 
educational and cultural 
exchange programs but no 
EU budget line to promote 
such exchanges and not 
likely to be created 
 
Welcomes cooperation in the 
fields of education and 
culture; however, 
implementation is 
challenging 
 
Need to thoroughly assess 
feasibility and sustainability 
in advance considering 
socio-political, cultural and 
organizational factors 
 
Suggests sending European 
specialists and teachers to 
North Korea to work there 
among the population at 
large 
 
Against academic exchanges 
because they only benefit 
select individuals chosen by 
the regime 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of the views expressed by the interviewees. Own elaboration.  
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  South Korean EU-affairs scholar 
Senior Seoul-based 
European diplomat 
Representative of a NPO 
active in North Korea 
Member of the European 
Parliament 
Changes in the 
DPRK 
Social and economic     
Denuclearization     
Changes in EU-
DPRK relations 
Proactive 
engagement 
    
Sanctions     
Institutional 
relations 
    
Human rights     
Effects on EU-South 
Korea relations 
    
 
Areas for 
increased 
cooperation and 
engagement 
Humanitarian aid 
   
 
 
Development 
cooperation 
    
Energy cooperation     
Environmental 
cooperation 
    
Trade relations and 
capacity building 
    
Educational and 
cultural exchanges 
    
 
 
Table 3. Color-coded interpretation of the views expressed by the interviewees. Own elaboration. 
 
Legend: Red cells: interviewee expressed openly negative views regarding possible changes or an eventual enhanced engagement. 
Orange cells: interviewee expressed mixed views regarding possible changes or an eventual enhanced engagement. 
Green cells: interviewee expressed he would mostly agree with an eventual enhanced engagement or considers changes are possible. 
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To conclude this chapter, a brief discussion of what these tables and the corresponding 
data tell us – and how it correlates with our first hypothesis – will be presented. As 
expected, the respondents with a professional profile not directly tied to European 
policy-making or diplomacy usually showed a more optimistic point of view, even 
calling for increased engagement and multilateral proactivity. Indeed, both the South 
Korean scholar and the NPO representative only expressed openly negative views on 
one of the explored issues, while expressing a rather positive attitude in three and four 
cases, respectively. On the other hand, both the senior diplomat and the Member of the 
European Parliament were highly critical or negative in six of the eleven explored 
subsets of changes and cooperation avenues.72 
 
It is noteworthy that all four interviewees expressed relative trust in the possibility that 
the new North Korean leader implements much-needed reforms to progressively open 
up the economy, even if they all expressed doubt about the timeframe and/or the scope 
of those reforms. Concerning possible enhanced cooperation possibilities, rather 
positive consensus was detected on the issue of expanding trade relations and capacity 
building, with the four experts expressing either positive or neutral views while also 
warning about the need for internal pro-market reforms before any further engagement 
is possible. 
 
Near-consensus of a more neutral tone was also detected on the views on humanitarian 
aid, where positive assessments of current EU engagement combined with predictions 
of continuity instead of an eventual increase. Finally, the option of EU energy 
cooperation also generated consensus, but in this case the views were predominantly 
very negative. Albeit for different reasons – ranging from historic and technical issues 
to perceived lack of EU competence –, three of the four interviewees considered it was a 
closed avenue while the fourth, in this case the diplomat, expressed deep reservations. 
 
                                                            
72 It could be even argued that the independent Dutch MEP offered negative views on seven items as, 
when asked about possible avenues for cooperation that potentially involved using EU funds, he 
consistently expressed the view that it was not a matter for the EU to decide but for individual Member 
States. However, I have consciously decided to assign a neutral mark in the case of environmental 
cooperation as he openly expressed his agreement with the value of such an approach – thus partially 
offsetting the fact that he considers that any such engagement should be decided by the Member States. 
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The strongest endorsement of EU values came from the two actors directly working 
inside the European bureaucratic system, the diplomat and the independent Dutch MEP, 
who also strongly criticized the parliamentary chamber and the EU in general as not 
truly standing up to its principles of promotion and defense of universal values. 
Consequently, the fact that both offer negative views on the accounts of the possible 
cancellation of sanctions and progress on the human rights issue has to be ascribed to 
their deep trust in such values – either personal, as in the case of the MEP, or as a 
representation of the perceived views of the EU, as in the case of the diplomat. 
 
We can thus conclude that, although both the diplomat and the MEP tended to adopt 
what we could label a more rationalist view, while the scholar and the NPO 
representative offered a more positive account of the situation, the sheer divergences 
between the views expressed by all four interviewees leads us to assert that i) their 
opinions were not only nuanced and influenced by their respective professional profiles 
and responsibilities but also their own beliefs, ideas and cultural background – and, 
consequently, the initial hypothesis is just partially validated;73 and ii) further from the 
much-analyzed issues of horizontal (i.e. incompatibilities between measures, also due to 
interinstitutional battles) and vertical (i.e. incoherencies due to diverging actions by 
member states) coherence and cohesion, the sheer diversity of views, not only split by 
the conventional political cleavages – the left/right axis and, in some cases, also the 
centralist/federalist axis, with all their respective subdivisions – but also by deeply 
ingrained cultural and sociological factors, that are amalgamated under the common 
roof of the European Union makes it extremely difficult to formulate a cohesive and 
coherent approach towards foreign policy. 
  
                                                            
73 Let us remind that the hypothesis stated that there would be “certain internal debate” between the actors 
“opting for a view limiting the possibility of engagement and underestimating the possible implications of 
the EU’s role in North Korea, and those arguing that the EU should increase humanitarian aid, reinforce 
institutionalized dialogues and adopt a more proactive approach to endorse the EU’s position and identity 
values in the region.” As we can see from the results, internal dissonances were found and two clear lines 
of thought, mostly aligned with the respective professional profiles of the respondent, were also detected, 
but did not fully align with the predicted values and options. 
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5. The public speaks: a quantitative approach to future perspectives on EU-North 
Korea relations (II) 
 
5.1. Overview 
 
The next and final data collection and analysis step of the current thesis is based on a 
quantitative and statistically relevant study of young South Koreans, viewed as indirect 
stakeholders and possible future actors in multilateral commercial, diplomatic or 
cultural EU-South Korea-North Korea relations and, of course, in EU interactions with 
the Republic of Korea. 
 
The future-based approach adopted in this thesis – whose focus is to analyze not just 
current EU-North Korea relations but also the shape they could take in the next few 
years – is precisely the main reason behind the need to poll a key part of the South 
Korean public, namely future leaders, to better explore the chances the EU could have 
of breaking through as a major player in a hypothetical transformation and progressive 
or sudden opening up of the DPRK. 
 
Consequently, the data collected via survey-based field research will be statistically 
analyzed to reveal general preferences and other valuable aspects that will put to the test 
the second hypothesis of this thesis: the fact that there will be expectation gaps between 
the studied South Korean publics and the views expressed by EU experts and actors, 
including in how EU engagement with North Korea can affect South Korean 
perceptions of the EU and regarding the preference for certain forms of EU engagement 
with North Korea over others. Analyses have also been run to prove if preferences and 
views of EU engagement with North Korea are indeed correlated with those expressed 
for South Korea-North Korea engagement and/or affected by the identified socio-
demographic factors. 
 
Additionally, and despite the fact that there is little empirical research dealing with the 
issue at hand and no previous examples of research on the specific topic and particular 
population this thesis focuses on, available studies will be used to benchmark our results 
and gauge their validity and relevance vis-à-vis other population tranches of the South 
Korean citizenry. 
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South Korean official sources and think tanks, such as the Asan Institute for Policy 
Studies, conduct both regular and ad-hoc assessments of the views the overall South 
Korean population maintains regarding their Northern neighbors. Among them, a 
recent, relevant study conducted by the Asan Institute on 20 December 2011, just one 
day after the announcement of Kim Jong-il's death, with 1000 respondents aged 19 or 
older and reported results divided by age groups, will be used as a benchmark for some 
of our findings. 
 
Some of the results obtained in the current research project will also be compared with 
the outcomes reported in relevant scholastic literature, including a study conducted by 
Park and Yoon (2010) among a reduced number of members of the South Korean 
economic and political elites, as well as civil society, academia and media 
representatives regarding their views of the European Union. 
 
This chapter will be organized as follows: after going through the necessary 
methodological considerations, the results and findings from descriptive statistical 
analysis will be presented, followed by the results and findings from bivariate analyses. 
The final section of this chapter will present unified and combined results of the current 
and the previous chapters of the thesis, in order to identify and comment on possible 
expectation gaps between the views expressed by the two subsets of stakeholders, 
including the possibility that the EU engages with North Korea in different ways than 
those employed until this moment, in order to assess the validity of our initial 
hypotheses (see section 1.2).  
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5.2. Methodological considerations 
 
In order to precisely adapt to and accurately reflect the opinions of the desired target 
group of the overall South Korean population by using a mixed sampling technique, 
only South Korean nationals studying at the country’s widely recognized top-three 
ranked universities – Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei 
University –, as well as at the top university for foreign language and international and 
area studies, the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS), were asked to answer 
the questionnaire. 
 
Therefore, a combination of cluster and convenient sampling was used to collect a total 
of 444 answers from South Korean nationals who identified themselves as being 
students at one of the four selected universities, with the aim of detecting and gauging 
the opinion of “future South Korean leaders,” understood as current (full- and/or part-
time) students at the top 3-ranked universities in the country and a fourth institution, top 
10-ranked and a major source of qualified personnel for the South Korean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, among other relevant national and international 
institutions.74 
 
While non-probability, convenient sampling methods cannot fully guarantee that the 
observed sample will be representative of the whole population under study (Babbie, 
2004: 186), in our particular case, risk of biases is minimized by the relatively high 
homogeneity of the respondents and the element of study – young, ethnically Korean 
students who are also South Korean nationals and are currently studying at top higher 
education institutions. This allows for a high degree of clusterization of the population 
(instead of the sample) that also limits variation as far as educational status and age are 
concerned. Moreover, in order to further randomize the sample, questionnaires were 
handed in different spots around the relevant Seoul campuses by the researcher himself, 
during the second week of May 2012. 
 
                                                            
74 Consequently, we consider the opinion of HUFS students, whose chances to interact with EU 
organizations, governments, institutions and/or citizens in the near future is highly significant, to be as 
valuable as that of students from the top ranked universities. 
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The study, therefore, focuses on what we could consider an infinite population (of over 
100,000 individuals), meaning that a sample of 444 respondents75 guarantees a 96.5% 
confidence level and a +/- 5% margin of error with a relatively high level of 
representativeness, as its characteristics closely approximate those of the chosen 
population: while females are slightly overrepresented, accounting for more than 50% 
of the participants, the fact that over 75% of participants were undergraduate students 
closely approximates the latest South Korean figures this researcher could access (Lee, 
2009). 
 
The questionnaire (Annex 4) consisted of 21 questions, each of them receiving at least 
400 valid and computable answers but the last one, regarding the income of the 
respondent’s family, which has consequently been dropped from the data analysis. 
Respondents spent between 5 and 9 minutes answering the questionnaire, and the 
interviewer/researcher made himself available at all times to solve any doubts 
concerning the questions.76 
 
The combined use of closed-ended questions and statements (standardized using the 
Likert scale format) gave extra flexibility in the design of the questionnaire items. 
Closed-ended response categories were designed to be as exhaustive as possible, 
including an “Other, please specify” category when needed. Moreover, mutual 
exclusivity was also assured unless otherwise clearly indicated. 
 
Double-barreled questions have been systematically avoided despite the complexity of 
the subject matter and the apparent length of some questions. No matrix questions have 
                                                            
75 While 400 respondents should have been enough to guarantee the desired confidence values, the 
number was increased by 11% for two reasons: i) the experimental use of an iPad device to collect 10% 
or 44 answers and ii) asserting there would be at least 400 valid answers to all questions. 
76 The questionnaires were not translated into Korean for three reasons: i) to further guarantee that the 
students were highly qualified individuals able to read in English; ii) to further emphasize the 
international approach of the survey; and iii) to guarantee smooth communication between the 
interviewer/researcher and the respondents. The risk of misunderstanding the questions was minimized in 
two ways: i) by asking the respondents if they felt confident enough to answer in English; and ii) by 
volunteering to resolve any doubt or question the respondents might have while answering. Although the 
first measure had the undesirable effect of scaring off a number of potential participants, thus apparently 
reducing the randomness of the sample, i) the number of “drop-outs” was not statistically significant; and 
ii) it created a sample that reflected even more closely the profile this researcher was looking for, namely 
a highly qualified, young South Korean individual who was able to effectively engage with an EU citizen 
using a widely spoken foreign language. 
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been used in the Likert-format items due to the inherent complexity of the questions and 
the high risk of fostering response-setting among time-pressed respondents. 
 
For greater convenience, and also taking into account the highly uniform features of the 
studied population, some socio-demographic and educational data that would allow for 
the use of continuous variables (i.e. age and degree being pursued) have already been 
collected in the form of discrete variables (i.e. age ranges and knowledge field), thus 
excluding the need to recode the answers. 
 
Given that the goal of this research project is gauging the opinions of South Koreans on 
certain issues related to the European Union and North Korea, and then comparing them 
with the opinions expressed by the interviewed experts (see Chapter 4), but not to 
explain why they might express one point of view or another, descriptive statistics will 
mostly suffice for this purpose. However, occasional bivariate and partial correlation 
analyses have been run to assess possible relationships between the key dependent 
variables – i.e. stated cooperation preferences vis-à-vis North Korea – and the relevant 
independent variables. To that aim, the following socio-demographic values of the 
sample doubled as independent variables: 
 
Political orientation: The concept of political orientation has been operationalized via a 
variable we could codify as “vote intention.”77 Participants were asked to assert which 
possible candidate/party they would be inclined to vote in the upcoming presidential 
election. 18.6% (N = 82) proclaimed they would vote the Conservative (Saenuri) party; 
14.0% (N = 62) indicated they were inclined to vote the Liberals (Democratic United 
Party, DUP); 31.4% (N = 139) said they favored a well-known independent candidate, 
professor and businessman Ahn Cheol-soo; 30.1% of participants (N = 133) said they 
were still undecided; and the remaining 5.9% (N = 26) declared having no interest in 
politics. For the purposes of our research, only the students reporting affinity with one 
of the major parties and/or the independent candidate will be taken into account in 
bivariate analyses. 
 
                                                            
77 As the data was being collected, the 2012 South Korean presidential election was just 6 months away, 
while the legislative election had been held barely one month before. Therefore, it the adequacy of using 
this variable to operationalize the relevant concept was an even more natural choice than usual. 
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Connections with the EU: Just 26% of the consulted students (N = 114) reported having 
personal and/or academic connections with EU institutions and/or citizens, while 74% 
of them (N = 324) said they did not have any such connections. 
 
Gender: The sample was composed of 47% male (N = 207) and 53% female (N = 233) 
respondents. 
 
Age range: Age data were already collected using discrete variables based on the year 
of birth78 and grouped according to the following two criteria: i) reasonable age ranges 
for university students; and ii) historical/generational relevance of the year of birth. 
Therefore, 61.5% of respondents (N = 273) reported being born in 1989 or later,79 
29.1% (N = 129) said they were born between 1988 and 1984, and the remaining 9.5% 
(N = 42) reported being born in 1983 or earlier. 
 
Educational level: 77.6% of respondents (N = 340) were undergraduate students, 19.4% 
(N = 85) were graduate students, and only 3.0% (N = 13) reported being at the PhD 
level. Education was coded from 1 to 3, with the higher the education level, the higher 
the score. Given the very low number of PhD students in our sample – and, therefore, its 
dubious representativeness of the actual views of this collective –, correlations 
concerning this group of students will not be reported in the body of text of this thesis. 
 
Knowledge field: 27.5% of respondents (N = 121) were pursuing a degree in the pure, 
applied or life sciences field; 37.0% of them (N = 163) were social science students; 
23.9% (N = 105) were studying a degree in the humanities field; and 11.6% of the 
surveyed students (N = 51) were pursuing a degree in law or business.80 
                                                            
78 This was done to avoid any confusion related to the specific Korean age calculation system, according 
to which one calculates his/her age from the moment of conception and adds a year to his age every time 
the natural calendar changes years. Therefore, it could happen that someone who was really 23 years old, 
according to international standards, reported being 24 or 25 years old – therefore being miscoded into a 
wrong subgroup. 
79 With 1988 being the year when South Korea finally became a democratic country, this group represents 
the first generation of “sons of the democracy.” 
80 Although law and businesses should technically be considered part of the social sciences, their 
explicitly separation from other specialties is justified for two reasons: i) the nature of their future 
qualifications is the one more often found among business and political leaders; and ii) their probability to 
significantly interact with either North Korea or the European Union during their professional careers 
might be remarkably high. 
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Additionally, the mixed nature of the variables used in this survey, obviously due to the 
complex nature of the issue at hand, calls for the usage of different statistical analysis 
techniques depending on the particular questions. Thus, Pearson’s correlation bivariate 
analyses have only been performed for the five Likert-format items offering interval-
level values, while the selected independent variables were combined with variables at 
the nominal level using cross tabulation techniques. All data was processed and 
analyzed using version 19 of the IBM SPSS Statistics software application.  
 
Descriptive statistical analyses will be presented and commented first, with results 
conveniently distributed along three overarching thematic subdivisions. Results from 
bivariate analyses will be presented and discussed in the last subsection of this chapter. 
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5.3. Descriptive statistical analyses and related findings 
 
5.3.1. Perceptions of North Korea and North Korea-South Korea relations 
 
Before assessing their views on EU-North Korea relations, it is important to analyze 
what the respondents to the survey had to say about South Korea-North Korea relations.  
 
To that end, four different questions were asked to the participants in the study. Two of 
them were directly related to Korean reunification, the second dealt with security 
consequences of a North Korean collapse, and the last one presented them with a 
multiple choice selection of possible engagement avenues with the DPRK. 
 
When asked if they would favor Korean reunification – nowadays a highly contentious 
proposition, especially among younger South Koreans –, 57.4% of the participants (N = 
255) responded affirmatively, while 32.2% (N = 143) took the opposed view. The 
remaining 10.4% of respondents (N = 46) said they did not have a clear position or did 
not care about the issue. 
 
The answers received to the question measuring the degree of probability the 
participants attached to an eventual Korean reunification in a mid-term scenario also 
showed clear divisions: while 23.4% of respondents (N = 104) said they were pretty 
sure Korean reunification would take place within the next 25 years, 28.8% (N = 128) 
denied this possibility, with an even larger group (47.7%, N = 212) expressing their 
uncertainty about any of the two possible outcomes. 
 
Combined, these results can be interpreted as proof of the younger generation being less 
attached to North Korea, due to reduced personal, family and emotional ties to the North 
and a more individualistic and consumption-oriented mentality. 
 
To test the perceived risk posed by an unforeseen collapse of the North Korean regime, 
a Likert scaled question was used. Students were asked about their degree of agreement 
with the statement “A sudden collapse of the North Korean regime would put South 
Korea’s security at risk.” 81.5% of respondents (N = 361) said they completely agreed 
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or somewhat agreed with the assertion, while only 11.3% (N = 50) expressed some 
degree of disagreement. 
 
While these results are not fully comparable with those obtained by the Asan Institute 
for Policy Studies December 2011 instant poll, whose population was South Koreans of 
all age ranges, it is interesting to point out that 56.5% of respondents to that poll said 
that a collapse of the North Korean regime would worsen South Korean security, while 
34.6% asserted that it would improve Southern security. However, younger respondents 
were especially pessimistic: 63% of people in their 20s said it would make things worse. 
Therefore, we can assert that the population selected for this research project strongly 
tends to consider instability in North Korea a threat to their own security – something 
that should be taken into account when considering their views of enhanced EU 
involvement in the North Korean theater. 
 
Respondents were also asked to assess the degree to which they approved Lee Myung-
bak's hard-line policies vis-à-vis North Korea. A triadic selection was presented, also 
including the possibility to express support for even tougher policies – an option 
selected by 19.9% of respondents (N = 88). 31.2% of them (N = 138) considered current 
policies to be correct, while a considerable but not absolute majority (49%, N = 217) 
said that further dialogue and cooperation should be sought. 
 
These results contrast with those obtained by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in 
December 2011, when 64% of people in their 20s said they disapproved the policy (also 
including those who disapprove it because they would like to see even tougher stances), 
with just 20% of respondents approving it. However, results of that instant poll were 
surely affected by the uncertainty surrounding Kim Jong-il’s death: while 45% of 
respondents in the same age range supported a stronger line in a November poll, the 
number had fallen to 26% by December. 
 
The last question of this first thematic block asked participants to choose one or two 
cooperation areas they would approve of in case the South Korean government decided 
to alter current policies and seek engagement with Pyongyang – it what might be a very 
possible outcome of the December 2012 presidential election.  
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In order to properly process the answers to this question, two different variables were 
created. The options chosen by the participants were initially spread between them; they 
were later regrouped creating a single multiple response variable set. As shown in Table 
4, the choices were widespread. However, two cooperation avenues stand out as the 
most desirable: food aid and humanitarian assistance, chosen by 47.9% of the 
respondents,81 and human rights and political dialogue, approved by more than half of 
the participants in the survey (54.4%). Academic and cultural exchanges also received 
widespread support, with trade relations and capacity building not far behind. 
 
 N Percent of cases 
 Academic and cultural exchanges 138 31,9%
Energy assistance 90 20,8%
Environmental protection programs 43 10,0%
Food aid and humanitarian assistance 207 47,9%
Human rights and political dialogue 235 54,4%
Trade relations and capacity building 112 25,9%
Other 6 1,4%
 
Table 4. Options selected for enhanced South Korea-North Korea cooperation. The most 
widely chosen options are highlighted. Own elaboration. 
 
  
                                                            
81 Remarkably, the Asan instant poll of December 2011 reported that just 47% of young South Korean 
adults would support sending food and fertilizer as aid to North Korea, while 50% of them would 
disapprove of the measure. 
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5.3.2. Views of EU engagement with North Korea 
 
Perceptions of eventual increased EU engagement with North Korea were measured via 
a rather diverse set of questions, starting with a multiple choice question on the two 
foreign powers perceived by the respondents as being able to play a greater role in 
improving inter-Korean relations. 
 
Not surprisingly, the surveyed students overwhelmingly chose China and the United 
States, with 90.1% (N = 390) and 73.7% (N = 319) of respondents respectively 
mentioning them. The EU failed to crown the dissenting responses, with only 7.6% of 
participants (N = 33) selecting it as a key partner, far away from Russia, which managed 
to obtain support in 13.9% of the cases (N = 60).82 
 
The discouraging results regarding the perceived importance of the EU’s potential to 
improve relations between Seoul and Pyongyang were somewhat corroborated by the 
ambivalence showed vis-à-vis the suggestion that deeper EU engagement with North 
Korea could help improve the security level in the Korean Peninsula: just 37% of the 
participants (N = 164) responded affirmatively, with 32.7% (N = 145) choosing the 
opposite option and the remaining 30.2% (N = 134) saying they did not know the 
effects such developments might have. 
  
Intimately tied to this question are the perceptions about the possible effects a higher 
level of EU cooperation with the DPRK could have on South Korea-EU bilateral 
relations. Respondents’ answers were widely divided among the three possible answers, 
with 43.8% of them (N = 193) saying it would have a positive influence, 37.6% of the 
respondents (N = 167) predicting negative influence and a further 18.2% (N = 81) 
saying it would not have any effect on South Korea's relations with Brussels. 
 
Participating university students were subsequently asked if the EU should intervene by 
sending military personnel, civilian experts and/or emergency aid in case of a sudden 
                                                            
82 In this case, results presented here do not strongly differ from those obtained by the Asan Institute in 
December 2011. When asked to name the country most important for South Korea to cooperate with to 
improve North-South relations, 51% of the respondents chose China, followed by the U.S. and Russia, 
with 35% and 5% of the responses, respectively. 
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collapse of the North Korean regime. Their responses, gauged using a Likert scale 
providing interval-level values, were slightly positive, with 47.4% of responses (N = 
210) being either "completely agree" or "somewhat agree." However, 20.8% of the 
respondents (N = 92) had no clear opinion on the issue, and 31.8% of them (N = 141) 
expressed moderate or strong disagreement with this possibility. 
 
A question regarding the possibility that Europe engages with North Korea in a 
proactive manner, cancelling some of the sanctions it applies to the regime even if the 
rogue state does not show clear willingness to abandon its nuclear program. This highly 
risky, complex proposal – that was openly rejected by the interviewed experts, who 
mostly called for a multilateral approach driven by South Korea and China – collected 
overall positive responses among the studied sample. Up to 58.8% of the respondents 
(N = 261) said they agreed completely or in part with the proposal, while an also high 
number (24.3%, N = 108) reported ambivalence towards it. Just 16.9% of respondents 
(N = 75) said they disagreed with the proposal. 
 
However, the complexity of the question and the fact that up to 72.3% of respondents 
(N = 321) reported moderate agreement or neither agreement nor disagreement83 calls 
for extreme prudence in assessing the validity of these particular results and effectively 
disqualifies them from further bivariate analyses. 
 
The last question assessing the participants’ views on future EU engagement with North 
Korea is the one offering the strongest direct link between the results of this survey and 
the information collected via the in-depth interviews with the four experts on EU-North 
Korea relations. 
 
Coinciding with the request to indicate one or two preferred cooperation avenues for 
further South Korean engagement with North Korea, students have been asked to 
                                                            
83 For cultural reasons, East Asians tend to disproportionately show moderate agreement or lack of 
knowledge on the issue when they are not sure about an answer. Reticence and humility are highly 
valued cultural traits, rooted in the Confucian tradition, and conformity has positive connotations of 
connectedness and harmony in East Asian culture (Kim and Markus, 1999). Therefore, conclusion about 
answers highly skewed towards moderate agreement and including very high levels of neutrality should 
not be taken at face value. 
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indicate which kind(s) of cooperation options they would like the EU to prioritize in 
case Brussels decided to deepen and widen the scope of its relations with North Korea. 
As shown in Table 5, the respondents showed a high degree of consensus in 
preferentially choosing two of the proposed options: food aid and humanitarian 
assistance (62.8%, N = 275) and human rights and political dialogue (65.1%, N = 285), 
which were also the preferred choices for South Korea-North Korea cooperation – albeit 
with a far lesser degree of consensus. 
 
Also of note it the almost perfect tie for third place between three of the proposed 
options, with environmental protection programs – an option with relatively high 
acceptance among the interviewed experts – falling far behind the rest (8.2%, N = 36).84 
 
 N Percent of cases 
Academic and cultural exchanges 85 19,4%
Energy assistance 81 18,5%
Environmental protection programs 36 8,2%
Food aid and humanitarian assistance 275 62,8%
Human rights and political dialogue 285 65,1%
Trade relations and capability building 81 18,5%
Other 4 ,9%
 
Table 5. Options selected for enhanced EU-North Korea cooperation. The most widely chosen 
options are highlighted. Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
84 Curiously enough, Park and Yoon (2010) reported that South Korean elites considered the EU as the 
most important and reliable defender and promoter of not just human rights and international 
development, but also environmentalism. This makes even more surprising the relatively low level of 
interest that the environmental protection option has arisen among respondents to the present survey and 
begs for the question of how results would have looked like in case participants had been asked to select 
up to three cooperation choices. 
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5.3.3. Broader perception of the European Union 
 
Given their future relevance for bilateral EU-South Korea relations – and even 
multilateral relations involving the EU, North Korea and South Korea –, the broader 
perception elite South Korean university students have of the European Union has also 
been gauged via four questions, two of them strictly interrelated and measuring the 
relative weight participants give to South Korea-EU relations and the remaining two 
evaluating the degree of acceptance of the EU as a supranational organization fostering 
integration, both within its borders and immediate neighborhood and eventually in 
Northeast Asia.85 
 
The first subset of questions calibrated opinions on the international powers considered 
to be more relevant partners for South Korea, both at the time of performing the 
research and in a mid-term scenario reflecting the approximate timeframe in which 
current South Korean elite university students have greater chances to have leadership 
positions in their respective professional fields. This gives highly relevant feedback on 
the evolution of the international system foreseen by future South Korean leaders. 
Additionally, respondents were asked to select two powers instead of just one to better 
reflect the current and expected world affairs setup and that of East Asia in particular, 
shaped by growing China-U.S. bipolarity according to most experts and scholars. 
 
Both when asked about current and future premiere partnerships, respondents massively 
aligned with both China and the United States. However, while the U.S. was the most 
prevalent answer when asked about the present (89.1%, N = 392), young South Koreans 
clearly see U.S. power declining in the next decades, as just 66.2% of them (N = 292) 
selected it as a top partner for the year 2040 – a 23% drop. Meanwhile, China goes from 
appearing in 76.6% of all responses (N = 337) to being mentioned by 85% of them (N = 
375) when the timeframe is changed. 
 
As far as the European Union is concerned, it consistently attains third place in both 
current and future rankings, even managing to increase its perceived future value to 
                                                            
85 It must be noted that indexes of these questions were not created due to the lack of satisfactory results 
when performing the relevant factor analyses, meaning that the index would not be reliable due to the fact 
that the questions also measure other elements instead of just one factor. 
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South Korea: 61 respondents (13.9% of the total) mention it as a major partner in the 
present, but 74 of them (16.8%) do it when asked about future perspectives. However, 
other than China and the EU, emerging Latin America and Russia also experiment 
remarkable improvements, going from an almost negligible number of votes up to 34 
(7.7%) and 31 (7%), respectively. 
 
Therefore, we can assert that this particular population values the EU as a reliable 
international alternative to the two countries which are widely perceived to be most 
influential in the Northeast Asia region. While still far from the top two, the fact that an 
increasing number of respondents value the EU’s potential for future crucial bilateral 
cooperation – thus not condemning it to the notable decline in importance the U.S. is 
perceived to experiment – has to be seen as a very positive development.86 
 
 N Percent of cases 
China 337 76,6%
EU 61 13,9%
Japan 40 9,1%
Latin America 5 1,1%
Russia 8 1,8%
US 392 89,1%
Other 7 1,6%
 
Table 6. Major perceived international partners for South Korea in 2012. Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
86 These findings partially align with those presented by Park and Yoon in their 2010 paper. In their case, 
although 85% of the interviewees considered the EU was a global power, only 55% of them said it was a 
leading political power and a wide majority considered it less relevant than the U.S., China and even 
Russia. A narrow majority of the interviewees also asserted that the EU was either important or very 
important for South Korea; however, when asked about future importance, nearly 90% of them agreed on 
the importance of the EU for their country. 
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 N Percent of cases 
 China 375 85,0%
EU 74 16,8%
Japan 28 6,3%
Latin America 34 7,7%
Russia 31 7,0%
US 292 66,2%
Other 16 3,6%
 
Table 7. Major perceived international partners for South Korea in 2040. Own elaboration.  
 
The second subset of questions aims at directly and indirectly gauging support for and 
approval of the EU model among the participants and the relevant population via two 
interrelated Likert-scaled items. 
 
First, participants were asked about their views of regional integration along ASEAN or 
EU lines in Northeast Asia – thus indirectly evaluating perceptions of the European 
supranational integration process. Most responses were strongly positive, with 71.5% of 
respondents (N = 316) agreeing either completely or with some reservations to the idea 
that greater regional integration would be good for Korea, and just 11.3% of them (N = 
50) taking the opposite view. 17.2% of respondents (N = 76) expressed neutrality 
towards the proposal. 
 
In the next question, participants were told to directly rate their perception of the 
European Union. Results were also quite positive, with 68.7 % of respondents (N = 305) 
saying they had a positive view of the EU and just 7% of them (N = 31) expressing 
negative visions. However, only 13.1% of the total (N = 58) said their views were very 
positive, while a further 24.3% of respondents (N = 108) asserted that their perceptions 
of the EU were neither positive nor negative.  
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The combined analysis of these results, therefore, shows widespread reserves and/or 
doubts about certain elements of the European project and supranational integration, 
maybe influenced by recent economic trouble in Europe.87 
 
  
                                                            
87 Despite having no scientific or statistical significance, some participants were eager to have first-hand 
information about the eurozone troubles, their causes and the possible solutions, thus directly inquiring 
the researcher about the issue. 
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5.4. Bivariate statistical analyses and related findings 
 
After reviewing the descriptive information derived from the collected survey data, this 
section will deal with the outcomes of the performed bivariate statistical analyses, 
including cross tabulations and Pearson’s correlation analyses, with special emphasis on 
those generating results that are relevant for this research. 
 
In order not to unnecessarily split the information feeding from the three subtopics 
identified in the previous section, results arising from bivariate analyses are presented 
following a slightly different rationale from that used in the previous section. However, 
the basic order of the elements presented in the previous section has been respected to 
the maximum possible extent for greater internal coherence. 
 
5.4.1. Correlations involving variables on Korean reunification and opinions on 
North Korea 
 
The first cross tabulation analysis that generated significant results concerned the 
answers to the two questions regarding Korean reunification. Despite the fact that a 
Lambda distribution analysis yielded a statistically negligible relationship between the 
variables, when performing a cross tabulation of the two variables measuring the 
students' views on Korean reunification we see that students favoring reunification 
seemed clearly less liable to consider that reunification will not take place in the next 25 
years and considerably more prone to assert it will. Contrarily, students who were 
opposed to reunification or did not care about it were notably more inclined to assert 
that reunification would not take place in the mid-term.88 
 
Additionally, students who favor reunification tend to disapprove of current government 
policies vis-à-vis North Korea far more than people who do not favor it and people who 
do not report interest in this issue. Coincidentally, support for even tougher stances 
                                                            
88 Although, at first sight, correlations between the positions vis-à-vis reunification and those on 
engagement areas with North Korea would seem highly likely, the performed statistical analyses (cross 
tabulations) failed to show significant distinctions, maybe with the only exception of the higher degree of 
support environmental protection programs received from those students saying that they did not care 
about reunification. However, the correlation was extremely weak and, given that the amount of people 
asserting they did not care about reunification was relatively low, these results may be due to chance or 
other, non-explained factors. 
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regarding North Korea is strongest among this last group than among respondents who 
declared their opposition to reunification. 
 
Also of note is that those students stating that the South Korean government should be 
even tougher with North Korea show moderately different choice patterns when asked 
about possible cooperation areas with the DPRK. Both in the case of South Korean and 
EU engagement with North Korea, they give above average weight to environmental 
protection programs and trade relations and capacity building – maybe the more 
politically neutral options available – and less to human rights and political dialogue, 
favored by just 47.7% of them (instead of the 54.4% average support) in the case of 
South Korea-North Korea relations, and by 59.3% (instead of the average 65.1%) in the 
case of EU-North Korea engagement possibilities. 
 
5.4.2. Correlations involving the identified socio-demographic independent 
variables 
 
Already focusing on what South Korean elite university students think of EU and its 
eventual involvement in North Korea, cross tabulation analyses combining all the 
relevant dependent variables with the identified independent variables have been run, 
together with a Pearson’s correlation analysis involving the three reliable Likert-scaled 
items corresponding to this thematic subdivision of the quantitative study.89,90 
 
When assessing the relation of the socio-demographic values with the results of the 
question devoted to regional integration, we could only detect a slight negative 
correlation between being a student in the field of humanities and perceptions of 
regional integration, which tended to be less positive than the average, with just 65.7% 
of students agreeing with its benefits as opposed to 70.3% overall, as well as a lower 
amount of law and business students viewing it negatively (6.1% as opposed to the 
                                                            
89 Given the previously explained doubts generated by the reliability of responses to the question “The 
EU should cancel some of the sanctions it applies to North Korea and advance cooperation even if the 
regime does not give clear signals of abandoning its nuclear program. Do you agree with this statement?”, 
results of this question have no longer been analyzed to find correlations, as they could have a negative 
effect on the reliability and generalization of the reported correlations. 
90 The results reported have been simplified (i.e. they neither include N values nor all the detailed 
percentage information for all involved variables and values) in this section for additional clarity. All 
analyses and cross tabulations are available upon request (in SPSS format). 
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average 11.4%). In line with these results, students in the humanities also showed less 
inclination to perceiving the EU in a positive fashion, as just 61% of them reported 
positive opinions, as opposed to an average of 69%. 
 
Unlike the remaining possible political orientation values, affinity with the Liberal party 
(DUP) consistently proved to yield a modified distribution of the answers to the 
dependent variables, including a non-statistically significant positive relationship with 
pro-EU views, with 76.4% of students expressing their intention to vote for the liberal 
candidate in the next presidential election also having a good perception of the EU, 
compared with an average of 69% for the overall sample.  
 
Pro-DUP students also were more inclined to assert that eventual EU engagement with 
North Korea could have a positive effect on bilateral EU-South Korea relations (51.6% 
of them said so, as compared to the average 44%), while also showing less inclination to 
predict negative effects (27.4% as compared to an average of 37.6%). Students favoring 
the liberal party also asserted that deeper EU engagement with North Korea would help 
improve the security level in the whole peninsula at a higher ratio (45.2%) than other 
students (37.2% average), while saying it would not ameliorate security less often 
(27.4%) than their colleagues did (32.9%). Affinity with this party was also tied to 
additional disagreement with the option that the EU intervenes directly in North Korea 
by sending troops and/or civilian experts in case of regime collapse, as 38.7% of 
potential DUP voters disagreed with it, while just 31.8% of overall respondents 
expressed disagreement with the proposal. 
 
More remarkable is the strong relationship between having personal ties with EU 
citizens or institutions and reporting positive perceptions of the EU and its eventual 
involvement in North Korea. The previously mentioned overall EU approval rate 
skyrockets to 80.7% in the case of those reporting ties with the EU, falling to 65.1% 
among those who do not. Meanwhile, 44.7% of them said EU engagement would also 
increase security levels in the whole peninsula, while just 34.7% of those with no ties 
with EU citizens or institutions believed so. Personal connections with the EU also 
generated remarkably stronger support for an eventual EU intervention in North Korea, 
with an approval rate of 55.2%, as opposed to just 44.9% among those not reporting any 
ties with the EU. 
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EU intervention in case of regime collapse also showed widespread support within law 
and business students, with 58.8% of them expressing a positive view. Those same 
students also tended to express that enhanced EU relations with North Korea could have 
negative influences for EU-South Korea relations (52.9% as opposed to the 37.9% 
average); however, this trend did not subtract from the opposite view but from the 
neutral position (i.e. it would not matter), which was just supported by 3.9% of law and 
business students. 
 
When controlling for the gender and age of the participants, it was found out that 
perceived positive influence of EU engagement with North Korea on bilateral EU-South 
Korea relations was substantially higher among males (50.2%) than among females 
(38.4%), and even higher among older students, with 69% of them saying engagement 
would also be positive for Brussels-Seoul relations and just 14.3% of them asserting it 
would be negative – as compared to 37.9% for the full sample. However, the 
significance of this last observation is modulated by the relatively low number of 
students born in 1983 or earlier included in the survey.91 
 
Not surprisingly, males also tended to be more favorable to EU intervention than 
females (53.4% vs. 42.1%), and also to consider that deeper EU engagement with North 
Korean issues could improve security in the whole peninsula (44.4% as opposed to just 
30.2% among females), probably a reflection of the martial culture instilled by the 
military authorities among young South Koreans, who are asked to spend almost two 
years in the army as conscripts and to interrupt their university students to do so. 
Additionally, the reported age of the participants was also related to believing that EU 
involvement in North Korea could increase security in the whole peninsula, with 47.6% 
of respondents born in 1983 or earlier saying so compared to just 37% overall. 
 
Concerning possible correlations between the answers given in the relevant Likert-
scaled questions related to views of the European Union, a Pearson correlation analysis 
has been performed. As shown in Table 8, responses to the three selected questions are 
                                                            
91 The situation is even more extreme in the case of the 13 surveyed PhD students, who also massively 
aligned with the idea that EU engagement with North Korea would also be good for EU-South Korea 
relations (84.6%, N = 11). 
120 
 
positively correlated between them, although not too strongly. The strongest correlation 
is found between the reported perception of the European Union and the views on 
regional integration (r = .254, p = .000), with the views on direct EU intervention in 
case of a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime also showing a relevant positive 
correlation with the variable on perceptions of the EU (r = .188, p = .000). Additionally, 
responses to the variable measuring perceptions of greater regional integration in 
Northeast Asia and the one measuring views of an eventual EU intervention in the 
DPRK are also positively correlated, albeit less strongly (r = .152, p = .001). 
 
In short, strong evidence has been found to support the hypothesis that Korean students’ 
perceptions of the EU and of the effects and/or benefits its eventual engagement with 
North Korea might have vary along the lines of several key socio-demographic features 
– most notably gender and personal ties with EU citizens or institutions. 
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The European Union should intervene 
directly – by sending military personnel, 
civilian experts and/or emergency aid – in 
case of a sudden collapse of the North 
Korean regime. 
Greater regional integration – 
in the lines of ASEAN or the 
EU – would be positive for 
Korea and Northeast Asia. 
How is your perception 
of the European Union? 
The European Union should intervene 
directly – by sending military personnel, 
civilian experts and/or emergency aid – in 
case of a sudden collapse of the North 
Korean regime. 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 ,152** ,188** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,001 ,000 
N 443 441 443 
Greater regional integration – in the lines of 
ASEAN or the EU – would be positive for 
Korea and Northeast Asia. 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,152** 1 ,254** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,001  ,000 
N 441 442 442 
How is your perception of the European 
Union? 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,188** ,254** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000  
N 443 442 444 
 
Table 8. Bivariate analysis (Pearson correlation) of Likert-scaled items related to perceptions of the European Union. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed) and indicated with a double asterisk (**). 
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5.4.3. Correlations between the variables measuring cooperation preferences and 
the independent variables 
 
To complete the analysis of the survey data, the preferences in possible cooperation 
areas for both South Korea and the European Union have been cross tabulated and 
compared, first between them and later using the previously identified socio-
demographic independent variables. 
 
As Table 9 clearly shows, there seems to be a strong correlation between the 
cooperation choices for South Korea and those for the European Union. In other words, 
many of the surveyed students that selected a given cooperation avenue to eventually 
improve Seoul’s relations with Pyongyang strongly tended to choose the same option(s) 
when asked about the paths the European Union could choose to increase its 
engagement with North Korea. 
 
This relationship is particularly strong, visible and relevant among the most widely 
chosen options, namely food aid and humanitarian assistance and human rights and 
political dialogue. For instance, 83.4% of the 205 respondents who chose food aid and 
humanitarian assistance as a preferred area of cooperation for South Korea-North Korea 
engagement also chose this option for European Union-North Korea relations. In line 
with that, 77.3% of the 233 respondents who selected human rights and political 
dialogue as a viable avenue for South Korea-North Korea cooperation also decided it 
would be a very good option for EU-North Korea cooperation. Moreover, cross-relation 
between these two options was also strong, as 67.3% of people selecting humanitarian 
assistance as a priority for South Korea-North Korea cooperation also chose human 
rights and political dialogue for EU relations with the DPRK, and 67.8% of those 
selecting human rights and political dialogue for further Seoul-Pyongyang engagement 
also went with humanitarian assistance and food aid when asked about the EU. 
 
In other words, stated preferences for hypothetical South Korean engagement with 
North Korea have strong implications for the study of the perceptions of Brussels-
Pyongyang relations, as they seem to strongly correlate with the preferred options for 
EU engagement with North Korea. 
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EU Cooperation 
Total 
Academic and 
cultural 
exchanges 
Energy 
assistance 
Environmental 
protection 
programs 
Food aid and 
humanitarian 
assistance 
Human rights 
and political 
dialogue 
Trade relations 
and capability 
building Other 
South Korea 
Cooperation 
Academic and 
cultural exchanges 
Count 48 24 15 76 78 21 3 136 
%  35,3% 17,6% 11,0% 55,9% 57,4% 15,4% 2,2%  
Energy assistance Count 12 37 11 42 50 18 0 90 
%  13,3% 41,1% 12,2% 46,7% 55,6% 20,0% ,0%  
Environmental 
protection 
Count 12 13 9 16 25 7 0 42 
%  28,6% 31,0% 21,4% 38,1% 59,5% 16,7% ,0%  
Food aid and 
humanitarian 
assistance 
Count 28 26 11 171 138 27 2 205 
%  13,7% 12,7% 5,4% 83,4% 67,3% 13,2% 1,0%  
Human rights and 
political dialogue 
Count 40 29 14 158 180 35 1 233 
% 17,2% 12,4% 6,0% 67,8% 77,3% 15,0% ,4%  
Trade relations and 
capacity building 
Count 20 22 8 53 63 43 2 111 
% 18,0% 19,8% 7,2% 47,7% 56,8% 38,7% 1,8%  
Other Count 0 3 1 3 4 1 0 6 
% ,0% 50,0% 16,7% 50,0% 66,7% 16,7% ,0%  
Total Count 84 80 35 266 279 79 4 428 
 
Table 9. Cross-tabulation of the responses on preferred areas of cooperation with North Korea for South Korea and the EU. The options showing greater correlation appear 
highlighted. Percentages and totals are based on respondents. Own elaboration. 
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However, the fact that there seems to be a remarkable degree of correlation between the 
most popular choices for South Korea-North Korea and European Union-North Korea 
cooperation areas needs to be complemented by the analysis of the interaction between 
these two multiple choice variables and the selected independent variables. 
 
Cross tabulation analyses started with the independent variable Political orientation, 
which showed no discernible effects over choices of preferred South Korean or 
European Union cooperation avenues vis-à-vis North Korea.  
 
Even if not statistically significant, the independent variable Connections with the EU 
apparently showed a modest positive correlation with the choice of academic and 
cultural exchanges – 24.1% of people reporting personal connections with EU citizens 
or institutions supported this cooperation method, while just 19.4% of the overall 
sample and 17.6% of students with no personal ties with EU citizens or institutions 
supported it – as a preferred method of cooperation for the EU, while having no 
remarkable influence on the results for South Korea. 
 
When controlling for the Gender of the participants, males were found to be more 
interested in EU cooperation in the field of energy than women – 22.3% compared to 
just 15.3% – but less approving of cooperation in the form of increased human rights 
and political dialogue – just 62.1% of males selected this option, which was chosen by 
68.1% of participating females. Similar results could be observed in the case of South 
Korea cooperation choices. 
 
As far as the effects of the independent variable Age are concerned, both younger and 
older students seemed slightly more inclined to favor EU energy assistance vis-à-vis 
North Korea than their counterparts in the intermediate age group, who tended to give 
more weight to food aid and humanitarian assistance. An even more remarkable 
difference occurs with preferred cooperation areas for South Korea, with students in the 
intermediate age group aligning with the provision of food and humanitarian aid at a 
much higher ratio than their younger and older counterparts (60.3% of respondents 
compared to just 42.3% and 46.3%, respectively). However, these variations would not 
be considered statistically relevant due to the skewness of the distribution of the 
variable: low number of older students and a very high number of younger ones make 
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any observed correlation less reliable and potentially more affected by chance or other 
factors (spurious relations).92 
 
No special effects on choices for EU cooperation were detected when controlling for the 
variable Educational level. However, in the case of preferences for South Korean 
cooperation, undergraduate students did tend to favor energy assistance more than their 
older counterparts, with graduate students being the group favoring food aid and 
humanitarian assistance the most and academic exchanges the least. 
 
Some remarkable trends found when controlling for Knowledge field should also be 
highlighted. Concerning the choices of preferred EU-North Korea cooperation areas, 
pure, applied and life sciences students tend to favor academic and cultural exchanges 
(25%) and energy assistance (21.7%) more than their counterparts, while giving less 
relative weight to food aid and humanitarian assistance (56.7%). Social sciences 
students are the ones giving less weight to academic and cultural exchanges (14.8%), 
while surprisingly favoring energy assistance slightly more than their colleagues. Food 
aid was mostly favored by students in the humanities field (68.3%), while human rights 
and political dialogue was especially favored by law and/or business students (74.5%). 
 
Finally, regarding South Korea-North Korea cooperation options, pure, applied and life 
sciences students showed more inclination for energy assistance (25.2%) and 
environmental protection programmes (15.1%), and less weight to trade relations 
(20.2%) than their counterparts did. Meanwhile, students in the humanities field favored 
food aid (52.9%) and human rights and political dialogue (56.9%) more than the rest of 
students, and law and/or business students fittingly showed additional interest in 
developing trade relations with the North (34.7%). 
 
In conclusion, abundant evidence has been found to support the secondary hypothesis 
stating that some socio-demographic features would have an effect on the participants’ 
preferred choices for engagement with North Korea. 
                                                            
92 Although there are usually statistical methods available to precisely evaluate the significance and 
potential spuriousness of correlations, limitations in processing combined sets of multiple-choice 
variables do not allow for their application in such instances. 
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5.5. Combined qualitative and quantitative results: analysis and major findings 
 
After extensively reviewing all the information deriving from the collected and 
analyzed survey data and inferred from its statistical treatment, it is necessary that we 
connect it with the information and results obtained in the qualitative part of this study, 
allowing us to test the validity of the initial hypothesis regarding probable expectation 
gaps between the views expressed by experts and professionals directly linked to the EU 
and its activities in North Korea and those asserted by future South Korean leaders. 
 
In order to efficiently and clearly present the combined findings, a summary table, 
partially following the format of those included at the end of Chapter 4, has been 
created with the aim of visually summarizing opinions and eventual consensus between 
EU “insiders” and “outsiders” on all the relevant topics. Overall opinions have been 
recoded and classified in two columns: EU stakeholders and future South Korean 
leaders. In the case of the first column, reflecting the results of the qualitative part of 
this research, the color coding used in each cell represents both the identified degree of 
consensus (total, shown by monochromatic coloring, or partial, identified by a double 
color coding within the same cell) and the direction(s) (positive, neutral or negative) of 
the overall opinions reflected. As far as the second column is concerned, views of the 
students have been coded as positive, neutral or negative according to the respective 
percentages, rankings and approval rates, as reported in section 5.3. 
 
Given that they are predictions based on informed political analysis that can only be 
reliably provided by expert professionals, the topics related to possible social and 
economic changes in the DPRK and its eventual denuclearization have not been 
analyzed in the quantitative study and, therefore, do not appear in Table 10. Similarly, 
changes in institutional and diplomatic relations between the EU and North Korea have 
not been explicitly studied in the quantitative part of this thesis, and have also been 
excluded from this table. 
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 EU stakeholders Future South Korean leaders 
Proactive engagement    
Rescind sanctions   
Effects on EU-South Korea relations    
Human rights and political dialogue   
Food aid and humanitarian assistance   
Energy cooperation   
Trade relations and capacity building    
Educational and cultural exchanges    
Environmental cooperation    
 
Table 10. Color-coded interpretive comparison of the results of the qualitative and quantitative studies. Own elaboration. 
 
Legend: Red: unanimous negative views regarding the issue / low support for the engagement option 
Orange: unanimous mixed views regarding the issue / medium support for the engagement option 
  Green: unanimous positive views regarding the issue / high support for the engagement option 
  Mixed colors: mixed views regarding the issue 
128 
 
The first observation we can make from this interpretative table is that there is no 
perfect consensus in any of the proposed cooperation arenas, hypothetical engagement 
processes or expected effects, thus openly confirming one of the key hypotheses of this 
thesis: wide expectation gaps exist between the perceptions and preferences of eventual 
EU engagement with North Korea expressed by future South Korean leaders – i.e. 
external stakeholders – and the views expressed by the interviewed experts in EU-North 
Korea relations – i.e. the internal sources. 
 
Especially worrying is the complete dissonance found in the case of human rights and 
political dialogue.93 As already discussed in Chapter 4, the interviewed experts 
expressed mostly negative views about both the effectiveness of discussing human 
rights with North Korea and the real will to do so, even within the institution widely 
considered the beacon of democratic and universal values in a not always transparent 
EU, the European Parliament. Contrary to that, South Korean students, based on the 
widely-held image of the EU as a global force for good that actively promotes human 
rights and democracy, massively chose human rights and political dialogue as one of the 
most promising avenues for broader and deeper EU engagement with the DPRK. 
 
A certain lack of consensus is also felt on the second option that was also widely chosen 
by the surveyed South Korean students as a preferred EU cooperation choice vis-à-vis 
North Korea: food aid and humanitarian assistance – selected by almost 63% of 
respondents, slightly behind the 65% of votes received by human rights and political 
dialogue. While in this case the views expressed by the three interviewees that 
commented on that issue was not negative, they all coincided in expecting current 
unconditional programs to continue but not to increase in breadth or scope, while also 
valuing their positive effects for the North Korean population but remembering that 
serious shortcomings in monitoring and effective distribution still exist. Therefore, 
while it could not be ruled out that aid was eventually increased with the right 
conditions, and while also acknowledging that the experts mainly focused on the present 
situation and not on future expectations (always conditional to verifiable changes in 
                                                            
93 The table also clearly indicates completely opposite approaches concerning sanctions and their eventual 
cancellation. However, as already explained in section 5.3, we cannot take the results of this question at 
face value due to possible misunderstandings and undue influence of cultural factors. Therefore, no 
further conclusions should be drawn from that and, ideally, further research should be conducted to re-test 
this particular question. 
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North Korea), the interviewees did not seem to share the same degree of interest for this 
choice that South Korean students demonstrated. 
 
Interestingly enough, dissonance is also particularly strong among one of the possible 
cooperation areas that obtained better reviews by the interviewed EU experts and 
policymakers: environmental cooperation, widely considered a low (political) risk, high 
(mutual) reward option. While not openly rejected by the surveyed South Korean 
students – who were asked to select their preferred options and not to discard the ones 
they disagreed with –, its “negative” coding is due to the extremely low number of votes 
it received, being supported by barely 8% of the respondents. 
 
Dissonance is also found in the choice for energy cooperation: while EU experts warned 
about its impracticality for several reasons – ranging from limitations in technology 
imports to the lessons of recent history –, a reasonably large number of students (even 
larger among younger respondents) selected it instead of the more popular options, 
humanitarian aid and human rights and political dialogue. 
 
Better alignment within a relatively neutral degree of interest was found in the fields of 
trade relations and capacity building and educational/academic and cultural exchanges. 
Again, the fact that the surveyed South Koreans did not overwhelmingly choose them as 
preferred EU-North Korea cooperation axis does not mean they reject them, but solely 
that other options were preferred by most. Therefore, those should still be considered 
valuable areas of cooperation with a relatively high level of alignment between internal 
EU preferences and external preferences. 
 
Therefore, we can report that ample evidence of dissonance and disconnect between the 
opinions expressed by the interviewees in the qualitative part of this research and the 
predominant views and preferences among top South Korean students has been found. 
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that a remarkable expectations gap exists in such a 
sensitive issue for the EU and its perceptions among foreign publics as human rights 
promotion, some common ground can still be identified, thus eventually permitting the 
design of a limited, consensus-based policy of engagement that could incorporate the 
views of most stakeholders within the precepts and interests of the Union. 
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6. Conclusions and policy considerations 
 
North Korea is a truly unique case for both students of international relations and 
political practitioners. Its political insularity, combined with its extremely relevant 
geographical location, cushioned between three of the EU’s Strategic Partners and 
inside a key economic region where a fourth partner, the U.S., allegedly wants to shift 
its interest during the coming decades, make it especially relevant to conduct a study 
involving the opinions of foreign stakeholders to gauge the most viable cooperation 
avenues and possibilities for engagement. 
 
This is precisely the basic reason behind this research project: North Korea matters and 
the EU should not be content to stay in the back seat or, as former High Representative 
Javier Solana famously said, to be a payer and not a player. However, in order to be a 
player, the EU must first define a comprehensive, effective and satisfactory policy, 
ideally aligned with all its core interests and principles but also with the interests of all 
affected stakeholders, including partners such as South Korea in its considerations.  
 
In order to study the chances that such a policy might be aligned both with internal and 
external preferences and views, a comprehensive research has been developed, using a 
dual approach combining qualitative and quantitative methodology that allowed the 
performance of rich analyses of the abundant data collected and the eventual 
combination of the key results to evaluate the degree of consensus and dissonance 
between and among the views expressed by the two sets of participants. 
 
As we have also extensively seen in this thesis, dealing with the North Korean regime 
seems as hard as ever, and any future engagement will be highly conditioned by an 
eventual improvement in the approach taken by the regime, both internally, vis-à-vis its 
blatant human rights violations, and externally, regarding its nuclear program and the 
threat it supposes not only to Northeast Asia’s stability but also for global proliferation.  
 
Moreover, as Berkofsky already argued back in 2009, it is probable that “despite the 
ongoing nuclear crisis, North Korea will continue to be nowhere near the top of the 
EU’s external relations agenda” and that, as a consequence, the EU “is very unlikely to 
increase the existing limited resources dedicated to deal with and work on North Korea 
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unless there emerges an inter-European political consensus to increase the EU’s 
economic and political engagement after the resolution of the nuclear crisis” 
(Berkofsky, 2009). 
 
However, as argued in Chapter 2, there are multiple and potent reasons for the EU to 
eventually try to pursue a gradual increase of its engagement in the Korean peninsula, 
ranging from the more pragmatic – such as its geostrategic and security relevance and 
the economic opportunities it can represent – to the political – including eventually 
improving relations with regional Strategic Partners such as South Korea and even 
China –, all without forgetting the ideational goals, with North Korea potentially 
offering a prime chance for the EU to actively promote its core values, enhance its 
visibility as benign power in the greater East Asia and, also importantly, to help erase 
doubts about the lack of coherence, proactivity and strategic vision of its foreign policy. 
 
As former Member of the European Parliament Glyn Ford asserted in his 2008 book on 
the DPRK, “to engage requires both a willingness to talk and a willingness to 
understand.” Therefore, before focusing on future engagement paths, Chapter 3 was 
devoted to understanding both the past and the present of bilateral EU-North Korea 
relations. After the drama of the 1990s and the well-intentioned rapprochement strategy 
attempted at the turn of the century by the EU, the chain of events leading to the current 
situation of extremely limited engagement shaped by an overarching sanctions regime is 
punctuated by highly provocative and defiant acts performed by North Korea, most 
importantly those related to the completion of a successful nuclear program that has 
deservedly turned Pyongyang into an international pariah. 
 
Consequently, one must not be surprised to see how current bilateral trade figures are 
utterly irrelevant for the EU, why EU businesses are reluctant to even consider investing 
in the DPRK or why political and human rights dialogues have so far failed to generate 
any results. Nevertheless, if the situation were bound to gradually improve, the EU 
should stand ready to define an effective, consensus-based policy focusing on issues and 
areas that were not only relevant in themselves but also to the Union as an international 
actor struggling to articulate a coherent foreign policy. 
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Unfortunately, the advance exploration of the eventual capacity to design a coherent, 
cohesive and consensus-based policy for engagement with North Korea, to which 
Chapter 4 was devoted, while partially confirming the initial hypothesis about 
divergence in views according to the nature of the actors, did not give us grounds to be 
overly optimistic. The scale of the divergences between the views expressed by the four 
interviewees leads us to the double conclusion that not only their answers were shaped 
both by their personal beliefs and inclinations and their respective professional profiles 
– in other words, a certain degree of dissonance that had to be expected – but also that, 
further from the often analyzed problems of horizontal and vertical coherence and 
cohesion, the sheer diversity of views that are brought together under the common roof 
of the European Union make it extremely difficult to formulate a cohesive and coherent 
approach towards foreign policy. 
 
Still, green shots such as the emphasis on effective and proactive multilateralism – a 
staple of the EU’s stated strategic choices for the 21st century – and the relative 
consensus on the current value and the feasibility of implementing programs in some 
cooperation areas – such as food aid and humanitarian assistance, trade relations, 
educational exchanges and cooperation in the protection of the environment – modulate 
the negative perceptions and have also important implications as an indicator of what 
kind of internal consensus the EU is ready to achieve: not perfect by any means, but 
also not non-existent. 
 
Of even more significance might be the relative consensus on the perceived will of the 
new North Korean government, led by young leader Kim Jong-un, to slowly initiate a 
reform and opening process partially based on that of China in the 1980s. The fact that 
EU stakeholders share this view is also important, as it could eventually become what 
we should label as some kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy”: growing international 
exposure could trigger domestic change (however slow), which may eventually create a 
new cognitive framework (both inside and outside North Korea), along with a wider 
change of policy preferences. 
 
Many more important conclusions can be drawn from the results of the quantitative 
analysis on Chapter 5, starting with the high degree of alignment between Korean 
university students’ preferences for eventual cooperation of their own country with 
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North Korea and those preferred for the case of a foreign force like the European Union. 
Despite the relatively higher concentration of preferences in the case of the Union and 
the very specific nature of the selected population, this finding can be especially 
relevant for EU decision makers aiming at designing a policy of engagement with North 
Korea that would also consider the interests expressed by the citizens of the EU’s most 
natural partner in the region, South Korea. If stated preferences for hypothetical South 
Korean engagement with North Korea can predict similar preferences for the case of the 
EU, results from similar future polls measuring items of this nature performed by South 
Korean research institutes and public authorities could be interpreted as also providing 
valuable information for the European Union. 
 
Additionally, the fact that a strong relationship has been found between the views of 
regional integration in Northeast Asia and those of the European Union presents an 
interesting situation in which promotion or advancements on one side could spill over to 
its counterpart. In other words, successful steps towards regional integration in 
Northeast Asia perceived as positive by the local population or elites could eventually 
mean greater support for the European Union as a key partner. Consequently, and also 
based on the results of this study, EU efforts at promoting regionalization in East Asia 
and its very own image in the region could very well be tied to promoting interpersonal 
and interinstitutional exchanges with the local populations, as having personal ties with 
European citizens and institutions has shown to remarkably increase positive 
perceptions of the EU. 
 
However, not all outcomes regarding the prospects for EU public diplomacy in the 
region were equally positive. In fact, what probably is the most serious, implication-
loaded conclusion that we can reach from this study is closely linked to the general lack 
of alignment between the preferences and views stated by South Korean students and 
those of the interviewed experts; more precisely, the complete dissonance in the 
perceptions of human rights promotion efforts by the EU.  
 
As we have seen, South Korean students put remarkable emphasis in the role the EU 
can play in promoting human rights in North Korea, choosing it as their preferred 
cooperation method for the EU vis-à-vis North Korea – even above food aid and 
humanitarian assistance. However, the interviewed experts were either neutral or openly 
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pessimistic about both the outcomes and effectiveness of EU-North Korea human rights 
dialogue and the real desire of the EU institutions, including the democratically-elected 
European Parliament, to actively promote human rights in North Korea and to exert 
pressure to the North Korean regime on this issue. 
 
This misalignment could prove to have serious consequences for EU foreign policy, as 
expectation gaps, if not addressed, can transform into perceptual changes, that can prove 
hard to revert and would definitely need more than shrewd public diplomacy to offset. 
And, as pointed out by Zhang (2010), “the international image of the European Union is 
significant for its projection of public diplomacy and for playing an essential role in 
international and regional politics.”  
 
As has been widely reported, the Common Foreign and Security Policy already suffers 
from widespread, hard to solve vertical and horizontal coherence problems, mostly due 
to the very nature of the European construct. If dissonance and ineffectiveness is added 
on yet another level, the Union risks losing the minds and hearts of those it wants to 
captivate with its unparalleled soft power. Effective public diplomacy should also entail 
discursive and operational coherence, and the pessimistic opinions on the real 
effectiveness – or even the desire – of the EU in promoting human rights and ideational 
values should not be taken lightly: the perception of expectation gaps in core stated 
values run the risk of severely challenging future EU credibility in perhaps the most 
economically dynamic region of our times. A merely declaratory “force for good” will 
not do the trick forever. 
 
Moreover, if the accusations levied by Mr. Hartong are true, European citizens should 
start to question the true role of their elected Parliament in Brussels, Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg. Within its very limited powers as regard the Union's foreign action, the 
Parliament still has the prerogative of inquiry and other tools (such as, in this case, the 
trips to North Korea of the Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula) to 
defend the basic principles – which also double as the values that should guide EU 
foreign policy – enshrined in and transformed into law by virtue of the Treaty of the 
European Union. Failing to do so on a consistent manner and for sheer carelessness, as 
implied by Mr. Hartong’s words, should entail political responsibilities for which 
Members of the European Parliament should respond. 
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The only positive reading we can make from this particular issue is that the strongest 
endorsement of EU values came precisely from the two actors directly working inside 
the European bureaucratic system, the diplomat and the Member of the European 
Parliament, who also strongly criticized the institution in which he works and the EU in 
general as not truly standing up to its principles of promotion and defense of universal 
values. As already argued in Chapter 4, their pessimism on this issue should be ascribed 
to their deep personal trust in such values, as in the case of the MEP, or considered a 
representation of the perceived views of the EU, as in the case of the senior diplomat.  
 
Consequently, the fact that relevant individuals within the European bureaucratic 
apparatus still show they loyalty to these principles and voice their concern and 
frustration when experiencing their disregard or lack of effective transmission provides 
an explanation as to why the Union still enjoys the image of beacon of democracy and 
human rights among most global publics if internal dissonance and projection 
ineffectiveness are higher than desired. 
 
An additional consideration about the role the EU could and should play in Korea must 
be pointed out. If the EU wants to be taken seriously as political and security actor in 
the Korean Peninsula, it is advised to specify what role it seeks to assume in North 
Korea in the future, i.e. after the eventual resolution of the nuclear crisis, or even the 
expected economic aperture of the regime.  
 
So far, and in line with the results of this thesis, there seems to be no clear political or 
strategic line defining the steps the EU could or should take in its engagement with the 
Korean peninsula beyond boosting lucrative trade relations with Seoul. Despite their 
disparate professional backgrounds and specializations, the lack of consensus in the 
discourses of the four selected EU stakeholders, all demonstrating ample knowledge of 
EU-Korea relations, should serve as wake-up call for EU policymakers and decision 
makers if they truly want the EU to increase its influence in the troubled but bustling 
Northeast Asia region.94 
                                                            
94 Along these same lines, the results obtained and conclusions reached in this thesis could be 
complemented by further research on the reasons behind the lack of a coherent, strategic and effective EU 
foreign policy. This should also take into account the particularities of the foreign policies of EU Member 
States and how they intermesh with common European goals, priorities and stated policies. 
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And there might be no better time to put words into practice than the next few months. 
The aftermath of the presidential elections in the U.S. and South Korea in December 
2012 offers a window of opportunity for the resumption of a more constructive dialogue 
and an attempt to revive the spirit of the inter-Korean 2001 June 15 Declaration and its 
plan to work towards a confederation that would allow for the two political systems to 
coexist. Moreover, the leadership change in the North might also be a good opportunity 
to restore human rights dialogue. 
 
The North Korean leadership faces a fundamental reform dilemma: it needs to open up 
the economy to survive, but in the process of opening up, a spiral of expectations and 
forces for change could be unleashed and end with the regime’s demise (Cha, 2012). In 
fact, the overturning of systems like North Korea’s occur not when things are at their 
absolute worst, but when they begin to get better: when an important part of the 
population stops worrying about dire survival, rising expectations are funneled towards 
popular demands and, eventually, insurrection. 
 
As Berkofsky asserted, also back in 2009, there may be a role for the EU to play beyond 
picking up the bill. North Korea clearly perceives Europe as a separate actor from the 
U.S., with the potential to play its part in a multi-polar world, be it the part of a bridge 
or that of a catalyst. 
 
The EU remains a viable candidate for playing a larger, more effective role in the inter-
Korean reconciliation process, the resolution of the nuclear crisis and the improvement 
of the human rights situation. To do so, it needs wider multilateral political consensus 
and a verifiable willingness to change among the North Korean elites, but also the 
political will and vision to rise up to the challenge.  
 
Brussels decision- and policy-makers must be conscious of the EU’s major advantage in 
engaging with North Korea, one that its Strategic Partners in the region do not share: 
credibility. Even if Pyongyang is a profoundly objectionable regime, it gets the 
European Union nowhere to repeat it as if it was some kind of mantra instead of 
engaging and trying to foster internal change. The alternative was conveniently 
summarized by the European diplomat this researcher interviewed a few months ago in 
Seoul: “As the North Korean regime muddles through, everyone will muddle through.”
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Appendices 
 
I.  Questionnaire used in the interviews conducted in person 
 
The sanctions regime 
‐ In order for EU sanctions on North Korea to be suspended, should the North 
Korean regime firmly move towards denuclearization, or could we envision a 
nuclear-armed North Korea being reaccepted into the international community if 
it inverts its belligerent discourse and progressively opens up its economy? I 
base my assumption on the example of Pakistan, a non-signatory of the NPT 
which developed nuclear capability in a high-tension region of the world during 
a period of military rule but is still a major recipient of (U.S.) aid and bears 
neither UN nor EU sanctions. 
‐ According to scholar Leonid Petrov, although North Koreans see Europe as a 
valuable alternative to the US in politics, trade, and security – meaning that the 
EU can play a very positive role in helping North Korea through economic 
cooperation and training programs – the EU will have to remain in a wait-and-
see mode waiting for North Korea to denuclearize verifiably and for good to lift 
any sanctions. However, Axel Berkofsky (2009) suggests that “The EU could 
have continued its economic engagement towards North Korea in spite of the 
nuclear revelations offering North Korea and the international community an 
alternative approach of how to deal with a failing state on the brink of going 
nuclear”. Which one you consider the most accurate assessment, from the 
EU/EC/EEAS point of view? And personally? 
‐ Do you think the EU could eventually rescind part of its sanctions regarding the 
North Korean regime unilaterally (i.e. independently of the UN and the U.S.), 
only with the support of South Korea (and, admittedly, China), to advocate for a 
conditional engagement (i.e. based upon positive conditionality and local 
ownership) and promote an alternative way of fostering development and change 
in North Korea, also considering that the relevant regional partners do not see 
the EU as a crucial entity towards solving hard security issues? 
‐ According to several scholars, the suspension and termination of the early 2000s 
cooperation programs means that Brussels should have to start from scratch 
engaging North Korea economically, should the Commission one day decide to 
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resume extended engagement with the DPRK. Moreover, according to those 
same scholars, there are currently no indications that Brussels is planning to 
draft and adopt a new North Korea Country Strategy Paper as the basis and 
framework for an engagement course.  Can you corroborate this assessment, or 
do you think that many elements of the previous plans could/will eventually be 
refitted? 
 
Visions on denuclearization and opening up of the North Korean regime 
‐ Back in 2001-2002, when EU-North Korea cooperation was at a higher point 
than it is right now, EU policy-makers and officials stressed that their “quiet 
diplomacy” approach was based upon policies and initiatives that would 
“complement” South Korea’s DPRK policy. Obviously enough, North Korea’s 
acquisition of nuclear capabilities clouded any such outlook. However, can you 
foresee a similar approach in the short- or mid-term? 
‐ After a rather promising start to the Kim Jong-un era, with the Leap Day 
agreement reached with the U.S., the failed launch of a long-range missile 
(camouflaged as a space rocket) and recent unusually scaled-up anti-ROK 
rhetoric have put the international community back at the defensive (no aid, 
tighter sanctions). What are your personal views about Kim Jong-un and the new 
ruling elite in North Korea? Might a progressive opening-up be in their plans? Is 
North Korea rapidly becoming a Chinese puppet (albeit unruly) state? 
‐ Can you see the EU taking a more active role mediating in East Asian conflicts 
in the future (e.g. North Korea, South China Sea, etc.)? It should be pointed out 
that inactivity should be considered to go against the Guidelines on the EU’s 
foreign and security policy in East Asia, as North Korea defies all the security 
goals stated by the EU (Section II.2). 
‐ As Daewoon Ohn points out in a 2009 paper, in case of a sudden destabilization 
of the North Korean regime, the EU might initiate civilian and even military 
support missions for the restoration of peace and stability, in conjunction with 
and with the approval of its strategic partners in the area (namely China, South 
Korea, Japan and the U.S.). Can you foresee such interventions?  
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The European values 
‐ Lee (2012) points out that “institutionalized contact and economic aid to North 
Korea are motivated not by strategic ambition or economic interests but as a 
manifestation of moral traits that the EU has embraced to develop.” Would you 
agree with this assessment? 
‐ Do ideational factors (e.g. the genuine belief in democracy and human rights of 
European society as a whole and its promotion by the EU) play a major role in 
the relations with North Korea, or does the EU rather adopt a more pragmatic 
and rationalist approach towards relations with the DPRK (at least for the time 
being, given than human rights and political dialogue were abandoned)? 
 
 
Development cooperation 
a) Humanitarian and food aid 
‐ Back in 2008, the EU maintained that North Korea’s current humanitarian and 
food situation did not require additional large-scale food aid, so the 
Commission’s DG ECHO effectively closed its Pyongyang office in May of that 
year. However, the assessment seemed to change in 2011, backed by relevant 
UN data, and new formulas of engagement in the field of humanitarian aid were 
reportedly explored (Wissenbach, 2011). Could you elaborate on those aspects? 
Have there been any improvements in the field? Could DG ECHO become 
active again in North Korea? 
‐ According to information from 2009, EuropeAid had one officer in North Korea 
and worked with six NGOs in the ground, providing limited technical aid in 
building resilience in farms, self-sustainability and environmental management 
education, apart from providing direct aid in the form of fertilizers and farming 
equipment. However, the budget for such actions corresponded to the period 
2007-2010. Was it renewed under similar conditions? 
‐ Also back in 2008, the European Commission asserted that, even if no 
development aid would be offered, limited technical and humanitarian assistance 
would be available no matter the political situation in North Korea, and that it 
would also be ready to intervene if natural disasters or widespread famine struck 
again. (Barabesi, 2008). Do these words still hold full validity? 
140 
 
‐ Do the perceived insufficient capabilities to monitor and supervise the 
distribution of funds and implementation of humanitarian (and technical) 
assistance projects on the ground by the European Commission play a role in the 
limited humanitarian aid that is being dispensed to North Korea? 
‐ The nuclear issues (among others) have been a major impediment to the EU’s 
attempt to help North Korea in humanitarian terms. However, the EU has been 
among the largest and most consistent donors of assistance to alleviate the 
humanitarian consequences of the economic crisis in North Korea (Lee, 2012). 
In fact, despite aid being cut off by other partners such as the U.S. (already after 
2002), Japan (after 2006, when the issue of kidnapped Japanese nationals 
surfaced, together with a first nuclear test by North Korea) and South Korea 
(since Lee Myung-bak won the 2008 presidential elections), the EU has 
maintained a relative amount of (indirect) aid provision to North Korea. Can we 
anticipate this trend to continue (or even be reinforced) in the future, even if 
North Korea’s international behavior holds the current, threatening line? 
‐ “Considering the limited amounts of international assistance that are provided 
and the limited number of development assistance partners in the country, a 
great opportunity exists to create an efficient system for donor coordination.” 
This sentence, extracted from the Myanmar Strategy Paper, could maybe also be 
applied to the case of North Korea. Could it be a good way to move forward 
with making EU aid to North Korea more effective? 
‐ Is there any chance the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities thematic 
programme (NSA/LA) – which specifically finances measures to strengthen the 
capacity of non-state actors to deliver services in partnership with local 
authorities – could also be applied to North Korea in the short or mid-term? 
 
b) Energy assistance 
‐ According to EU policy-makers back in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, EU 
involvement in KEDO helped make this initiative “more credible” (Berkofsky, 
2003). However, the project was abruptly interrupted when North Korea 
withdrew from the NPT in January 2003 and detonated a first nuclear device in 
2006. Do you think the EU would consider participating actively in any future 
multilateral structure to provide energy assistance to the DPRK? 
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‐ As the KEDO project also demonstrated, provision of heavy fuel oil and the 
always contested project to provide Pyongyang with light water nuclear reactors, 
assistance based on conventional energy sources might yield sub-optimal results. 
Therefore, several research papers (mostly focused on ROK-DPRK cooperation, 
but also applicable to other partners) have suggested focusing instead on 
renewable energies, chiefly solar panels and wind turbines. Indeed, some minor 
projects with external funds have already been developed. Would the EU 
consider funding any such projects (or larger scale ones), other conditions 
permitting? 
 
c) Trade relations and capability building and economic reforms 
‐ Recent South Korean estimates have put the value of North Korea’s mineral 
resources at over $6 trillion (Abrahamian & See, 2012). North Korea is rich in 
coal, iron ore, gold ore and copper ore, among others. Despite recent minor 
legislative changes in laws governing foreign investment, only Chinese 
companies seem to profit from the opportunities offered by North Korea. Do you 
know of any European mining company that might have interest in developing a 
project in North Korea? Could such an approach be discouraged by the EU/EC? 
‐ There are a relative small number of North Korean-European joint ventures in 
the fields of pharmaceutics, food and beverages, as well as some North Korean 
textile factories producing for European customers. In a recent interview, KFA 
President Alejandro Cao de Benós asserted that several European companies 
contacted him every year to set up businesses in North Korea. Does the EU 
indirectly assist in any of these commercial operations? Do you foresee any 
increase in the number of joint ventures between European and North Korean 
companies? 
‐ According to Lee (2009), the European Union Chamber of Commerce in Korea 
established a North Korea Committee in 1996 and, by 2001, it was providing 
investment information to help the EU companies branch out into North Korea, 
acting as a bridge to help European entrepreneurs visit North Korea as a 
delegation of the EUCCK and contact with businessmen and bureaucrats of the 
DPRK. Moreover, a European Business Association Pyongyang was founded in 
2004. Do these organisms still exist and/or work actively?  
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‐ As Berkofsky suggested, the EU could continue to promote economic reform in 
North Korea though existing institutional links and exchanges, especially 
involving the European Parliament. That was back in 2009, when former MEP 
Glyn Ford led the way. Do you still think this could be a valuable approach? 
‐ Do you believe an approach similar to Vietnam's doi moi (progressive aperture) 
policy would be effective in North Korea, or is it already too dependent on 
China (and Chinese foreign direct investment) and, therefore, any economic 
apertures will be modeled and directed by China? 
 
d) Technical assistance, incl. environmental protection/education 
‐ The Regional Programming for Asia 2007-2013 is due for an update next year, 
in line with the new multiannual financial framework for the period 2014-2020. 
Do you foresee any major changes in the document itself and the regional 
programmes? We already guess that budgets won't be increased, but its 
allocation can vary (i.e. China and India will no longer benefit of the EU's 
development cooperation funds), and the food situation in North Korea is dire, 
according to the latest UN report. 
‐ Given that a) the Commission is still offering some very limited technical 
assistance to North Korea; b) the provision of technical assistance might be an 
optimal way to differentiate the EU from other international actors; c) it would 
be fully in line with EU soft power policies aimed at winning the hearts and 
minds of the beneficiary populations (also helped by the fact that the North 
Korean propaganda apparatus does not disseminate harsh anti-EU rhetoric); and 
d) it would also reorient EU assistance towards a more proactive approach (a 
desirable change, as stated in other relevant Strategy Papers, such as 
Myanmar’s), could a budget line dedicated to technical assistance to North 
Korea, along the lines of what was allocated in the 2002 Country Strategy Paper, 
eventually be revived? 
‐ In a more precise note, building capacity in disaster management and risk 
reduction could be a productive and non-controversial field for cooperation. 
Would that be a cooperation area the EU might consider? 
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e) Educational and cultural exchanges 
‐ North Korea is part of the Erasmus Mundus program, which sponsors student 
and scholar exchanges between the EU and third parties. Are there any plans to 
expand current cooperation levels in the educational exchange field? 
‐ Also in the field of education, could aid in building a high performance research 
and education network connection to support science and technology be a 
possible way to bolster EU-DPRK relations? According to Na (2009), this 
politically non-controversial area could enable North Korea to accumulate 
academic capacities (leading to economic development), foster the creation of 
epistemic communities and even influence policy-making processes, while 
raising the exposure of some citizens to the outside world. 
 
Political and human rights dialogue 
‐ According to the Council Guidelines on Foreign and Security Policy in East 
Asia, the EU should build up dialogue with the Republic of Korea on the issue 
of the broader stability of the Korean Peninsula, on humanitarian assistance to 
the DPRK and on human rights and practical areas in which the EU could 
provide assistance. Along the same line, the recent EU-ROK summit included a 
section devoted to political dialogue on regional issues, including the situation 
on the Korean Peninsula. Can we highlight any aspects of this dialogue? Can we 
extract any conclusions? Were the EU and South Korea on the same page? Were 
any proposals made? 
‐ Human rights dialogue (within political dialogue) was considered a staple 
element of EU attempts at engagement with North Korea between 1998 and 
2002, before being suspended due to lack of visible progress and to the 
continued provocations of the North Korean regime. Is there any realistic chance 
that attempts to establish productive bilateral dialogue on human rights issues 
with North Korea are pursued by the EU, or will it rather keep exclusively using 
the instruments of the UN system to approach North Korea’s human rights 
issues?  
‐ In a related tone, do you think human rights dialogue with repressive 
dictatorships is useful? Several scholars, commentators and even EU insiders 
have criticized such initiatives by the Commission for their lack of transparency, 
benchmarks and structure (Barabesi, 2008). 
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‐ EU-DPRK political dialogue was resumed in 2007 and held again in 2009, and 
the EU used it to voice its concern with the human rights situation and the 
denuclearization issue. However, DPRK engagement and dialogue with other 
powers other than China was at an all-time low since the 2009 and 2010 
provocations, until the Obama administration tried to engage them since July 
2011, a rapprochement that concluded with the (now stalled) Leap Day 
agreement. Does the EU have any plans to reinstate bilateral dialogue in the near 
future? 
‐ What about multilateral political dialogue via ASEM or with a renewed formula 
of the original 6-Party Talks (Six + EU dialogue)? Could it be effective to put 
extra pressure on the North Korean regime? 
 
South Korea and engagement opportunities 
‐ Do you think the Presidential Elections that will take place in November in 
South Korea will be important for any hypothetical engagement with North 
Korea? North Korean discourse towards current President Lee Myung-bak has, 
if anything, shown ever increased belligerence, so things could change from the 
perspective of the Kim regime come December. 
‐ According to some policy analysts, anyone taking the place of Lee Myung-bak 
at the Blue House will probably show more willingness to engage and dialogue 
with North Korea. However, nobody can envision even a partial return to Kim 
Dae-jung era policies. Does also the EU – and its Delegation in Seoul – perceive 
that all potential presidential candidates share a certain view (i.e. supporting 
moderate and cautious engagement) regarding North Korea? 
‐ Do you think that any proposal of further engagement with North Korea coming 
from the EU might clash with South Korean public opinion and, therefore, 
damage the image of the Union here? Or rather that positive conditional 
engagement proposals might be backed by a majority of South Koreans and thus 
bolster the perception of the Union as a reliable, innovative and powerful force 
for peace? 
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Reunification 
‐ In its DPRK Country Report (2002), the Commission stated the EU’s 
commitment to the inter-Korean reconciliation process. Would the EU 
nowadays support a (re)unification process of the two Koreas? If so, would it be 
ready to provide expertise and know-how based on the German model, while 
helping both parties avoid some of the mistakes made during the German 
reunification (chiefly the deficiencies of the Modrow plan or the relative 
mishandling of privatization processes by the Treuhandstalt, that proved unable 
to extirpate the control of many SOEs from the hands of former Communist 
bureaucrats and managers)? 
‐ Is there any mainstream EU-view concerning Korean reunification? Is it 
supported or frowned upon, as it would be for relevant regional actors such as 
China and Russia (both key partners of the EU)? Would the EU apply political 
pressure either to South Korea or to North Korea to move towards reunification? 
‐ Do you think changing the terminology (i.e. the term “unification”) to address 
the issue and recovering Kim Dae-jung’s reassuring proposal of progressive and 
constructive engagement would help desecuritize inter-Korean relations and, 
more importantly, the sense of vulnerability felt by the North? 
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II. Questionnaire sent to Members of the European Parliament Delegation for 
Relations with the Korean Peninsula 
 
Political issues and the role of the European Parliament 
Q: A European Parliament delegation visits North Korea almost once a year. Could you 
briefly explain the work done during those trips? Is there any visible progress in terms 
of mutual understanding that could fuel further cooperation and engagement? 
A: 
 
Q: Despite the numerous setbacks, EU-DPRK political dialogue has been a staple of 
bilateral relations since its establishment in 1998. Do you believe political and 
diplomatic relations between the EU and North Korea can and/or should be 
strengthened? Do you perceive a sincere willingness to improve political cooperation 
among your North Korean counterparts? 
A: 
 
Q: Thanks to pressure from the European Parliament, human rights dialogue was 
considered a key element of EU attempts at engagement with North Korea between 
1999 and 2002, before being suspended due to lack of visible progress and to the 
continued provocations of the North Korean regime. Is there any realistic chance that 
the reestablishment of bilateral human rights dialogue with Pyongyang is pursued by the 
EU, or will it rather keep exclusively using the instruments of the UN system to 
approach North Korea’s human rights issues? 
A: 
 
Economic issues 
Q: In a rare interview, Yang Hyong-sop, vice chairman of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly and a member of the politburo of the Workers’ Party, said that Kim Jong-eun 
is studying cases of economic reform in other nations, including China, envisaging a 
“knowledge-based” economy. During the Kim Jong-il era, it was a very dangerous thing 
for any power elite to mention reform or openness in public. Do you believe the young 
leader will undertake some kind of low-level aperture, give greater autonomy to state 
firms and increase the number of special economic zones, even if reforms fall short of 
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Chinese-style market economy? If so, what timeframe should be expected for such 
reforms to materialize? 
A: 
 
Q: There is speculation that Kim Jong-un might introduce modest economic reforms in 
the short-to-mid term, including the reestablishment and strengthening of currently 
designated Special Economic Zones at Raseon/Ranjin and Sinuiju/Hwanggumpyong, 
together with the successful Kaesong Industrial Zone, monopolized by South Korean 
companies and currently expanding in both size and production. As renowned scholar 
Andrei Lankov points out, SEZs are acceptable to the North Korean government 
because they are relatively easy to control. Do you foresee EU companies playing an 
active role in any future SEZ developments? 
A: 
 
Q: As suggested by Berkofsky in 2009, in addition to political dialogue, the EU should 
continue to promote economic reform in North Korea though existing institutional links 
and exchanges, especially involving the European Parliament. Do you still think 
fostering trade relations and capability building could be seen as a valuable approach? 
A: 
 
Nuclear proliferation and the sanctions regime 
Q: Diplomatic sources consulted by this researcher asserted that nuclear weapons are 
considered the regime’s only guarantee for survival, as well as a powerful deterrent, 
bargaining chip and status symbol. Moreover, as former MEP Glyn Ford states in his 
2008 book North Korea on the Brink, recent non-proliferation agreements (namely 
those of Libya and Ukraine) would not work for the North Korean case, as Pyongyang’s 
economic and security needs are remarkably different. Therefore, the North Korean 
regime would only consider denuclearization if “impossible” concessions were made: 
total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korean soil and reunification as equals with South 
Korea. Considering this information and the recent enshrinement of North Korea as a 
nuclear armed power in its revamped Constitution, do you think North Korean 
denuclearization is still possible?  
A:  
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Q: In order for EU sanctions on North Korea to be suspended, should the North Korean 
regime firmly move towards denuclearization, or could we envision a nuclear-armed 
North Korea being reaccepted into the international community if it changes its 
belligerent discourse – including a freeze in the uranium-enrichment program – and 
progressively opens up its economy? I base my assumption on the example of Pakistan, 
a non-signatory of the NPT which developed nuclear capability in a high-tension region 
of the world during a period of military rule but is still a major recipient of (U.S.) aid 
and bears neither UN nor EU sanctions. 
A: 
 
Q: Do you think the EU could eventually rescind part of its sanctions regarding the 
North Korean regime unilaterally (i.e. independently of the U.S.) or only with the 
support of South Korea (and, admittedly, China), to advocate for a conditional 
engagement (i.e. based upon positive conditionality and local ownership) and promote 
an alternative way of fostering development and change in North Korea, also 
considering that the relevant regional partners do not see the EU as a crucial entity 
towards solving hard security issues? 
A:  
 
EU active mediation/intervention 
Q: Do you envision the EU as having a proactive role encouraging greater regional 
cooperation and engagement with the North Korean regime? Could you foresee a 
favorable political climate among major stakeholders – attitude changes in the Kim 
Jong-un regime, a softer-line stance from the new South Korean president, renewed aim 
from the U.S. administration if Obama is reelected, etc. – in order for the EU to actively 
mediate and foster dialogue? 
A: 
 
Q: Answering a recent question by MEP Marina Yannakoudakis, High Representative 
Catherine Ashton asserted that despite not being directly involved in the Six Party 
Talks, the EEAS was working closely with its international partners towards a 
“complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” of North Korea’s nuclear 
program, adding that the issue was discussed in all political meetings with the EU’s 
strategic partners and also directly with North Korea. Do you think the Six Party Talks 
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are a useful instrument to achieve progress towards reducing tensions and enhancing 
cooperation in the Korean Peninsula? Do you believe the EU should ask for a seat in the 
negotiation table, as suggested by former MEP Glyn Ford in his 2008 book, or 
embracing the role of a credible neutral broker? 
A:  
 
Q: Back in 2008, the European Commission asserted that, even if no development aid 
would be offered, limited technical and humanitarian assistance would be available no 
matter the political situation in North Korea, and that it would also be ready to intervene 
if natural disasters or widespread famine struck again. Do these words still hold full 
validity? 
A:  
 
Q: As South Korean scholar Daewoon Ohn points out in a 2009 paper, in case of a 
sudden destabilization of the North Korean regime, the EU might initiate civilian and 
even military support missions for the restoration of peace and stability, in conjunction 
with and with the approval of its strategic partners in the area (namely China, South 
Korea, Japan and the U.S.). Can you foresee such interventions? 
A: 
 
EU policies towards North Korea and their implications 
Q: In its DPRK Country Report (2002), the Commission stated the EU’s commitment 
to the inter-Korean reconciliation process. Would the EU still support a (re)unification 
process of the two Koreas, even if viewed reluctantly from Beijing and Moscow? If so, 
would it be ready to provide expertise and know-how based on the German case? 
A:  
 
Q: According to most analysts, the next South Korean president will most probably take 
a softer stance vis-à-vis North Korea than current president Lee Myung-bak. Would the 
European Parliament favor a less hostile official South Korean approach towards the 
North Korean regime? Would that also affect EU-North Korea relations? Would a 
return to an updated, upgraded, probably less naïve "Sunshine Policy" be welcomed by 
the European Union? 
A:  
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Q: Do you think that any proposal of further engagement with North Korea coming 
from the EU might clash with South Korean public opinion and, therefore, damage the 
image of the Union here, or rather bolster the perception of the Union as a reliable, 
innovative and powerful force for peace? 
A:  
 
Q: Should ideational factors (e.g. the genuine belief in democracy and human rights of 
European society as a whole and its promotion by the EU) play a greater role in the 
relations with North Korea, or should the EU rather adopt a more pragmatic and 
rationalist approach towards relations with the DPRK (at least for the time being, given 
than human rights and political dialogue were abandoned)? 
A:  
 
Possible cooperation avenues moving forward 
Q: Nuclear proliferation and human rights violations have been a major impediment to 
the EU’s attempts to help North Korea in humanitarian terms. However, the EU has 
been among the largest and most consistent donors of assistance to alleviate the 
humanitarian consequences of the economic crisis in North Korea. A few months ago, 
coinciding with the failed launch of a rocket by the Pyongyang regime, MEP Anna 
Rosbach, Vice-chairman of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the 
Korean Peninsula suggested that the EU immediately stop all funding and aid to North 
Korea, including food aid. What should we expect as far as aid is concerned if North 
Korea’s threatening diplomatic stance does not change? 
A: 
 
Q: Given that i) the Commission is still offering some very limited technical assistance 
to North Korea; ii) the provision of technical assistance might be an optimal way to 
differentiate the EU from other international actors; iii) it would be fully in line with EU 
soft power policies aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the beneficiary 
populations (also helped by the fact that the North Korean propaganda apparatus does 
not disseminate harsh anti-EU rhetoric); and iv) it would also reorient EU assistance 
towards a more proactive approach (a desirable change, as stated in other relevant 
Strategy Papers, such as Myanmar’s), could a budget line dedicated to technical 
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assistance to North Korea, along the lines of what was allocated in the 2002 Country 
Strategy Paper, eventually be revived? 
A:  
 
Q: How would you see any plans to expand current EU-North Korea cooperation levels 
in the educational and culture fields – i.e. by increasing the number of academic 
exchanges, fostering the learning of European languages or helping establish joint 
research networks? Should it be considered a priority? 
A:  
 
Q: Do you think the EU would consider participating actively in any future multilateral 
structure to provide energy assistance – similar to the failed KEDO project or otherwise 
– to the DPRK? In a related note, several research papers have suggested focusing 
assistance on renewable energies, chiefly solar panels and wind turbines, and some 
minor projects with external funds have already been developed. Should the EU 
consider funding any such projects, political and economic conditions permitting, or 
should this task be left to economically dynamic neighbors China and South Korea? 
A:  
 
Q: Should the EU prioritize providing environmental protection assistance to North 
Korea, in what could be seen as a win-win situation, both for its positive transnational 
implications and its low political risk? In a related note, building capacity in disaster 
management and risk reduction could also be a productive and non-controversial field 
for cooperation. Should that be a cooperation area the EU might as well consider? 
A: 
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III. Questionnaire sent to representatives of European Non-Profit 
Organizations working in the field in North Korea 
 
Q: Could you please summarize the key aspects and main focus of the work your 
foundation carries out in North Korea in one paragraph? 
A: 
 
Q: Related to your work in North Korea, which is the current role of the EU/EC/EEAS 
consultant office in Pyongyang? Does it allow contractors to have direct contact with 
North Korean top officials? Could you envisage an expansion of its role and scope? 
A: 
 
Q: Representing a German foundation with unambiguous political ties and being able to 
work on the ground in North Korea, do you believe the German Ostpolitik and 
reunification experience could successfully be exported to the North Korean case, or at 
least be partially applied? 
A: 
 
Q: Do you believe the EU should pursue a more active negotiating or mediating role in 
the Korean Peninsula? Does your foundation (implicitly) support greater EU 
engagement further from purely humanitarian aid and development cooperation? 
A: 
 
Q: Do you think that any proposal of further engagement with North Korea coming 
from the EU might clash with South Korean public opinion and, therefore, damage the 
image of the Union here, or rather bolster the perception of the Union as a reliable, 
innovative and powerful force for peace? 
A:  
 
Q: According to most analysts, the next South Korean president will most probably take 
a softer stance vis-à-vis North Korea than current president Lee Myung-bak. Would 
your institution welcome a less hostile official South Korean approach towards the 
North Korean regime? Do you think this would positively affect your work and 
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engagement possibilities? Would a return to an updated, upgraded, probably less naïve 
"Sunshine Policy" be welcomed by your foundation? 
A:  
 
Q: In a rare interview, Yang Hyong-sop, vice chairman of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly and a member of the politburo of the Workers’ Party, said that Kim Jong-eun 
is studying cases of economic reform in other nations, including China, envisaging a 
“knowledge-based” economy. During the Kim Jong-il era, it was a very dangerous thing 
for any power elite to mention reform or openness in public. Do you believe the young 
leader will undertake some kind of low-level aperture, give greater autonomy to state 
firms and increase the number of special economic zones, even if reforms fall short of 
Chinese-style market economy? If so, what timeframe should be expected for such 
reforms to materialize? 
A: 
 
Q: Nuclear proliferation and human rights violations have been a major impediment to 
the EU’s attempts to help North Korea in humanitarian terms. However, the EU has 
been among the largest and most consistent donors of assistance to alleviate the 
humanitarian consequences of the economic crisis in North Korea. Can we anticipate 
this trend to continue in the future, even if North Korea’s threatening diplomatic stance 
does not change? 
A: 
 
Q: As suggested by Berkofsky in 2009, in addition to political dialogue, the EU should 
continue to promote economic reform in North Korea though existing institutional links 
and exchanges, especially involving the European Parliament. Do you still think 
fostering trade relations and capability building could be seen as a valuable approach? 
A: 
 
Q: How would you see any plans to expand current EU-North Korea cooperation levels 
in the educational and culture fields – i.e. by increasing the number of academic 
exchanges, fostering the learning of European languages or helping establish joint 
research networks? Would you consider it a priority? 
A:  
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Q: Several research papers have suggested focusing assistance on renewable energies, 
chiefly solar panels and wind turbines, and some minor projects with external funds 
have already been developed. Should the EU consider funding any such projects, or 
should this task be left to economically dynamic neighbors China and South Korea and 
any relevant Asian non-profits and companies? 
A:  
 
Q: Should the EU prioritize providing funds for environmental protection assistance to 
North Korea, in what could be seen as a win-win situation, both for its positive 
transnational implications and its low political risk? In a related note, building capacity 
in disaster management and risk reduction could also be a productive and non-
controversial field for cooperation. Should that be a cooperation area the EU might as 
well consider for its partners on the field to implement? 
A: 
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IV. Survey questionnaire used for the quantitative analysis 
 
This is a survey to assess your opinions about some issues regarding North 
Korea. It is not a knowledge test, but simply asks for your opinions. There 
are no correct or incorrect answers. If you are not sure of an answer, just 
take your best guess. Unless the contrary is indicated, only one answer has 
to be given for each question. This survey is anonymous. Participation is 
voluntary. Your answers to the following questions are highly appreciated. 
Thank you!  
 
Would you personally favor reunification with North Korea? 
 Yes, definitely: Korea should be one country. 
 Not really: it would be socially and financially painful. 
 I don’t care / I don’t know. 
 
Do you think Korean reunification will take place within the next 25 years? 
 Yes, I am pretty sure it will. 
 I can’t really say. 
 No, I don’t think so. 
 
A sudden collapse of the North Korean regime would put South Korea’s 
security at risk. Do you agree with this statement? 
 I completely agree. 
 I agree somewhat. 
 I neither agree nor disagree. 
 I disagree somewhat. 
 I completely disagree. 
Which candidate or party do you favor towards the Presidential election 
that will be held in South Korea next November? 
 Park Geun-hye or any Saenuri Party candidate 
 Moon Jae-in or any Democratic United Party candidate 
 Ahn Cheol-soo or any other independent candidate 
 Still undecided 
 Not interested in politics 
 
Do you approve of the current South Korean government policies towards 
North Korea? 
 No, they should be tougher. 
 Yes, they are just about right. 
 No, dialogue and cooperation should be fostered. 
 
In case the South Korean government decided that greater cooperation with 
North Korea was needed, which priority areas would you consider the most 
beneficial? Please choose maximum 2 of the following.  
 Academic and cultural exchanges 
 Energy assistance 
 Environmental protection programs 
 Food aid and humanitarian assistance 
 Human rights and political dialogue 
 Trade relations and capability building 
 Other (please specify in English – thank you!)  
_______________________ 
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Which international partners you consider more important for South Korea 
right now? Please choose the 2 most important partners in your view. 
 China 
 European Union 
 Japan 
 Latin America 
 Russia 
 United States  
 Other (please specify in English – thank you!)  
________________________ 
 
Which international partners you think will be more important for South 
Korea by 2040? Please choose 2 of the following options. 
 China 
 European Union 
 Japan 
 Latin America 
 Russia 
 United States 
 Other (please specify in English – thank you!)  
________________________ 
Which of these powers could be more important to improve North 
Korea-South Korea relations? Please choose 2 of the given options. 
 China 
 European Union 
 Japan 
 Latin America 
 Russia 
 United States 
 Other (please specify in English – thank you!)  -
_______________________ 
 
Greater regional integration – in the lines of ASEAN or the EU – would be 
positive for Korea and Northeast Asia. Do you agree with this statement? 
 Completely agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Completely disagree 
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How is your perception of the European Union? 
 Very positive 
 Somewhat positive 
 Neither positive nor negative 
 Somewhat negative 
 Very negative 
 
The European Union should intervene directly – by sending military 
personnel, civilian experts and/or emergency aid – in case of a sudden 
collapse of the North Korean regime. Do you agree with this statement? 
 Completely agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Completely disagree 
 
In case the European Union decided to strengthen its cooperation and 
engagement with North Korea, do you think it would affect EU-South 
Korea relations? 
 Yes, it would have a positive influence. 
 Yes, it would influence them negatively. 
 No, it would not matter. 
Do you believe deeper EU engagement with North Korea would help 
improve the security level in the Korean Peninsula? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
 
 
The EU should cancel some of the sanctions it applies to North Korea and 
advance cooperation even if the regime does not give clear signals of 
abandoning its nuclear program. Do you agree with this statement? 
 Completely agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Completely disagree 
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If the European Union decided to increase its cooperation with North 
Korea, which areas should be given priority? Please choose maximum 2 of 
the following. 
 Academic and cultural exchanges 
 Energy assistance 
 Environmental protection programs 
 Food aid and humanitarian assistance 
 Human rights and political dialogue 
 Trade relations and capability building 
 Other (please specify in English – thank you!)  
_______________________ 
 
Do you have any personal and/or academic connections with EU citizens 
and/or institutions? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Could you please indicate your gender? 
 Female 
 Male 
 
 
When were you born? 
 In 1989 or later 
 Between 1988 and 1984 
 In 1983 or earlier 
 
What type of academic degree are you currently pursuing? 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Ph.D. 
 
Which knowledge field do your current studies belong to? 
 Pure, applied and life sciences (engineering, medicine, etc.) 
 Social sciences (excluding law and business)  
 Humanities (languages, teaching, etc.) 
 Law and/or business 
 
Could you please indicate the yearly income of your household? 
 Under 40 million KRW per year 
 Between 40 and 80 million KRW per year 
 Over 80 million KRW per year 
 Don’t know / I’d rather not say 
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